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Selecting Scrutiny in Compelled-Speech 
Cases Involving Non-Commercial 
Expression: The Formulaic Landscape of 
a Strict Scrutiny World After Becerra and 
Janus, and a First Amendment Interests-
and-Values Alternative 
Clay Calvert* 
 
This Article examines how courts select the standard of  
scrutiny—strict, intermediate, or something akin to rational basis—
in compelled-speech disputes following the United States Supreme 
Court’s 2018 rulings in National Institute of Family and Life  
Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees. The compelled-speech doctrine 
provides individuals and entities with a qualified First Amend- 
ment right not to be forced by the government to convey messages 
under certain circumstances. This principle sometimes is referred  
to as an unenumerated First Amendment right not to speak.  
The Article concentrates on compelled-speech mandates involv- 
ing non-commercial expression in a factually eclectic collection  
of 2019 cases. Specifically, it focuses on the methodologies for  
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determining scrutiny and how, in turn, Becerra and Janus influ- 
ence those tacks. The right-not-to-speak cases addressed here  
concern the government requiring: (1) building owners to post small  
warning notices about a structure’s construction; (2) real-estate de-
velopers to either display or fund public-facing art; (3) newspapers 
to disclose facts online about buyers of political advertisements; (4) 
groups registering voters to give disclaimers to those with whom 
they interact; (5) registered sex offenders to display warning signs 
in front of their residences proximate to Halloween; and (6) busi-
ness operators to create expressive products (wedding invitations 
and videos) celebrating same-sex marital unions. Courts selected 
strict scrutiny in all but one of these diverse circumstances and  
often were influenced by Becerra and/or Janus in doing so, but was  
that rigorous standard appropriate? Does its application, in other 
words, amount to judicial overkill against the handiwork of law-
makers? The Article argues that if courts in some of these settings  
used a First Amendment interests-and-values approach for deter- 
mining scrutiny—a path favored by Justice Stephen Breyer—instead 
of a simplistic, long-standing formula pivoting on whether a law  
is content-based or content-neutral, then they might have deploy- 
ed a less stringent test that better balanced competing interests.  
The Article identifies five First Amendment interests and values for 
resolving scrutiny in a more nuanced fashion in future compelled-
speech disputes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Striving to foster awareness of earthquake risks, the City of  
Portland, Oregon, adopted laws in 2018 and 2019 affecting owners 
of unreinforced masonry buildings.1 The city has approximately 
1,600 of such structures.2 Unfortunately, Portland also “has about a  
 
1 Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1292 (D. Or. 2019); 
see also id. at 1306 (noting “Defendants’ stated interests in ‘building awareness of seismic 
risk’ and promoting public safety”). The 2019 ordinance replaced a prior one adopted in 
2018 that affected the owners of such structures. Id. at 1287–88. 
2 Elliot Njus, Portland Delays Earthquake Warning Sign Ordinance, OREGONIAN 
(Portland), Mar. 1, 2019, at A4. 
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one-in-four chance of suffering a major 8.0-or-greater earthquake  
in the next fifty years.”3 These edifices are unlikely to withstand  
such powerful seismic activity.4 Portland’s Bureau of Emergency  
Management warns that unreinforced masonry buildings create “a 
great risk for human injury, property damage, and loss of economic 
use after an earthquake.”5 
The 2019 ordinance, like its 2018 predecessor, required owners 
of these buildings to conspicuously post placards measuring eight-
by-ten inches on their exteriors near main entrances.6 The signs had 
to convey the following government-mandated message in at least 
fifty-point bold type: 
THIS IS AN UNREINFORCED MASONRY 
BUILDING. UNREINFORCED MASONRY 
BUILDINGS MAY BE UNSAFE IN THE EVENT 
OF A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE. P.C.C. [Portland 
City Code] 24.85.065.7 
Portland established definitions of both reinforced and  
unreinforced masonry.8 Buildings satisfying specific retrofitting 
 
3 Elliot Njus, Building Owners Seek to Block Warning Sign Ordinance Permanently, 
OREGONIAN (Portland), May 15, 2019, at A9 [hereinafter Building Owners]. For purposes 
of comparison, the Loma Prieta earthquake, which struck the San Francisco Bay Area in 
October 1989, killed sixty-seven people and caused more than $5 billion in damages, 
measured 6.9 on the Richter scale. See San Francisco Earthquake of 1989, HISTORY (Dec. 
18, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/natural-disasters-and-environment/1989-san-
francisco-earthquake [https://perma.cc/RH9P-4PX2]. 
4 Elliot Njus, Earthquake Warning Ordinance Spurs Lawsuit, OREGONIAN (Portland), 
Dec. 21, 2018, at A10. 
5 Why Are We Focusing on URMs?, PORTLAND BUREAU OF EMERGENCY MGMT., 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/pbem/77827 [https://perma.cc/RH9P-4PX2]. 
6 Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1288. 
7 Id. 
8 Specifically, Portland defined unreinforced masonry as: 
[A]dobe, burned clay, concrete or sand-lime brick, hollow clay or 
concrete block, hollow clay tile, rubble and cut stone and unburned 
clay masonry that does not satisfy the definition of reinforced 
masonry as defined herein. Plain unreinforced concrete shall not be 
considered unreinforced masonry for the purpose of this Chapter. 
PORTLAND CITY CODE § 24.85.020(Z) (2019),https://www.portlandoregon.gov/citycode/ 
article/745486 [https://perma.cc/E2PZ-YKR3]. It also defined reinforced masonry. 
PORTLAND CITY CODE § 24.85.020(W) (2019), https://www.portlandoregon.gov/ 
citycode/article/745486 [https://perma.cc/E2PZ-YKR3]. 
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safety and collapse-prevention standards were exempt from the 
placard ordinance.9 
The Masonry Building Owners of Oregon (“MBOO”), along 
with several other plaintiffs, sued Portland and its mayor, Ted 
Wheeler.10 They claimed the mandate violated their First Amend-
ment right of free speech.11 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued the 
ordinance compelled them to transmit a message they wished not to 
utter, thereby transgressing their unenumerated First Amendment 
right not to speak.12 The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that: 
[t]he forced speech mandates violate core First 
Amendment principles, by compelling targeted 
building owners to broadcast the City’s views and 
negative opinions about their buildings. The forced 
speech mandates violate the constitutional rights of 
 
9 Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1289. 
10 Id. at 1293–94. 
11 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that 
“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five 
years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties 
to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (finding “that freedom of speech and of the press—which are 
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the 
fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”). 
12 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2464 (2018) (holding that “measures compelling speech are at least as threatening” as those 
restricting “what can be said”); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 
47, 61 (2006) (“Some of this Court’s leading First Amendment precedents have established 
the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what 
they must say.”); Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985) (“We 
have…held that in some instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First 
Amendment as prohibitions on speech.”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) 
(“We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to 
refrain from speaking at all.”). See generally Genevieve Lakier, Not Such a Fixed Star 
After All: West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, and the Changing Meaning 
of the First Amendment Right Not to Speak, 13 FIU L. REV. 741 (2019) (tracing the 
evolution and changing conceptions of the right not to speak from its origins in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), through the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in National Institutes of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)). 
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Plaintiffs and other targeted building owners to de-
cide for themselves what to say and what not to say.13 
In terms of the ordinance’s practical impact, the placards might 
harm the financial interests of some of the buildings’ owners. That 
is because prospective tenants of these structures might be chary of 
renting space upon discovering their vulnerability to earthquakes.14 
Additionally, the monetary costs to retrofit a building to avoid the 
placard requirement are steep.15 In brief, the placard ordinance 
partly pitted Portland’s public safety and welfare concerns against 
the private fiscal interests of some of the city’s owners of unrein-
forced masonry buildings. 
The nuances, however, of the First Amendment right not to 
speak asserted by the MBOO against Portland are unclear.16 Given 
such murkiness, a key issue facing an Oregon federal district court 
in May 2019 in Masonry Building Owners of Oregon v. Wheeler17 
was the standard of scrutiny that should apply to determine if  
 
13 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief for Violation of the United States 
Constitution and the Federal Civil Rights Act at 10, Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. 
Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Or. 2019) (No. 3:18-cv-02194-AC). 
14 See Building Owners, supra note 3 (reporting that “[b]uilding owners stand to lose 
tenants who are uncomfortable living or working in a vulnerable building, or who feel their 
customers might be wary of entering the building,” and adding that building owners “also 
face astronomical costs to retrofit the buildings and say they would as likely be forced to 
sell to a developer who would tear it down”). 
15 See id. 
16 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1283 
(2014) (“For the most part, government attempts to force individuals to affirm beliefs 
contrary to their own…are subject to strict scrutiny and struck down. But the Supreme 
Court has been less clear and less consistent when dealing with compelled speech that 
deviates from that paradigm.”) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); Nat Stern, The 
Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 847, 849 (2011) 
(observing that “the right to resist governmentally imposed expressive activities has 
evolved into a sprawling and ungainly doctrine” that “has lost much of its coherence and 
explanatory power”); Mark A. Strasser, What’s Fair for Conscientious Objectors Subject 
to Public Accommodations Laws, 48 N.M. L. REV. 124, 124 (2018) (asserting that while 
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right not to speak, “its contours 
are much less clear than many appreciate”); Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled 
Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 356 (2018) (contending that the details of the right not to be 
compelled to speak “are often hard to pin down”). 
17 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Or. 2019). 
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the warning on the small signs violated the First Amendment.18  
That issue tracks the twin macro-level questions at the heart of  
this Article: 
(1) How have courts selected scrutiny in compelled-speech  
cases involving non-commercial expression following the United 
States Supreme Court’s dual right-not-to-speak decisions in  
2018 of Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and  
Municipal Employees19 and National Institute of Family and Life  
Advocates v. Becerra?20 
(2) How are Janus and Becerra influencing the selection of  
scrutiny in subsequent compelled-speech cases? 
In Janus and Becerra, identical five-justice conservative major-
ities—over the objection of four-justice liberal dissents—applied 
heightened scrutiny to strike down laws that compelled expression 
either directly or via monetary subsidies.21 Writing for the Janus 
majority, Justice Samuel Alito declared unconstitutional, on First 
Amendment grounds, an Illinois statute that required non-union, 
public-sector employees to pay an agency or fair-share fee to the 
union designated to exclusively represent them in collective bar-
gaining.22 An agency fee is a percentage of union dues chargeable 
to non-union members for activities germane solely to collective 
 
18 See id. at 1294 (“In evaluating the Ordinance, the court must determine whether the 
Ordinance implicates the First Amendment and, if so, what level of scrutiny applies to the 
Ordinance, and whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated that a preliminary injunction is 
appropriate.”). 
19 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
20 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
21 See Clay Calvert, Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case After Becerra 
and Janus? Sorting Out Standards of Scrutiny and Untangling “Speech as Speech” Cases 
from Disputes Incidentally Affecting Expression, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 73, 78–80 
(encapsulating the five-to-four split along perceived ideological lines over scrutiny in  
both cases). 
22 As Justice Samuel Alito summed it up for the majority: 
Under Illinois law, public employees are forced to subsidize a  
union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the 
positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities.  
We conclude that this arrangement violates the free speech rights  
of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on 
matters of substantial public concern. 
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459–60. 
8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:1 
 
bargaining, as opposed to activities related to a “union’s political 
and ideological projects.”23 Plaintiff Mark Janus, a non-union mem-
ber, objected to the AFSCME’s positions on certain issues while 
bargaining on his behalf because Janus felt those stances were not 
in the best fiscal interests of cash-strapped Illinois.24 In other words, 
he balked at being compelled to subsidize the union’s speech during 
collective bargaining on his behalf. 
In analyzing the statute, the majority rejected the dissent’s  
contention that a deferential standard of review akin to rational basis 
should apply, with Alito deriding that “form of minimal scru-
tiny [as] foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence.”25 He reasoned 
that “[b]ecause the compelled subsidization of private speech seri-
ously impinges on First Amendment rights, it cannot be casually  
allowed.”26 Furthermore, Alito added teeth to the notion that com-
pelled-speech laws demand heightened scrutiny. Specifically, he  
asserted that “measures compelling speech are at least as threaten-
ing” to First Amendment rights as are ones restricting what people  
can say and, in fact, can cause “additional damage” when people  
are forced “to endorse ideas they find objectionable.”27 Penning a  
dissent joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and 
Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan rejected the majority’s position “that 
compelling speech always works a greater injury, and so always  
requires a greater justification.”28 
In Becerra, a conservative majority similarly used heightened 
scrutiny to declare “likely” unconstitutional a California statute  
that required licensed crisis pregnancy centers—which advocate 
against abortion—to disclose on their premises the factually  
accurate message that California provides low-cost and free  
abortion services.29 In doing so, the majority followed a decidedly 
 
23 Id. at 2461. 
24 See id. at 2461–62. 
25 Id. at 2465. 
26 Id. at 2464. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
29 See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018) (“In 
short, petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the licensed 
notice.”). 
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formulaic tack for scrutiny: (1) the law was content-based because 
it targeted a specific topic and subject matter for regulation, rather 
than applying neutrally to all speech and regardless of the underly-
ing topic and subject matter;30 (2) content-based laws are presump-
tively unconstitutional and generally must clear strict scrutiny;31 (3) 
the law did not fall within the confines of two exceptions—one for 
the disclosure of non-controversial facts in commercial speech set-
tings32 and one for informed-consent mandates that regulate profes-
sional conduct and only burden speech incidental to that con-
duct33—to the general rule that compelled-disclosure laws face strict 
scrutiny;34 and (4) the obligation to disclose facts about low-cost and 
free abortion services did fit within a new exception to strict scrutiny 
that the majority cryptically and cursorily carved out for “health  
and safety warnings long considered permissible.”35 The interests  
of the listeners (women who come to the centers), as compared to 
the speakers (the centers), were given short shrift on the road to 
heightened scrutiny, as the goal of protecting speakers against  
compelled expression became paramount.36 
Adding insult to California’s injury, Justice Clarence Thomas 
opined for the majority that it was not even necessary to apply  
strict scrutiny because the law failed under the more deferential— 
although still heightened when compared to rational basis—test of 
intermediate scrutiny.37 The bottom line is that the mandatory notice 
about abortion services violated the crisis pregnancy centers’ First 
 
30 See id. at 2371 (“By requiring petitioners to inform women how they can obtain state-
subsidized abortions—at the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from choosing 
that option—the licensed notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of petitioners’ speech.” 
(quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988))). 
31  Id. 
32 See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626 (1985); infra text 
accompanying notes (describing this exception that the Court fashioned in Zauderer). 
33 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); 
infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
34 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372–74. 
35 Id. at 2376. 
36 See Helen Norton, Gender Equality and the First Amendment: Pregnancy and the 
First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2417, 2428 (2019) (“The [Becerra] majority’s 
opinion centered only on the speakers and what they did and did not want to say, entirely 
ignoring pregnant women’s First Amendment interests as listeners.”). 
37 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
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Amendment right not to speak.38 More fundamentally, as Professor 
Mark Strasser writes, Becerra can be read “to suggest that the 
State’s power to compel speech is more limited than previously 
thought.”39 In brief, Janus and Becerra, while involving different 
facts, create a powerful one-two punch in favor of heightened scru-
tiny in compelled-speech cases. Janus suggests that compelled-
speech mandates may be even more dangerous than laws censoring 
content, while Becerra both makes it clear that strict scrutiny  
presumptively applies to compelled-speech mandates and severely  
limits possible workarounds from that rigorous test.40 They also  
reveal, however, that the justices disagree along perceived ideolog-
ical lines about that principle.41 
Are Janus and Becerra, in fact, now affecting the selection of 
scrutiny, pushing courts toward adopting a heightened standard in 
right-not-to-speak disputes such as Wheeler? That question is  
critical not simply because identifying scrutiny is a key facet of 
modern constitutional law,42 but also because the level of scrutiny 
often dictates a case’s outcome.43 Specifically, when strict scrutiny 
 
38 See Erica Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 
639, 643 (2019) (“Becerra held, among other things, that requiring anti-abortion crisis 
pregnancy centers to alert patrons to the fact that the state can provide low cost abortions 
violated the centers’ First Amendment rights against compelled speech.”). 
39 Mark Strasser, Deception, Professional Speech, and CPCs: On Becerra, Abortion, 
and the First Amendment, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 311, 345 (2019). 
40 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018); 
see also Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
41 Id. 
42 See Charles W. Collier, Law as Interpretation, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779, 812 (2000) 
(“The modern levels of scrutiny doctrine has become a basic interpretive tool―arguably 
the basic interpretive tool―in contemporary constitutional analysis.”) (emphasis in 
original); R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 
52 IND. L. REV. 355, 355 (2019) (“The preliminary decision that must be made in First 
Amendment free speech cases is what level of review to apply.”). 
43 See Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign Finance: The First Amendment 
Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 MO. L. REV. 141, 160 
(2001) (“In effect, the categorization of a law as subject to either strict or minimal scrutiny 
is outcome determinative, with the actual application of those standards a rhetorical and 
mechanical afterthought.”); but see Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as 
an Alternative to Multiple Levels of Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 
384, 385 (2018) (“The American multi-tiered approach might be expected to lead to more 
predictable outcomes, yet, in recent decades, the application of these tests has become 
progressively less determinative of outcomes.”). 
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is chosen,44 it typically dooms a statute in First Amendment juris-
prudence.45 This means, in turn, that if courts in compelled-speech 
cases today embrace a methodology for selecting scrutiny that  
almost invariably leads to strict scrutiny, then those courts are  
also consistently tilting the playing field heavily against compelled-
speech statutes, including those that simply require disclosure  
of purely factual information to help people make better in- 
formed choices or to provide enhanced context for understanding  
related information. 
Before analyzing other post-Janus and post-Becerra cases,  
however, it helps to return to Wheeler. It sets the stage for some  
of the contrasting options courts might take for deciding scrutiny  
in compelled-speech controversies, as well as the opposing narra- 
tives through which those options may be perceived. In Wheeler, 
U.S. Magistrate Judge John Acosta concluded that strict scrutiny 
was the correct test.46 He then determined that Portland’s placard  
requirement failed this typically rigorous standard, and he enjoined 
its enforcement.47 
After Acosta’s ruling, Portland repealed the measure and agreed 
in November 2019 to pay $350,000 to cover the MBOO’s attorneys’ 
fees in successfully challenging the law.48 Portland’s effort to com-
pel speech thus proved futile and costly.49 It is helpful then for law-
makers to know in advance the level of scrutiny their compelled-
 
44 See infra text accompanying notes 52–64 (providing an overview of strict scrutiny). 
45 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(noting that strict scrutiny leads “to almost certain legal condemnation”); United States v. 
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (contending strict scrutiny 
yields “near-automatic condemnation”). 
46 Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1305 (D. Or. 2019) 
(concluding that “the placard provision in the Ordinance is a content-based regulation of 
non-commercial speech, and therefore, is invalid unless Defendants can survive strict 
scrutiny.”). 
47 See id. at 1309–10 (finding “that Defendants have not carried their burden of 
demonstrating that the Ordinance furthers a compelling governmental interest and is 
narrowly tailored to further that interest,” and concluding that “Plaintiffs have 
demonstrated they are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim with 
respect to the placard provision in the Ordinance.”). 
48 Everton Bailey Jr., Portland to Pay $350K Settlement Linked to Suit Over Earthquake 
Signs, OREGONIAN (Portland), Nov. 22, 2019, at A4. 
49 Id. 
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speech handiwork will likely face so they can better calculate if 
adopting it is worth the fiscal risk of litigated unconstitutionality. 
Wheeler is over, but the question remains: Was strict scrutiny 
appropriate for evaluating whether a seemingly factual disclosure—
one certainly not compelling building owners to espouse or endorse 
a state-sponsored political, philosophical, ideological, or religious 
viewpoint or orthodoxy with which they disagreed50—on placards 
measuring less than one square-foot violated the First Amendment? 
Strict scrutiny, after all, is a “high bar”51 to clear—“a demanding 
standard”52 under which statutes presumptively are unconstitutional 
and rarely survive.53 
Indeed, it represents “the most searching form of judicial review 
in free speech cases.”54 More bluntly stated by former Justice David 
Souter, it “leaves few survivors.”55 By adopting strict scrutiny,  
 
50 See infra text accompanying notes 102–21 (contrasting Wheeler with several of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal right-not-to-speak cases in which the compelled speech 
squarely involved political, philosophical, ideological, or religious viewpoints or 
orthodoxies). 
51 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2236 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
52 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011). 
53 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (“This is…one of the 
rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny.”) (emphasis added); see 
also Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the 
Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233 (“For decades now, the 
Supreme Court has insisted that content-based laws—laws that restrict speech because of 
its ideas or messages or subject matter—are presumptively unconstitutional, and will be 
sustained only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny.”). 
54 Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment 
Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 350 (2011). 
55 City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (Souter, J., dissenting). To 
wit, one scholar recently observed that subjecting a law to strict scrutiny “is essentially 
outcome determinative; in only one modern case has a majority of the Court 
unambiguously upheld a content-based law under strict scrutiny.” Ashutosh Bhagwat, In 
Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1428 (2017) (internal citation 
omitted). The case referenced (and internally cited) in this quotation by Professor Bhagwat 
is Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). A slightly older First Amendment 
case in which the Court also upheld a statute while applying strict scrutiny, but in which 
only a plurality of four justices joined in the opinion of the Court, is Burson v. Freeman, 
504 U.S. 191 (1992). It involved a 100-foot buffer zone around the entrances to polling 
places that prohibited campaigning within that space. Id. at 193. Writing for the plurality, 
Justice Harry Blackmun observed that “it is the rare case in which we have held that a law 
survives strict scrutiny. This, however, is such a rare case.” Id. at 211. 
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Magistrate Judge Acosta thereby stacked the metaphorical deck 
against Portland’s compelled-speech ordinance.56 
Under this form of assessment, the government must prove  
two things: (1) a compelling interest in regulating speech, and (2) 
that its regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest such  
that no more speech is restricted than is absolutely necessary.57  
Regarding the first prong, a compelling interest frequently is  
considered one of the highest order.58 There also must be a “direct 
causal link” between the regulated speech and the harm it allegedly 
produces.59 The second part of the test involves the fit between  
the statutory means and the compelling interest, and it demands that  
the means be the least speech-restrictive avenue.60 Strict scrutiny  
 
56 Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 455. 
57 See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014) (providing that to pass strict 
scrutiny review, a statute “must be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling 
state interest”); Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (noting that a law passes strict scrutiny if “it is 
justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”); 
United States v. Playboy Enm’t. Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting that under strict 
scrutiny, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the 
legislature must use that alternative”); see also Erica Goldberg, Free Speech 
Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 705 (2016) (“As a general matter, when faced 
with a content-based restriction on speech, the Court subjects regulations of high-value 
speech to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring 
between the goal of the statute and the means by which the law accomplishes that goal.”). 
58 See Andrew P. Napolitano, Whatever Happened to Freedom of Speech? A Defense of 
“State Interest of the Highest Order” as a Unifying Standard for Erratic First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1197, 1232–33 (1999) (“Very often…courts wed 
the phrase state interest of the highest order with language talismanic of strict scrutiny, 
requiring the state to demonstrate a ‘compelling state interest of the highest order’ or means 
that are the least restrictive alternative to serve the government’s interest.”); Howard M. 
Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 
N. KY. L. REV. 421, 445 (2006) (contending that the Supreme Court’s use of “highest 
order” in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979), was “seemingly 
synonymous with the ‘compelling interest’ required as part of strict scrutiny.”). 
59 Brown, 564 U.S. at 799. See also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) 
(“The First Amendment requires that the Government’s chosen restriction on the speech at 
issue be ‘actually necessary’ to achieve its interest….There must be a direct causal link 
between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”) (quoting Brown, 564 U.S. 
at 799) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
60 R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit Under Equal Protection, 
Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: Separating Questions of 
Advancement, Relationship and Burden, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279, 1299 (1994) (“At strict 
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is the same stringent standard the Supreme Court applies today in  
its Equal Protection Clause61 jurisprudence when evaluating the 
constitutionality of laws that discriminate based on a person’s race.62 
The Court’s First Amendment standards for and presumption 
against content-based regulations of speech long have tracked its 
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, at least since its 1972 deci-
sion in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley.63 
This circles back to an earlier question, albeit framed slightly 
differently: Was it necessary for Magistrate Judge Acosta to apply 
the same test used in race-based discrimination lawsuits when  
evaluating the constitutionality of disclosure placards about unrein-
forced masonry structures? 
After all, more deferential standards of review exist in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Most notably, there is intermediate  
 
scrutiny, the statute must be the ‘least restrictive’ alternative under the restrictiveness 
analysis and must have no unnecessary over-inclusiveness pursuant to the over-
inclusiveness inquiry.”). 
61 The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o state shall…deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
62 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 307 (2013) (finding that “[a]ny racial 
classification must meet strict scrutiny’); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 724 (5th ed. 2015) (“The Court has expressly declared that 
all racial classifications—whether disadvantaging or helping minorities—must meet strict 
scrutiny.”); Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A 
Constitutional Challenge to the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages, 
106 CALIF. L. REV. 325, 337 (2018) (“The Equal Protection Clause applies only to state 
action, and the level of scrutiny applicable to the state action at issue depends on the nature 
of the classification at issue, with classifications based on race necessarily subject to the 
highest level of scrutiny.”). 
63 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosley, the Court reasoned that “above all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Id. at 95. It added that “under the 
Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not 
grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those 
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.” Id. at 96. See Kenneth L. 
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 20–
21 (1975) (“In a number of recent cases involving [F]irst [A]mendment interests, the 
Supreme Court has used the framework of equal protection analysis to limit government’s 
power to restrict free expression.”). 
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scrutiny.64 It typically is used when a law is content neutral.65  
Additionally, in somewhat more rare situations, forms of reasona-
bleness balancing apply.66 In fact, some varieties of compelled-
speech regulations in commercial speech settings are subject to  
a very deferential reasonableness standard developed by the Su-
preme Court thirty-five years ago in Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel.67 The Court there held that Ohio could force  
attorneys in their advertisements to convey “purely factual and 
 
64 To pass intermediate scrutiny, a regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant interest, but it does not need to be the least speech-restrictive means of serving 
it. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014). See Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan 
Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 191, 195 (2018) (“Under 
intermediate scrutiny, content-neutral laws are held constitutional if they advance a 
significant or important government interest and are narrowly tailored to advance that 
interest. Content-neutral laws, however, do not have to be narrowly tailored to the least 
restrictive means.”); see generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: 
Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. Ill. L. REV. 783 
(providing an overview of intermediate scrutiny and its origins). 
65  See Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed 
Landscape, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 123, 127 (2017) (“Once a regulation is determined to 
fit into one of the three categories, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny for content-
neutral laws and strict scrutiny for content-based laws.”). 
66 See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, 
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 291 (2016) 
(noting that modern free-speech doctrine involves strict scrutiny, intermediate review, and 
reasonableness balancing).  
The Court applies a variation of the extremely deferential rational basis standard in cases 
involving the speech of public-school students that is sponsored by a school or that is part 
of the curriculum. It has ruled “that educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) 
(emphasis added). Dean Erwin Chemerinsky dubs this “the classic phrasing of the rational 
basis review.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The 
Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 294 (2013). 
Similarly, the speech rights of prison inmates can be squelched upon on a showing that the 
interest in censorship is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Beard v. 
Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (citation omitted). See Alicia Bianco, Prisoners’ 
Fundamental Right to Read: Courts Should Ensure that Rational Basis is Truly Rational, 
21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (noting that courts “have continuously deferred 
to the legislature and prison administrators when considering the validity of prison policies 
that threaten prisoners’ First Amendment rights. In essence, this deference leads to courts 
applying an extremely lenient form of rational basis review.”). 
67 Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
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uncontroversial information about the terms under which”68 their 
services are rendered, provided that the “disclosure requirements are 
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers”69 and are not “unduly burdensome.”70 This “relatively 
relaxed form of scrutiny”71 is treated by some courts as tantamount 
to rational basis review,72 which generally only applies to economic 
and social legislation.73 
Magistrate Judge Acosta, however, did not apply one of these 
more forgiving tests. That primarily is because he found the placard 
ordinance was a content-based regulation.74 A regulation is content-
based if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic  
discussed or the idea or message expressed.”75 Furthermore, a law 
is content-based if it targets a particular subject generally, regard-
less of whether it discriminates against a specific viewpoint or 
stance on that subject.76 
 
68 Id. at 651. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Felix T. Wu, The Commercial Difference, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2005, 2036 
(2017). 
72 See Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech About Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 
447, 505 (2018) (“Many courts and commentators have treated the Zauderer ‘reasonable 
relationship’ test as a highly deferential test similar to rational basis review.”); Lili Levi, A 
“Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 
680–81 (2015) (observing that the test in Zauderer is “akin to rational basis review”). 
73 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 290 (2016) (“The ‘rational basis’ standard ordinarily used to 
evaluate social and economic legislation is quite generous to the government.”); Nicholas 
Walter, The Utility of Rational Basis Review, 63 VILL. L. REV. 79, 79 (2018) (observing 
that rational basis is “typically applied to review of economic and social regulations,” and 
noting that under this test, a governmental action generally “will be upheld if the court can 
conceive of any valid reason for the action, whether or not the legislature or executive had 
that reason in mind when taking the action”). 
74 Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1296–97  
(D. Or. 2019). 
75 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
76 See id. at 2230 (noting that “a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is 
content-based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject 
matter”). Laws that do, in fact, discriminate against some viewpoints but not others on a 
given subject are deemed viewpoint-based regulations, a particularly egregious subset of 
content-based laws. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
See generally Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. 
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The First Amendment strongly protects against laws that  
discriminate on speech based on its topic or subject matter.77  
The Supreme Court has long adopted this position.78 Indeed, the 
Court embraces what Professor David Han dubs a “longstanding  
default rule that strict scrutiny applies to content-based speech  
restrictions.”79 As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote five years ago for 
the majority in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, “strict scrutiny applies  
either when a law is content based on its face or when the purpose 
and justification for the law are content based.”80 Reed, which  
did not involve compelled speech, made it clear that strict scrutiny 
is the presumptive standard for statutes that are either facially con-
tent-based or, even if facially neutral, were adopted because  
of a discriminatory intent.81 As this Article later makes evident, 
Reed—along with Becerra and Janus—plays a key role today in  
resolving the scrutiny question in compelled-speech cases. 
Thus, when viewed from one angle, Magistrate Judge Acosta 
simply followed the Supreme Court’s formulaic lead—one embrac-
ing a pivotal, decades-old dichotomy between content-based  
and content-neutral laws that generally establishes the level of  
 
REV. 695, 703 (2011) (“The first rule of free speech theory and doctrine is that the 
government may not discriminate against a particular viewpoint based simply on its 
disagreement with that viewpoint.”); Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: 
Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
69, 76 (1997) (“Viewpoint regulations go beyond regulating speech on a particular topic 
or subject matter. They regulate one side of a debate or topic but not the other.”). 
77 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765–66 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment 
guards against laws ‘targeted at specific subject matter,’ a form of speech suppression 
known as content based discrimination.”) (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (2015)). 
78 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restriction of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar 
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 82 (1978) (“In its 
interpretation of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has been especially wary of 
government action that restricts speech because of its content.”). 
79 David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359,  
363 (2015). 
80 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228. 
81 See Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV. 66, 
67 (2017) (describing the Reed Court’s two-step process for determining if a law is content-
based and thus presumptively subject to strict scrutiny); see also R. Randall Kelso, supra 
note 42, at 400 (observing that “the majority in Reed adopted a rigid rule that if a regulation 
is content-based ‘on its face,’ then strict scrutiny is automatically triggered”) (quoting 
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228). 
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review82—by adopting strict scrutiny.83 He added that the placard’s 
message was noncommercial and therefore the much more lenient 
Zauderer test noted earlier was inapplicable.84 Acosta concluded the 
placard ordinance failed to pass strict scrutiny.85 
Buttressing the notion that Acosta was warranted in selecting 
strict scrutiny to analyze the compelled-placard law are the Supreme 
Court’s 2018 decisions of Janus and Becerra. As described above, 
the majorities in these two cases applied heightened scrutiny. 
Acosta’s use of strict scrutiny, in fact, illustrates the accuracy of the 
prediction of Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and Professor Michele 
Goodwin that Becerra “weakens notification laws or makes them 
vulnerable to constitutional challenges.”86 In line with the outcome 
in Wheeler, Chemerinsky and Goodwin also accurately forecasted 
that Becerra would: 
open the door to challenges to the myriad of laws  
that require disclosure of information to patients, to  
consumers, to employees, and to others. The Court 
expressly says that a law requiring disclosure of  
 
82 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) (exploring the development of, and critiquing, the 
Court’s distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws). 
83 As Justice Clarence Thomas explained in 2018, “[t]he First Amendment, applicable 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws that abridge the freedom 
of speech. When enforcing this prohibition, our precedents distinguish between content-
based and content-neutral regulations of speech.” Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. 
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018). See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the 
Tracks: Should Justice Breyer be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1294 (2005) 
(“The use of the content-based/content-neutral distinction as a trigger for the level of 
scrutiny is entrenched in First Amendment doctrine.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing 
Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1062 (2015) (“It is of course familiar grounds in 
First Amendment jurisprudence that content-based laws are of greater constitutional 
concern than content-neutral laws. For restrictions on speech itself, the doctrine imposes 
strict scrutiny on content-based laws and a relatively deferential form of intermediate 
scrutiny for content-neutral laws.”); see also Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative 
Channels” Flaw in First Amendment Doctrine, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1691 
(2016) (noting that “the content-based versus content-neutral distinction…governs Speech 
Clause doctrine”).  
84 Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1298 (D. Or. 2019). 
85 Id. at 1309–10.  
86 Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering Against 
Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 112 (2019). 
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specific information is a content-based restriction on 
speech because it prescribes the content of the  
expression and thus it must meet strict scrutiny.87 
Indeed, Acosta leaned heavily on Becerra to conclude that strict 
scrutiny provided the correct test in Wheeler for evaluating the  
constitutionality of Portland’s placard law. He cited Becerra for a 
trio of foundational propositions: 
(1) Content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional and 
only valid if the government proves it has a compelling interest that 
is served by a narrowly tailored law;88 
(2) Laws compelling an individual to utter a particular message 
are content-based and subject to that same test because they neces-
sarily alter the content of a person or an entity’s speech;89 and 
(3) “[A] regulation that compels a disclosure is a content-based 
regulation of speech, subject to heightened scrutiny, unless an  
exception applies.”90 
In brief, Becerra’s impact in Wheeler proved powerful in  
articulating principles for scrutiny selection. Furthermore, as  
noted above, Magistrate Judge Acosta reasoned that the Zauderer 
exception to strict scrutiny did not apply because the message on the 
placards was noncommercial.91 Strict scrutiny therefore governed—
and killed—Portland’s ordinance.92 Wheeler was thus, when viewed 
 
87 Id. 
88 Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. at 1296. Acosta referred to Becerra as NIFLA on short-citation 
references. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Magistrate Judge Acosta reasoned here that: 
[T]he placards do not propose any kind of commercial transaction, and 
do not convey any discernable relationship to any products or services 
offered by Plaintiffs. Indeed, Plaintiffs have no economic motivation 
to display the placards because they compel Plaintiffs to state a 
message they wish to avoid. The court finds that the placards fall 
outside any commonsense understanding of commercial speech. 
Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1298. 
92 See id. at 1309–10 (concluding “that Defendants have not carried their burden of 
demonstrating that the Ordinance furthers a compelling governmental interest and is 
narrowly tailored to further that interest,” and finding that “[p]laintiffs have demonstrated 
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from one perspective, a systematic, button-downed decision that 
never veered off course from the Supreme Court’s precedential 
tracks for content-based laws. 
There is, however, a radically different and alternative narrative 
to one that perceives Acosta as simply heeding precedent and  
following well-established rules about applying strict scrutiny to 
content-based laws. That competing account is far harsher. It is this: 
Acosta, to borrow Justice Elena Kagan’s memorable phrase from 
her dissent on behalf of the liberal justices in Janus, was “weapon-
izing the First Amendment.”93 He did so by selecting strict scrutiny, 
thereby “turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it 
against workaday economic and regulatory policy”94 established by 
the democratically elected Portland City Council to help protect  
citizens from dangers some buildings may pose during earthquakes. 
What is more, Acosta failed to adopt—to quote Justice Stephen 
Breyer in his Becerra dissent attacking the majority’s embrace of 
heightened scrutiny—a “respectful approach to economic and social 
legislation”95 that affects speech. Just as Breyer prognosticated in 
Becerra, the deleterious ramifications of applying strict scrutiny to 
analyze “the mine run of disclosure requirements,”96 such as those 
“alert[ing] the public about child seat belt laws, the location of stair-
ways, and the process to have their garbage collected,”97 sprung  
vividly to life in Acosta’s decision to apply that stringent stand- 
ard to a law compelling disclosure of a building’s structure. In a  
nutshell, Acosta’s approach to scrutiny, at least in this alternative 
reading of Wheeler, embodies the Lochnerization of the First 
Amendment that many academics have feared and decried in recent 
 
they are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim with respect to the 
placard provision in the Ordinance”). 
93 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018)  
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. 
95 Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
96 Id. at 2381. 
97 Id. 
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years.98 The First Amendment, in other words, was swung like  
a wrecking ball by some businesses—owners of unreinforced  
masonry buildings—in Wheeler to bring down a stigmatizing safety 
notice that jeopardized their financial interests. 
In this counterposed narrative, shielding an owner from posting 
a placard revealing a building’s structure and what it may portend if 
an earthquake hits is an extremely far cry from the human dignity 
and autonomy interests at stake in the Supreme Court’s seminal 
right-not-to-speak cases of West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette99 and Wooley v. Maynard.100 The former involved mi-
nors being compelled to salute the flag of the United States of Amer-
ica and to pledge allegiance to it over their religious objections.101 
In protecting against forced engagement in such expression, the  
Supreme Court declared that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our con-
stitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,  
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or  
act their faith therein.”102 Justice Robert Jackson added that “the  
action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and 
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and in-
vades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official  
 
98 This concept generally refers to use of the First Amendment “to thwart economic and 
social welfare regulation.” Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an 
Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1959 (2018). The name arises 
from “the theory that businesses are using the First Amendment to do the work that 
substantive due process once performed in the era of Lochner v. New York, the notorious 
1905 Supreme Court case invalidating a New York maximum-hours law for bakers as an 
infringement of liberty of contract.” Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to 
Strike, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 513, 520 (2017). See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 
57 (1905) (declaring unconstitutional, as an interference with the right to contract under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state statute limiting the number 
of hours that bakers could work); see also Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, 
Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 337 (2017) (describing how some 
scholars perceive “a new free speech Lochnerism—an exploitation of the First Amendment 
to promote a broad deregulatory agenda, regardless of popular democratic will”). 
99 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
100 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
101 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625–30. 
102 Id. at 642. 
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control.”103 Barnette thus embraces what Professor Jed Rubenfeld 
calls the “anti-orthodoxy principle” in First Amendment jurispru-
dence that prohibits the government from dictating “what beliefs 
must and must not be expressed.”104 
This alternative narrative to Wheeler holds that requiring one to 
post a placard about a building’s structure: (1) is nothing akin to 
being forced to speak the government’s position about politics,  
nationalism, and religion, and (2) does not invade an individual’s 
private sphere of either intellect or spirit. As Justice Kagan wrote 
about Barnette in her Janus dissent, “[r]egulations challenged as 
compelling expression do not usually look anything like that.”105  
Indeed, the challenged law in Wheeler looked nothing like the one 
in Barnette, yet Magistrate Judge Acosta treated it just as seriously 
by applying strict scrutiny.106 Of course, his decision to do so might 
partly be because Barnette itself failed to create clear guidelines for 
addressing future compelled-speech cases, thereby leaving it for 
judges to fathom scrutiny standards and, as Acosta did, to resort to 
the content-based-versus-content-neutral formula.107 
Like Barnette, Wooley also involved religious objections to  
being compelled to speak.108 The Supreme Court there declared that 
 
103 Id. 
104 Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 818 (2001) 
(emphasis removed). Rubenfeld explains that the anti-orthodoxy principle does not apply 
to factual matters, but rather “to the world of meaning, of ideas, of feeling, of the ineffable, 
of spirit-to every act of human imagination.” Id. at 821. It allows a person to be “free to 
express himself without fear that his beliefs or feelings or imaginings will be deemed 
unspeakable by law.” Id. 
105 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2494 (2018)  
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
106 See Joseph J. Martins, The One Fixed Star in Higher Education: What Standard of 
Judicial Scrutiny Should Courts Apply to Compelled Curricular Speech in the Public 
University Classroom?, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 122 (2017) (noting that “the strict 
scrutiny standard [was] explicitly applied in Barnette”); Toni M. Massaro, Nuts and Seeds: 
Mitigating Third-Party Harms of Religious Exemptions, Post-Hobby Lobby, 92 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 325, 355 (2015) (noting “the Barnette strict scrutiny compelled speech test”). 
107 Paul Horwitz, A Close Reading of Barnette, in Honor of Vincent Blasi, 13 FIU L. REV. 
689, 695 (2019) (contending that Barnette “does very little by way of practical doctrinal 
development. Beyond the particular context, it offers very little by way of judicially clear 
and manageable standards for lower courts in the area of what came to be labeled as 
‘compelled speech.’”). 
108 See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
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New Hampshire could not stop a Jehovah’s Witness couple from 
taping over the state’s motto, “Live Free or Die,” on their vehicles’ 
license plates.109 The majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice  
Warren Burger, was especially concerned about the government 
forcing people to convey an “ideology” regarding “history, state 
pride, and individualism” to which they object.110 Linking Wooley 
with Barnette, Burger observed that “as in Barnette, we are faced 
with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily 
life—indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view—to 
be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological 
point of view he finds unacceptable.”111 The message at issue in 
Wheeler, in contrast, was not ideological but factual. No one’s reli-
gious beliefs were placed in the balance.112 The owners of masonry 
buildings were not compelled to voice a government-sponsored  
ideological pledge or motto.113 
Wheeler also is factually distant from another seminal right-not-
to-speak case, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.114 That dis-
pute involved a Florida right-of-reply statute compelling newspa-
pers in the Sunshine State to publish—free of charge—the responses 
of candidates for public office whom those papers had criticized.115 
Thus, unlike Wheeler, Tornillo entangled being compelled to print 
an objectionable political viewpoint with the jeopardization of jour-
nalistic freedom, via the Press Clause, to retain editorial independ-
ence.116 Additionally, the Supreme Court was bothered in Tornillo 
 
109 Id. at 717. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 715. 
112 See Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Or. 2019). 
113 Id. at 1310. 
114 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
115 See id. at 244 (noting that the law in question “provide[d] that if a candidate for 
nomination or election [was] assailed regarding his personal character or official record by 
any newspaper, the candidate [had] the right to demand that the newspaper print, free of 
cost to the candidate, any reply the candidate may make to the newspaper’s charges.”). 
116 The Court reasoned in Tornillo that: 
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, 
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a 
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and 
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public 
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by the chilling effect on political speech that the law might pro-
duce.117 As Professor Abner Greene encapsulates it, the Court in 
Tornillo struck down the right-of-reply statute “because it would  
affect editorial decisions ex ante (some newspapers might not  
critique a candidate for fear they would have to run a reply) and  
ex post (the effect of the law is to alter newspaper content).”118  
In brief, the need to vigilantly guard against compelled expression 
to protect speakers from harm that was present in Barnette, Wooley, 
and Tornillo is decidedly absent in Wheeler and thus militates 
against selecting strict scrutiny. 
In summary, Magistrate Judge Acosta’s ruling in Wheeler on 
scrutiny can be viewed through oppositional lenses of dueling  
narratives that reflect the ideological cleavage on today’s Supreme 
Court. This Article thus examines how other courts, in the aftermath 
of both Janus and Becerra and in five very different factual settings, 
resolved the issue of scrutiny when individuals or businesses raised 
First Amendment-based, right-not-to-speak objections. Those cases 
are analyzed below in Part I, which also considers how alternative 
tacks to choosing scrutiny—ones beyond simply deciding if a law is 
content-based or that rigidly follow the call for heightened scrutiny 
 
officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial 
control and judgment.  It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental 
regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First 
Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this 
time. 
Id. at 258. 
117 See id. at 257 (“Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that 
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute, 
editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under 
the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or 
reduced.”); see also Jennifer M. Kinsley, Chill, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 255–56 (2016) 
(calling the chilling effect an “important concern when a putative speaker’s intended 
speech is subject to self-censorship as a result of government regulation,” but arguing that 
“interweaving that concern into existing free speech doctrine potentially interrupts the 
intentions of the First Amendment.”); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First 
Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978) (providing an 
overview of the chilling effect concept). 
118 Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
1475, 1487 (2018). 
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by the majorities in Janus and Becerra—might have led to the ap-
plication of different standards of review in some of these cases.119 
Part II then identifies five First Amendment interests and values 
that courts might use to help determine the level of scrutiny in future 
right-not-to-speak cases involving non-commercial expression.120 
Finally, the Article concludes by calling on courts to adopt a First 
Amendment-based interests and values approach to scrutiny in  
compelled-speech cases that, although entailing greater judicial time  
and effort, spurns reductionist scrutiny formulas in favor of a more 
nuanced, reflective path.121 
 
I. FROM PUBLIC ART, POLITICAL ADS, AND VOTER-REGISTRATION DRIVES 
TO SEX OFFENDER SIGNS AND SPEECH CELEBRATING SAME-SEX WEDDINGS: 
THE STATUS OF SCRUTINY IN 2019 IN SELECTED COMPELLED-SPEECH CASES 
This Part separately analyzes five compelled-speech scenarios 
courts considered in 2019. In each scenario, this Article focuses on 
how those courts determined the applicable level of scrutiny and, 
more specifically, the role that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
in Becerra and Janus played in those scrutiny decisions. The five 
scenarios were chosen because they are factually distinct, thereby 
allowing analysis of whether a uniform and predictable methodol-
ogy for determining scrutiny in compelled-speech cases was applied 
regardless of a case’s distinctive facts.122 
As with Wheeler, the scenarios addressed below do not involve 
compelled disclosure of commercial speech. That is because the 
Court in Becerra clearly identified Zauderer compelled-
speech cases as a distinct niche or carve out from those requiring 
heightened scrutiny.123 Such post-Becerra cases thus merit separate 
attention—perhaps a separate article—as a distinct line of dis- 
 
119 See infra Part I. 
120 See infra Part II. 
121 See infra Conclusion. 
122 Much like the eclectic mix of 2019 cases analyzed in this Article, the compelled-
speech doctrine itself has long been comprised of “something of a hodgepodge of cases.” 
Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 1010 (2019). 
123 Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018). 
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putes in which courts apply Zauderer and wrestle with its reach  
and requirements.124 
Similarly, the cases analyzed here do not involve informed- 
consent mandates incidental to the professional conduct of medical  
procedures, given the Becerra Court’s notice that such disputes are 
not subject to strict scrutiny.125 That conclusion, which rests largely 
on the Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey,126 is highly controversial. This exception 
 
124 In fact, there have been several Zauderer-standard cases since Becerra and Janus were 
decided. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 
2019) (applying Zauderer to measure the validity of a local ordinance mandating health 
warnings in advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages appearing in certain venues and 
forms of media); CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 836 (9th 
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 658 (2019) (applying Zauderer when considering the 
validity of a local ordinance requiring “cell phone retailers to inform prospective cell phone 
purchasers that carrying a cell phone in certain ways may cause them to exceed Federal 
Communications Commission guidelines for exposure to radio-frequency radiation”). 
Professor Sarah Haan addresses recent applications of Zauderer, including in American 
Beverage Association, in a new article. Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 
94 IND. L.J. 1351, 1374–87 (2019). 
125 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. The Becerra majority approvingly cited Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), as such an 
informed-consent case where a lesser standard of review was permissible. Id. In dissent, 
Justice Breyer noted that the majority confined Casey to “regulation[s] of professional 
conduct that only incidentally burdened speech” so that it now applies “only when 
obtaining ‘informed consent’ to a medical procedure is directly at issue.” Id. at 2385 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
126 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, the Court considered the “asserted First Amendment 
right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, 
in a manner mandated by” Pennsylvania. Id. at 884. The plurality cited Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705 (1977), which is addressed earlier in this Article in the text corresponding to 
footnotes 108–111, in recognizing that the law affected a “physician’s First Amendment 
rights not to speak.” Id. Yet, the plurality concluded that such a right was subject to 
“reasonable licensing and regulation.” Id. (emphasis added). It found, in turn, that there 
was no constitutional problem with Pennsylvania’s requirement that: 
[A]t least 24 hours before performing an abortion a physician inform 
the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the 
abortion and of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age of the 
unborn child.” The physician or a qualified nonphysician must inform 
the woman of the availability of printed materials published by the 
State describing the fetus and providing information about medical 
assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the 
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from strict scrutiny now deserves stand-alone analysis post-Becerra, 
especially considering the Supreme Court’s December 2019 deci-
sion declining to review the abortion-based, informed-consent case 
of EMW Women’s Surgical Center v. Beshear.127 
In brief, Becerra identified two settings (Zauderer and Casey 
cases) when heightened First Amendment review is unnecessary  
in compelled-speech disputes. In all other compelled-speech scenar-
ios—at least, based on the majority’s logic in Becerra and Janus, 
along with Reed’s reasoning about when a law is content-based  
and the presumption that strict scrutiny governs content-based 
measures—strict scrutiny seemingly controls the case.128 As be-
comes clear below, that largely is proving to be the case across a 
wide swath of factual situations, with the sole exception of the next 
case addressed immediately below. 
A. Compelled Public-Facing Art 
If Wheeler is lamentable for weaponizing the First Amendment 
by applying strict scrutiny to vitiate a workaday regulation that  
targeted building owners to protect public safety, then—quite  
 
father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services 
as alternatives to abortion. 
Id. at 881. In brief, the plurality arguably applied something approximating rational basis 
review regarding the First Amendment right-not-to-speak claim in Casey. See Carl H. 
Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV. 843, 851 (2019) (suggesting the 
Court’s “use of the word ‘reasonable’ might mean that such laws are permissible as long 
as they have a rational basis, given that the word ‘reasonable’ is often used as a synonym 
for ‘rational’”); B. Jessie Hill, Sex, Lies, and Ultrasound, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 421, 432 
(2018) (“The Court’s language of reasonableness, along with its dismissive treatment  
of the claim, suggest something like rational basis review was applied to the physician’s  
free speech claim.”). 
127 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 655 (2019). The Sixth Circuit 
majority in Beshear relied on Becerra for the proposition “that no heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny should apply to informed-consent statutes like the abortion-informed-
consent statute at issue in [Casey].” Id. at 424. The Beshear majority thus reasoned “even 
though an abortion-informed-consent law compels a doctor’s disclosure of certain 
information, it should be upheld so long as the disclosure is truthful, non-misleading, and 
relevant to an abortion.” Id. Applying that deferential form of review, the majority upheld 
a Kentucky law that “directs a doctor, before performing an abortion, to auscultate (or make 
audible) the fetal heartbeat, perform an ultrasound, and display and describe the ultrasound 
images to the patient.” Id. at 423. 
128 See Armijo, supra note 81 (explaining Reed’s holding regarding when strict  
scrutiny applies). 
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conversely—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s  
not-for-publication ruling in August 2019 in Building Industry  
Association–Bay Area v. City of Oakland129 is laudable for blunting 
the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit did so by applying a version 
of rational basis review to uphold an ordinance compelling develop-
ers of certain real-estate projects either to display art in areas open 
to the public or to contribute to a fund to purchase public art.130 What 
is perhaps even more remarkable is that the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria was correct in his 2018  
ruling to select the deferential level of scrutiny articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Zauderer.131 
That is remarkable because the Ninth Circuit held, just one 
month prior to ruling in Building Industry Association, that the  
Zauderer test, which was described earlier,132 applies to the disclo-
sure of factual information in commercial speech settings.133 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court in Becerra closely cabined Zauderer’s applica-
bility to only situations involving the mandated disclosure of purely 
factual, noncontroversial information related to services provided 
directly by the individual being compelled to speak.134 Building 
 Industry Association, in contrast, had nothing to do with either com-
mercial speech or the disclosure of purely factual information.  
 
129 775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019). 
130 See id. at 349 (“In relevant part, the ordinance requires developers to commit a small 
percentage (of up to 1%) of the project budget to displaying art in areas freely accessible 
to the public, or, alternatively, to pay that amount directly into a city fund that is set up to 
further those public art goals.”). 
131 See id. at 350 (holding that “the district court did not err by applying the lower form 
of scrutiny set forth in Zauderer, or by concluding that Oakland’s policy satisfies this 
review because the ordinance is ‘reasonably related’ to the city’s legitimate interests in 
improving the city’s aesthetics and raising real estate property values”). 
132 See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text (addressing Zauderer). 
133 See CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n. v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(“Under Zauderer as we interpret it today, the government may compel truthful disclosure 
in commercial speech as long as the compelled disclosure is ‘reasonably related’ to a 
substantial governmental interest . . . and involves ‘purely factual and uncontroversial 
information’ that relates to the service or product provided.”) (quoting Nat’l Inst. of Fam. 
& Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018)) (internal citation omitted) 
(emphasis added); see also Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 756 
(9th Cir. 2019) (holding that “Zauderer provides the appropriate framework to analyze a 
First Amendment claim involving compelled commercial speech”) (emphasis added). 
134 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
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Instead, it had everything to do with compelling the display or fund-
ing of art.135 Put bluntly, the Ninth Circuit in Building Industry  
Association gave the green light to ripping Zauderer’s variation of 
rational basis review from its commercial-speech and factual-infor-
mation moorings and extending its reach to laws compelling the  
display of something as subjective in meaning—and sometimes as 
provocative in impact—as artwork.136 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Building Industry Association 
also is important because the court rejected the notion that the  
Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in Janus and its seminal right-not-to-
speak decision in Wooley137 require heightened scrutiny in all  
compelled-speech cases.138 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished Janus from Building Industry Association by factually con-
fining Janus’s reach to laws that “compel the subsidy of private 
speech.”139 The appellate court also distinguished Wooley because, 
unlike the compelled motto on the Granite State’s license plates, 
Oakland’s art ordinance did not require property developers to  
“endorse any specific viewpoint.”140 In brief, the underlying nature 
of the speech being compelled makes a difference in ferreting out 
the correct level of scrutiny in this tack. Mandating the display of 
art is far less concerning to core First Amendment interests in 
speaker self-realization and autonomy than is compelling a person 
 
135 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 775 F. App’x. at 349. 
136 See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 574 (1998) (labeling as 
“provocative” the homoerotic photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe and “artist Andres 
Serrano’s work Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix immersed in urine”); Brooklyn Inst. 
of Arts & Sci. v. City of N.Y., 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (involving a First 
Amendment challenge to the defunding of a public art museum in New York City because 
then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani deemed “sick” and “disgusting” an exhibit entitled 
“Sensation: Young British Artists from the Saatchi Collection”). 
137 See supra text accompanying notes 108–111 (addressing Wooley, which held that a 
Jehovah’s Witness couple could not be compelled to display New Hampshire’s motto 
“Live Free or Die” on their vehicles’ license plates in light of the couple’s religious 
objections to that slogan). 
138 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 775 F. App’x. at 350. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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to endorse a viewpoint with ideological overtones such as “Live 
Free or Die.”141 
The 2018 federal district court decision that the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed in Building Industry Association merits examination  
because it embraces a radically different path to determining  
scrutiny than, as was the situation in Wheeler, simply asking if a law 
is content-based or content-neutral and if it involves commercial 
speech.142 Issuing his ruling in February 2018—several months  
before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Janus and Becerra— 
Judge Vince Chhabria approvingly cited and embraced a First 
Amendment-based interests approach to scrutiny advocated by  
Justice Stephen Breyer, perhaps doing so because Chhabria clerked 
for Breyer in the early 2000s.143 In particular, Chhabria quoted  
several statements144 affecting scrutiny that Breyer made when  
concurring in the high court’s 2017 ruling in Expressions Hair  
Design v. Schneiderman:145 
 “virtually all government regulation affects 
speech,”146 and 
 
141 As Professor Edward Eberle explains:  
Intrinsically, free speech is valuable because it promotes and reflects 
human personality and is an essence of human dignity. Autonomy to 
think, listen, and speak for oneself is essential to a free and self-
determining human being. Free speech theorists have captured aspects 
of this justification for expression as resting on a basis of individual 
self-fulfillment, self-realization, or liberty. 
Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 953, 960-61 (2004). 
142 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 
2018), aff’d, 775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019). 
143 See id. at 1059; see also Press Release, The White House (Office of the Press 
Secretary), President Obama Nominates Six to Serve on the United States District Court 
(July 25, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/25/ 
president-obama-nominates-six-serve-united-states-district-court [https://perma.cc/Y2S6-
BG7R] (“From 2001 to 2002, he [Chhabria] clerked for Justice Stephen G. Breyer on the 
United States Supreme Court.”). 
144 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 1059–60 (quoting Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017)  
(Breyer, J., concurring)). 
145 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
146 Id. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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 scrutiny determinations should be based on 
“whether, or how, a challenged statute, rule, or 
regulation affects an interest that the First 
Amendment protects,”147 with mere rational basis 
review normally called for when a regulation 
“does not significantly affect the interests that 
the First Amendment protects.”148 
This reasoning from Expressions Hair Design tracks a 2015  
assertion by Justice Breyer in Reed v. Town of Gilbert. There, he 
contended that when determining scrutiny, “[t]he First Amendment 
requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expres-
sive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than 
a simple recitation of categories, such as ‘content discrimination’ 
and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would permit.”149 Breyer’s interests-based  
approach to determining scrutiny thus rejects mechanistically and 
hastily applying categorical labels to laws such as content discrimi-
nation and strict scrutiny.150 
For Breyer, the speech “interests close to the First Amendment’s 
protective core”151 that seemingly mandate a heightened level of  
judicial review of a statute are “the processes through which politi-
cal discourse or public opinion is formed or expressed.”152 He also 
has suggested that protecting both unpopular ideas and a truth-seek-
ing marketplace of ideas153 are important First Amendment interests 
 
147 Id. (emphasis added). 
148 Id. (emphasis added). 
149 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
150 Justice Breyer added in Reed that “the category ‘content discrimination’ is better 
considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic 
‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.” Id. 
151 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
152 Id. 
153 See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The 
‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech 
tradition.”). The marketplace theory pivots on the belief that free speech “contributes to the 
promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy 
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003). It holds “that truth will 
emerge in the long run as long as the marketplace remains free from government 
intervention and all ideas.” Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach 
for Economic Expression, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 21, 26 (2012). 
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that might demand heightened review “in an appropriate case.”154 
For Justice Breyer, protecting a diverse marketplace of ideas serves 
self-governing democracy.155 
Conversely, core First Amendment interests are not impli-
cated—and thus vaster deference should be granted to democrati-
cally elected legislative bodies—when laws regulate marketplaces 
for goods and services.156 As Breyer opined in Becerra when  
pushing back against the Lochnerization of the First Amendment  
addressed earlier in this Article,157 the Court should embrace a  
“respectful approach to economic and social legislation” that impli-
cates speech.158 Explaining in interests-based terminology why a 
more relaxed level of judicial review is appropriate in these situ-
ations, Breyer asserted that “[u]sing the First Amendment to strike 
down economic and social laws that legislatures long would have 
thought themselves free to enact will, for the American public, ob-
scure, not clarify, the true value of protecting freedom of speech.”159 
In brief, Judge Chhabria in Building Industry Association firmly 
latched on to Breyer’s interests-and-values tack rather than reflex-
ively applying strict scrutiny simply because the law was content-
based.160 This ultimately led Chhabria to conclude that Oakland’s 
ordinance did “not raise any of the red flags”161 that would require 
heightened scrutiny, such as: (1) compelling a person to convey a 
disagreeable political or ideological message, as was the circum-
 
154 Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382 (2018)  
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
155 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 583 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“Without such a marketplace, the public could not freely choose a government pledged to 
implement policies that reflect the people’s informed will.”). 
156 Id. 
157 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (addressing First Amendment Lochner-
ization). 
158 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
159 Id. at 2383 (emphasis added). 
160 Although Judge Chhabria did not analyze the question of whether Oakland’s law  
was content-based or content-neutral, the law would certainly seem to be content-based  
because it compelled either the display or funding of art—a particular form of content, 
as compared to other varieties of content, such as compelling the funding of news or 
educational materials. 
161 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1060 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018), aff’d, 775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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stance in both Barnette and Wooley; or (2) requiring publication of 
others’ messages in a way that might hinder or deter a speaker’s 
willingness to convey his own message, as was the situation in 
Tornillo, where a newspaper might engage in self-censorship rather 
than be forced, by speaking up, to run a political candidate’s 
views.162 In other words, the determination of scrutiny should entail 
a close comparison between the interests and objectives of protect-
ing the right not to speak in the case at bar with the interests and 
objectives that were at stake in the Supreme Court’s seminal  
compelled-speech cases of Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo. 
The Oakland art ordinance did not fit within these situations  
because, as Judge Chhabria reasoned, it did: 
not require a developer to express any specific view-
point, because developers can purchase and display 
art that they choose. To the extent a developer wishes 
for the building to convey a particular message, 
there’s no reason to believe that an art display would 
muddle that message…Perhaps most importantly, 
even if the ordinance to some extent encourages  
developers to engage in expressive conduct by pur-
chasing and displaying art, the degree of compulsion 
is minimal, because if developers do not want to  
purchase and display art on or near their property, 
they can comply with the ordinance by paying a fee 
to the City in the same amount.163 
In summary, the ordinance’s intrusion into the kinds of interests 
that the First Amendment ostensibly is meant to safeguard was  
minimal, and the law therefore was “subject to review under 
the First Amendment only to ensure that it [was] reasonably related 
to a legitimate governmental purpose.”164 Judge Chhabria had little 
problem, in turn, finding that the law was reasonably related to Oak-
land’s legitimate interests in “improving the aesthetics within the 
 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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city and bolstering real property values.”165 He therefore concluded 
it did not violate the First Amendment.166 
Ultimately, Judge Chhabria’s approach to scrutiny is unusual. 
His opinion nowhere references whether Oakland’s law is content-
based or content-neutral. There is no citation to the Court’s 2015 
decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,167 which made it clear that  
content-based laws generally face strict scrutiny.168 Instead, Judge 
Chhabria relied on statements made in a concurring opinion by  
a lone member of the Supreme Court—Justice Breyer in Expres-
sions Hair Design—to lead him, by focusing on whether First 
Amendment interests like those in play in Supreme Court deci- 
sions such as Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo were significantly  
affected by the law, to conclude that a form of rational basis review 
was appropriate.169 
Breyer, of course, long has engaged in the “partial de-doctrinali-
zation of the First Amendment”170 by advocating for a propor- 
tionality approach to judicial review and against a rigid tiers-of-
scrutiny methodology.171 He sometimes associates proportionality 
 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 1061. 
167 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
168 See id. at 2226 (“Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its 
communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if 
the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”). 
169 See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 1059–60 (quoting Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) 
(Breyer, J., concurring)). 
170 Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-Doctrinalization of Free Speech 
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 508, 511 (2014). 
171 For example, Justice Breyer recently described his “proportionality analysis” as 
“focus[ing] on the interests the First Amendment protects” and asking, in turn, whether the 
regulation in question causes harm to those First Amendment interests that is 
disproportionate to the government’s objectives in regulating speech. Iancu v. Brunetti, 
139 S. Ct. 2294, 2306 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As one 
scholar summarizes it, Breyer views the First Amendment as “an elastic amendment, 
expanding and contracting depending on the interests that each side asserted for the dispute 
currently before the Court. Through proportionality testing, Breyer typically will determine 
if, in his estimation, the government’s ends justify the means employed to achieve these 
goals.” Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid 
Conceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB. L. REV. 403, 507 (2016). See Floyd Abrams, 
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with intermediate scrutiny.172 As he explained in one First Amend-
ment case, the issue for the Court under proportionality is whether  
a “statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to  
its justifications.”173 
Put bluntly, Judge Chhabria—the former Breyer clerk—went 
rogue on the scrutiny determination by following the lead of a  
justice known for precisely doing that.174 Yet, the Ninth Circuit  
in 2019 in Building Industry Association—ruling on the case  
subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Janus and 
Becerra—affirmed Judge Chhabria’s decision and his choice of  
applying a Zauderer-like level of deferential scrutiny in a non-com-
mercial speech setting.175 Chhabria and the Ninth Circuit pave a  
possible future alternative path for determining scrutiny in com-
pelled-speech cases involving non-commercial expression. It is a 
route guarding against weaponizing the First Amendment by not im-
mediately turning to strict scrutiny when faced with a content-based 
law. Of all the cases examined in this Article, however, it is the only 
one not to adopt strict scrutiny. It thus is a clear outlier. 
 
Keynote Remarks, Free Speech Under Fire: The Future of the First Amendment, 25 J.L. 
& POL’Y 47, 58 (2016) (remarking that Justice Breyer’s First Amendment opinions 
“repeatedly seek to apply the concept of proportionality”); Jamal Greene, The Supreme 
Court 2017 Term: Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 55 (2018) 
(“Proportionality and balancing approaches to rights have long found favor with Justice 
Breyer.”). 
172 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 
3094, 3096–97 (2015) (noting that “in United States v. Alvarez, Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence, joined by Justice Kagan, associated proportionality review with intermediate 
scrutiny and applied this standard to evaluate a First Amendment challenge to the Stolen 
Valor Act”). 
173 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
174 Id. 
175 See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 775 F. App’x. 348, 350 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (holding that “the district court did not err by applying the lower form of scrutiny 
set forth in Zauderer”). 
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B. Compelling Disclosure About the Buyers of Political 
Advertisements 
In January 2019, a federal district court in Washington Post v. 
McManus176 blocked Maryland’s enforcement of a statute177 that, 
among other things, compelled social media platforms and newspa-
per websites to publish on their own sites the identities of buyers of 
political ads and the cost of those ads, within forty-eight  
hours of their purchase.178 The law, which was challenged by the  
Washington Post, Baltimore Sun, and several other news outlets, 
was intended to curtail foreign interference in United States  
elections.179 District Judge Paul Grimm determined that strict  
scrutiny was the correct test for measuring the law’s constitutional-
ity.180 He concluded, in turn, that what he called the “publication 
requirement” was “most likely unconstitutional” as applied to the 
news-organization plaintiffs, and he enjoined its enforcement.181 
In December 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth  
Circuit affirmed Judge Grimm’s ruling, dubbing it “thoughtful.”182 
The Fourth Circuit did not, however, decide whether strict scrutiny 
or a slightly less stringent standard of review known as exacting 
scrutiny (and described later) was appropriate.183 That is because it 
concluded that Maryland’s statute could not survive even under the 
more deferential test of exacting scrutiny.184 Its decision thus is not 
the focus in this Article, which concentrates on how courts have  
resolved which standard of scrutiny applies in compelled-speech 
cases after Becerra and Janus. 
How, then, did Judge Grimm determine that strict scrutiny was 
appropriate? He did so largely by relying on Reed, Becerra, and  
 
176 355 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Md. 2019), aff’d, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019). 
177 MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 13–405 (2019). 
178 McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 277–83. 
179 Id. at 277–78. 
180 Id. at 297. 
181 Id. at 306. 
182 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2019). 
183 See id. at 520. See also infra note 197 (describing the exacting scrutiny standard). 
184 See McManus, 994 F.3d. at 520 (“On that front, we decline to decide whether strict or 
exacting scrutiny should apply to a disclosure law like the one here because we hold that 
the Act fails even the more forgiving standard of exacting scrutiny.”). 
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Janus.185 He also articulated three “baseline principles” for deciding 
scrutiny.186 Those principles are: 
(1) Political speech receives the highest level of First  
Amendment protection and laws restricting it are subject to  
strict scrutiny;187 
(2) Content-based laws are highly suspect, presumptively  
unconstitutional and are also subject to strict scrutiny;188 
(3) The First Amendment limits the government’s power to 
compel speech just as much as it does the power to restrict speech, 
and laws that compel speech are necessarily content-based and thus 
also must face strict scrutiny.189 
Judge Grimm found that all three baseline principles were im-
plicated by Maryland’s statute and consequently strict scrutiny was 
the default standard of review unless the state could prove that an 
exception to those guideposts applied.190 The Fourth Circuit, it 
should be stressed, concurred that the law was a content-based  
regulation that singled out political expression while also compel-
ling speech.191 Furthermore, and unlike Grimm, the appellate court 
raised another First Amendment red flag about the law: it implicated 
the right to engage in anonymous political speech,192 thereby putting 
into play an additional layer of First Amendment interests.193 All of 
these factors, the Fourth Circuit concluded, “illustrated the impera-
tive of [applying] some form of heightened judicial scrutiny.”194  
As noted above, however, the appellate court declined to resolve 
 
185 See infra notes 199–206 and accompanying text (referencing at least one of these  
three cases). 
186 McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 285. 
187 Id. at 285–86. 
188 Id. at 286. 
189 Id. at 286–87. 
190 Id. at 287. 
191 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 513–14 (4th Cir. 2019). 
192 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that a 
private citizen cannot be compelled to identify herself as the author of political materials); 
see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (noting that “there are times and 
circumstances when States may not compel members of groups engaged in the 
dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified”). 
193 McManus, 944 F.3d at 515. 
194 Id. at 520. 
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whether the correct heightened standard was strict or exacting  
scrutiny because it found the law failed under the latter, more lenient 
level of review.195 
Judge Grimm identified multiple exceptions to the general rule 
that strict scrutiny applies under the trio of “baseline principles” 
noted above.196 These exceptions include: (1) categories of unpro-
tected speech such as incitement, fighting words, true threats, and 
obscenity; (2) commercial speech, which is generally subject to a 
variation of intermediate scrutiny; (3) speech by particular classes 
of individuals or entities, including public school students, prison 
inmates, members of the military, public employees who are speak-
ing pursuant to their job duties, and over-the-air broadcasters; and 
(4) campaign finance disclosure requirements and ballot-initiative 
disclosures affecting candidates, campaigns, political committees, 
or donors, which are treated under an “exacting scrutiny” test that is 
not as rigorous as strict scrutiny.197 He found that none of these  
exceptions to strict scrutiny applied, and he rebuffed Maryland’s  
argument that the exception for such disclosure laws should be  
expanded in McManus to apply to “third-party media outlets or other 
publishers of election-related advertisements.”198 
In pushing back against stretching the reach of the campaign  
finance disclosure exception, Judge Grimm turned to Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert, calling it “a watershed First Amendment case” that  
 
195 Id. The Fourth Circuit seemed reticent, however, to apply strict scrutiny because of 
its almost insurmountable burdens and challenges to protecting electoral integrity. See id. 
(observing that “strict scrutiny, in practice, is virtually impossible to satisfy, while exacting 
scrutiny is merely difficult. To declare an invariable reviewing standard of strict scrutiny 
would be an attempt to script the future in the face of novel challenges to electoral integrity 
that we know not of and cannot foresee”). 
196 See supra text accompanying notes 186–189 (noting the three baseline principles). 
197 See Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 287–93 (D. Md. 2019), aff’d, 944 
F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019). Judge Grimm explained that exacting scrutiny requires the 
government to prove that record-keeping, reporting, or disclosure provisions within 
campaign finance laws “are ‘substantially related’ to an ‘important’ government interest.” 
Id. at 291. See also Mark Strasser, Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and Classifying 
on the Basis of Sex, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2011) (noting that under the exacting 
scrutiny test, a regulation “will be upheld only if it is substantially related to the promotion 
of an important state interest.”). See generally R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting 
Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. REV. 207 (2016) (providing an overview of exacting scrutiny). 
198 McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 293. 
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refined “the analysis of content-based regulations and cementing the 
primacy of the rule that such regulations receive strict scrutiny.”199 
Reed, he reasoned, suggests that carving out any new exceptions  
to the general rule that content-based laws must surmount strict  
scrutiny should occur very rarely.200 
Perhaps more significantly for this Article, Judge Grimm also 
relied on the Court’s 2018 ruling in Becerra to suggest that fashion-
ing new exemptions from strict scrutiny in compelled-speech cases 
is frowned upon.201 Specifically, he pointed out that the majority  
in Becerra: (1) refused to adopt a new exemption from strict scru-
tiny for anything labeled “professional speech,” and (2) tightly  
confined the reach of the Zauderer test.202 As Judge Grimm put it, 
Becerra both “reaffirms the bedrock principle that content-based 
laws are presumptively unconstitutional”203 and “signals that pre-
Reed precedents [such as Zauderer] according diminished First 
Amendment protection to certain categories of speech ought to be 
read narrowly.”204 Finally, he cited the Court’s 2018 ruling Janus.205  
He did so to support his assertion that “the Court has left no doubt 
that the First Amendment cabins the government’s power to compel 
speech no less than it does the power to restrict speech.”206 
Viewed collectively, as Judge Grimm considered them in 
McManus, the Court’s recent rulings in Reed, Becerra, and Janus 
create a powerful presumption that strict scrutiny applies in com-
pelled-speech cases. In selecting it to govern McManus, Grimm  
followed that precedential trifecta and, unlike both Judge Chhabria 
 
199 See id. at 296. 
200 See id. (“Plainly…the thrust of Reed is that content-based laws, as a general matter, 
are suspect. In my view, its strong, unqualified language cuts against the State’s plea here 
to review the Maryland statute—a facially content-based law—under a less rigorous level 
of scrutiny.”). In affirming Judge Grimm’s decision, the Fourth Circuit also cited Reed for 
the proposition that content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. Wash. Post v. 
McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2019). 
201 See McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 297. 
202 See id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 See id. at 286. 
206 Id. See also Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2019) (In 
affirming Judge Grimm’s ruling, the Fourth Circuit also cited Janus as recognizing that the 
First Amendment protects the right not to speak). 
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and the Ninth Circuit in Building Industry Association, did not  
expressly engage in a separate and distinct Breyer-like analysis  
of whether core First Amendment interests and objectives were  
negatively affected by the statute. 
He implicitly did so, however, by acknowledging the law 
“plainly implicated”207 political speech and that such expression 
merits heightened protection because of the role it plays in the  
electoral and campaign processes.208 Additionally, in rebuffing  
Maryland’s argument that exacting—rather than strict—scrutiny 
was applicable, Judge Grimm emphasized that the statute raised not 
just Free Speech Clause concerns, but also Free Press Clause prob-
lems, as the government was encroaching on the independence  
of an entity (the press) that plays a critical role as a check on the  
government.209 In other words, two constitutional interests—free 
speech and free press—were at stake, thus heightening the notion 
that core interests and objectives of the First Amendment were  
indeed at stake. 
The elephant in the McManus courtroom, as it were, was the  
Supreme Court’s 1974 ruling in Tornillo, addressed earlier, in which 
newspapers were also forced by the government to publish  
content.210 Judge Grimm did not compare the case before him  
with Tornillo when determining the applicable level of scrutiny. 
How courts determine scrutiny—not how they apply it once cho-
sen—in compelled-speech cases after Becerra and Janus is the  
focus of this Article.211 Grimm did, however, compare McManus 
with Tornillo in the actual application of strict scrutiny, and it is 
worth considering his logic there, as well as reviewing the funda-
mental holding of Tornillo.212 
 
207 McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 287. 
208 See id. at 285–86. 
209 See id. at 295; see also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment 
Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (observing the value that a free press 
“can serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials,” and noting the then-recent 
impact of the First Amendment “on American life by facilitating a process by which 
countervailing forces check the misuse of official power.”). 
210 See supra notes 114–118 and accompanying text (addressing Tornillo).  
211 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
212 See McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 300. 
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In striking down Florida’s right-of-reply statute that compelled 
newspapers to print the responses of political candidates attacked by 
those publications, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for the 
Tornillo majority that: 
[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and 
the decisions made as to limitations on the size and 
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues 
and public officials—whether fair or unfair—consti-
tute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It 
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regu-
lation of this crucial process can be exercised  
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free 
press as they have evolved to this time.213 
Two points emerge from this quotation. The first is that editing 
is for editors, not the government.214 As Professor Jerome Barron, 
who argued the case before the Supreme Court for candidate Pat 
Tornillo and against the Miami Herald,215 wrote more than three 
decades ago, Tornillo’s central theme “is editorial autonomy: the 
right of editors to decide, without judicial oversight, what they will 
print and what they will not.”216 This facet of Tornillo, as Professor 
David Anderson wrote, “seems to recognize a distinct right of  
editorial autonomy arising from the Press Clause.”217 In fact, 
Tornillo has been viewed as absolutist and unequivocal in its  
protection of press editorial sovereignty when it comes to thwarting 
governmental interference.218 By privileging journalistic autonomy, 
 
213 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
214 See id. The Florida statute, Burger wrote, “intru[ded] into the function of editors.”  
215 See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Media–A Contemporary Appraisal, 35 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 937, 941 (2007) (“Pat Tornillo’s lawyer, Tobias Simon, asked me to join him as 
counsel in seeking a right of reply for Pat Tornillo. Consequently, I argued the case on 
behalf of Pat Tornillo in the Supreme Court.”). 
216 Jerome A. Barron, Essay, On Understanding the First Amendment Status of Cable: 
Some Obstacles in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (1989). See also Jerome 
A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight From First Amendment Doctrine: Justice 
Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 817, 869 (1998) 
(identifying “editorial autonomy” as “a preeminent value” in Tornillo). 
217 David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 494 (2002). 
218 See L.A. Powe, Jr., Tornillo, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 346 (1987) (“Yet instead of 
balancing, the Court held the press interests absolute.”). 
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the Court “embraced a Fourth Estate checking model”219—one  
in which the press plays the role of an independent watchdog on  
the government.220 
The second point from Chief Justice Burger’s quotation above 
relates to the financial and spatial costs to the press of Florida’s  
statute. Specifically, in a print edition of a newspaper such as the 
Miami Herald more than forty-five years ago when Tornillo was  
decided, a periodical that was compelled to run a candidate’s  
response would either: (1) need to sacrifice some of its own planned 
editorial content to make room for that response, or (2) if it did not 
want to cut its own content, would need to add more pages to that 
edition of the paper, thereby ratcheting up financial costs.221 
Although the Maryland statute in McManus only compelled 
speech on newspapers’ websites—not in their print editions—and 
thus did not affect the total volume of content a newspaper could 
either post or print, that facet of Tornillo’s logic was not central for 
Judge Grimm. In fact, he readily acknowledged that Tornillo’s 
 
219 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF 
THE PRESS IN AMERICA 248 (1991). 
220 As the late Professor C. Edwin Baker explained, “the press receives constitutional 
protection to be a voice independent of the government (or, at least, independent of the 
other three ‘estates’) in order to perform the crucial democratic tasks of providing an 
independent source of vision and information, including performance of a watchdog role.” 
C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 968 (2007). Indeed, the Supreme Court, subsequent to Tornillo, 
has remarked on the role of “the press as a watchdog of government activity.” Leathers v. 
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991). 
221 The Tornillo majority explained that: 
The Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a 
newspaper. The first phase of the penalty resulting from the compelled 
printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the cost in printing and 
composing time and materials and in taking up space that could be 
devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to print. 
It is correct, as appellee contends, that a newspaper is not subject to 
the finite technological limitations of time that confront a broadcaster 
but it is not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can 
proceed to infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the 
replies that a government agency determines or a statute commands 
the readers should have available. 
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974). 
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spatial issues were not at play in McManus.222 What was, however,  
critical for Grimm about Tornillo was the central facet of  
that ruling—journalistic autonomy and independence from the  
government. Grimm reasoned that Maryland’s statute “fails strict  
scrutiny…because of its ‘intrusion on the function of editors.’”223  
He added that “respect for a publisher’s right to exercise ‘editorial 
control and judgment’ is not reserved for print media alone; it  
applies with equal force to outlets that publish content on the Inter-
net.”224 For Grimm, Tornillo clearly provides a formidable bulwark 
of protection for the press against any and all efforts by the govern-
ment to compel it to print or post content. 
The Fourth Circuit also suggested that Tornillo grants absolute 
protection from any governmental intrusions into a news organi- 
zation’s decisions about any type of content.225 As Judge J. Harvie 
Wilkinson explained for a unanimous three-judge panel when quot-
ing from Tornillo: 
The First Amendment does not just protect a news 
outlet’s editorial perspective or the way its beat  
reporters cover a given campaign or policy initiative. 
Rather, because the integrity of the newsroom does 
not readily permit mandated interaction with the  
government, the First Amendment applies in full 
force to all “news, comment, and advertising.”226 
It certainly seems, then, like an open-and-shut case that strict 
scrutiny was the correct test for measuring the validity of Mary-
land’s law. Playing the role of devil’s advocate, however, one 
should drill deeper and ask another question: What if Judge Grimm 
had engaged in a more Breyer-like approach to determining scrutiny 
that focused on the extent of the intrusion of Maryland’s laws into 
the core objectives and interests that the First Amendment 
 
222 See Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 300 (D. Md. 2019), aff’d, 944 F.3d 
506 (4th Cir. 2019) (“I grant that requiring state-mandated disclosures to appear on a news 
website does not necessarily take up space the site’s owner might otherwise devote to other 
content.”). 
223 Id. (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258). 
224 Id.  
225 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 517–18 (4th Cir. 2019). 
226 Id. at 518 (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258). 
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safeguards?227 Might this methodology, entailing a closer compari-
son of McManus with Tornillo’s facts and those in seminal right-
not-to-speak cases such as Barnette and Wooley, have led him to 
choose a different standard of review? Such an analysis might  
unspool something akin as to what follows. 
First, it is essential to examine the nature of the obligated  
message. Maryland’s statute does not compel newspapers to convey 
a government-scripted, viewpoint-based message, be it either a short 
ideological maxim, such as “Live Free or Die,” as in Wooley, or a 
longer political one, akin to pledging allegiance to the United States, 
as in Barnette.228 Furthermore, newspapers under the Maryland law 
are not even compelled to convey a purely fact-based, government-
scripted message, such as the one in Becerra that licensed crisis 
pregnancy centers were mandated to convey229 and that likely  
diluted the effectiveness of their own anti-abortion viewpoint.230 
Second, it is important to contrast McManus with Tornillo,  
another Press Clause compelled-speech case. Maryland’s statute 
does not compel newspapers to accommodate and convey objection-
able political viewpoints of private third-parties, as was the situation 
in Tornillo. No space, in fact, need be given to anyone else’s  
viewpoint or opinion—be it that of the government or an individual. 
In turn, there is scant threat of the variety of self-censorship that 
worried the Court in Tornillo—namely, that a newspaper might 
 
227 See supra notes 143–159 and accompanying text (addressing Breyer’s approach to 
scrutiny). 
228 See supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text (addressing Barnette and Wooley). 
229 Licensed crisis pregnancy centers were compelled to disseminate the  
following message: 
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-
cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all 
FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion 
for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the 
county social services office at [insert the telephone number].”  
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 (2018). 
230 See id. at 2371 (“By requiring petitioners to inform women how they can obtain state-
subsidized abortions—at the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from choosing 
that option—the licensed notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of petitioners’ speech.”) 
(quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)). 
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stifle its own viewpoint rather than convey it to readers and, as a 
result, be forced to transmit an oppositional view.231 
Third, and an even more fundamental difference when compared 
with McManus, Tornillo was “an enforceable right of access”232 
case—candidates attacked by newspapers were afforded free entrée 
to those publications’ editorial pages.233 Conversely, the statute in 
McManus does not provide anyone with access to a newspaper’s 
print pages or to its website. McManus, instead, is only about  
compelling disclosure of the names of purchasers of political ads 
and what they paid for them. It does not pivot on giving those  
individuals free access to espouse their views and opinions. 
McManus, in brief, is about compelled revelation, not compelled 
access. Tornillo thus seemingly involved a far greater intrusion on 
press freedom than McManus. 
All of these distinctions between McManus, on the one hand, 
and Wooley, Barnette, Becerra, and Tornillo, on the other, call into 
question whether strict scrutiny was the correct test for Judge 
Grimm to apply because they suggest Maryland’s law does not work 
the same kinds of harms to core First Amendment interests. Clearly, 
political speech was at issue in McManus, but no political viewpoint 
was compelled. Thus, while Justice Breyer acknowledges that  
political speech “lies at the heart of the First Amendment”234 and 
 
231 As the Court explained in Tornillo:  
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that 
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-
of-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to 
avoid controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida 
statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced. 
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974). 
232 Id. at 254. 
233 The Court described the Florida law as:  
a “right of reply” statute which provides that if a candidate for 
nomination or election is assailed regarding his personal character or 
official record by any newspaper, the candidate has the right to demand 
that the newspaper print, free of cost to the candidate, any reply the 
candidate may make to the newspaper’s charges. The reply must 
appear in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the 
charges which prompted the reply, provided it does not take up more 
space than the charges.  
Id. at 244. 
234 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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laws affecting it presumptively demand heightened review,235 that 
presumption might be rebutted in McManus. After all, the law in 
McManus does not restrain political speech; instead, it actually  
provides the public with greater information about the sources  
(the purchasers of advertisements) of political speech in order to  
make better informed judgments about the claims being made.  
The Supreme Court has recognized that the government “has a  
compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion,”236 and 
Maryland’s law arguably helps voters understand political adver-
tisements by clearing up any confusion regarding whose point of 
view is being conveyed. 
Instead of strict scrutiny, then, might not Justice Breyer’s more 
flexible balancing approach of proportionality have been more  
appropriate? He argues that proportionality “is specially designed 
for a context where important constitutional rights and interests  
conflict”237 and is “useful when a statute restricts one constitution-
ally protected interest in order to further some other comparably  
important interest.”238 
That fits the scenario in McManus. Protecting the press from 
government intrusions that jeopardize its independence must be  
balanced against the need to safeguard the democratic electoral  
process. Indeed, the intent behind Maryland’s statute was “to  
stop foreign powers—Russia, in particular—from interfering in  
Maryland elections in the future.”239 Whether the law actually  
furthers that objective, of course, is a matter to be sorted out later in 
the actual application of whatever level of scrutiny is applied. But 
when it first comes to the crucial antecedent step of selecting the 
standard of scrutiny, Maryland’s interest seems to be, in Breyer’s 
 
235 See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (“If, for example, a challenged government regulation negatively affects the 
processes through which political discourse or public opinion is formed or expressed 
(interests close to the First Amendment’s protective core), courts normally scrutinize that 
regulation with great care.”) 
236 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992). 
237 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 163 (2010). 
238 Id. at 163. 
239 Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 281 (D. Md. 2019), aff’d, 944 F.3d 
506 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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terms, “comparably important”240 to protecting the press from  
having to reveal the identity of individuals and entities who  
purchase advertisements. 
There is even more reason than this, however, to push back on 
strict scrutiny from a Breyer-like perspective. He observes that when 
“a challenged government regulation negatively affects the  
processes through which political discourse or public opinion is 
formed or expressed (interests close to the First Amendment’s pro-
tective core), courts normally scrutinize that regulation with great 
care.”241 The argument for not applying strict scrutiny, when viewed 
through the prism of this quotation, is that Maryland’s law is  
intended to positively affect the processes through which public 
opinion about political issues is formed. It strives to accomplish this 
by adding more speech to the marketplace of ideas to help voters 
better understand the sources behind the viewpoints expressed in  
advertisements. Knowing, for example, that Russia or a Russian  
entity purchased a specific political ad might cause voters to dis-
count its credibility and devalue its viewpoints. In other words, the 
argument is that a little bit of government intervention in the  
marketplace of ideas, via compelled-speech mandates that provide 
the public with more objective facts about the ads they read, actually 
enhances democratic self-governance, and furthers informed public 
debate, even if it intrudes on press autonomy.242 
Safeguarding speech in order to facilitate democratic self- 
governance, in turn, is a First Amendment theory often associated 
 
240 BREYER, supra note 237, at 163. 
241 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
242 Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987) (contending 
that “autonomy may be protected, but only when it enriches public debate. It might well 
have to be sacrificed when, for example, the speech of some drowns out the voices of others 
or systematically distorts the public agenda,” and asserting that the government may need 
“to enact measures or issue decrees that enrich public debate, even if that action entails an 
interference with the speech of some and thus a denial of autonomy”); Howard M. 
Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 
194 (2002) (asserting that “compelling individuals to speak…facilitates a greater amount 
of speech, likely from a greater number of speakers. Ensuring more speech from more 
sources arguably ensures the dissemination of a greater amount of speech and a broader, 
more diverse, and more dynamic marketplace of ideas.”). 
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with philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn.243 Columbia 
University President Lee Bollinger explains that for Meiklejohn, 
“the principle of free speech plays a practical role for a self-govern-
ing society, protecting discussion among the citizens so that they can 
best decide what to do about the issues brought before them for  
decision.”244 Indeed, Meiklejohn contended that the twin points of 
ultimate interest in protecting political speech are “the minds of the 
hearers”245 and “the voting of wise decisions.”246 If that really is the 
case, then Maryland’s statute actually promotes the voting of wise 
decisions by providing citizens with facts that might help them to 
make better sense of the content they read in political advertisements 
and thereby to make more informed voting-booth choices about  
candidates and ballot measures. Choosing an often outcome-deter-
minative standard such as strict scrutiny to evaluate the constitution-
ality of Maryland’s law thus might not have provided the correct 
mechanism for balancing the arguably comparable competing inter-
ests and values at stake. Where the First Amendment right of the 
press not to speak collides head on with the public’s interest in  
receiving accurate facts about political speech in a manner that does 
not compel the press to print another person’s or the government’s  
political viewpoint, a proportionality or intermediate scrutiny  
approach to judicial review may be appropriate. 
In summary, and as described earlier in this section, a confluence 
of multiple forces (the presence of a content-based regulation that 
both affects political speech and compels members of the press to 
convey information they otherwise would not) and a trio of cases 
(Reed, Becerra, and Janus) strongly suggest that Judge Grimm was 
correct in deciding that strict scrutiny should govern McManus.  
 
243 See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY 
AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 9 (2001) (“Alexander Meiklejohn, 
perhaps the leading proponent of the self-government theory, argued that the freedom of 
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was the means by which democracy 
functioned.”); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of 
Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1993) (noting that “Meiklejohn 
anchors the First Amendment firmly to the value of self-government”). 
244 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 46 (1986). 
245 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 25 (1948). 
246 Id. 
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The counter-argument offered above (one contrasting McManus’s 
facts with those of key right-not-to-speak cases such as Barnette, 
Wooley, and Tornillo, and one more closely examining how First 
Amendment objectives in protecting speech are implicated by  
Maryland’s statute) suggests, however, that Judge Grimm’s deter-
mination need not have been inevitable and that another less formu-
laic path for selecting scrutiny was viable. Whether the application 
of a different standard—notably, Breyer’s proportionality approach 
or something akin to intermediate scrutiny—ultimately would have 
changed the outcome, of course, is another matter. 
What is key for this Article, though, is considering how the 
standard of scrutiny was selected and suggesting possible alternative 
methodologies to that selection process. In brief, if one equally  
values press autonomy and the integrity of the electoral process, 
then selecting a standard that initially tilts the playing field in favor 
of the former interest and against the latter is suspect. 
C. Compelling Disclosure of Information in Voter Registration 
Drives 
In September 2019, a federal district court in League of Women 
Voters v. Hargett247 blocked Tennessee from enforcing a compelled-
speech obligation imposed on groups engaged in voter registration 
drives. Specifically, when making any “public communication  
regarding voter registration status,” these groups were statutorily 
mandated to “display a disclaimer that such communication is not 
made in conjunction with or authorized by the secretary of state.”248 
In issuing a preliminary injunction, District Judge Aleta Trauger 
reasoned that the measure implicated “well-developed caselaw  
regarding government-compelled speech.”249 Although she did not 
use the phrase “strict scrutiny,” Judge Trauger nonetheless deemed 
the statute presumptively unconstitutional and held it would only 
 
247 400 F. Supp. 3d 706 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).  
248 Id. at 712–13 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132(a)(1), repealed by H.B. 2363, 
111th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2020)). The statute defines public communications as ones 
“made using newspapers or magazines, mass mailings, phone bank or text messages, 
electronic mail systems, or websites.” Id. at 732 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-
132(a)(2), repealed by H.B. 2363, 111th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2020)).  
249 Id. at 729. 
50 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:1 
 
pass First Amendment muster if Tennessee could demonstrate that 
it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.250 In other 
words, she adopted strict scrutiny without calling it such. She indi-
cated that the disclaimer provision fit within this framework as a 
content-based law—the touchstone for triggering strict scrutiny  
under Reed—because it involved a government-drafted script that 
would necessarily alter the message of groups registering voters.251 
Judge Trauger’s analysis of the applicable level of review was 
very brief, consisting of only two paragraphs. Given that she se-
lected strict scrutiny, however, it is unsurprising that she cited both 
Becerra and Reed to support her conclusion.252 These cases, she 
wrote, helped to establish what she characterized as “bedrock First 
Amendment principles.”253 
Judge Trauger also rebuffed Tennessee’s contention that a lesser 
standard of review—namely, the vastly deferential rational basis 
test254—was merited because the law only compelled the disclosure 
of objective facts about those registering voters.255 Citing Becerra, 
she reasoned that “[t]he Supreme Court…has flatly rejected the  
argument that merely because a statement is technically true then 
the government can force a person to make that statement without  
offending the First Amendment.”256 She added—citing Becerra 
once again—that “the Supreme Court has recognized that, if left  
unchecked, the government can use mandatory disclaimers—even 
truthful ones—as a means of ‘manipulat[ing] the content of…dis-
course’ on issues of profound importance.”257 This is an important 
point. The manipulation of the message in Hargett was particularly 
troublesome, Judge Trauger found, because: (1) speech regarding 
voter registration is political and thus resides at the heart of First 
 
250 Id. at 729–30. 
251 Id. at 729. 
252 Id. at 729–30. 
253 Id. at 730. 
254 See id. at 729, n.10 (noting that “[t]he defendants suggest…that the disclaimer 
requirement is subject only to rational basis review,” and holding that such a relaxed 
approach was cabined to the context of commercial speech, not political expression). 
255 Id. at 730. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
2020] SELECTING SCRUTINY IN COMPELLED-SPEECH CASES 51 
 
Amendment protection,258 and (2) the disclaimer denigrated the 
power of those trying to sign up voters by calling to the public’s 
attention their “lack of authority.”259 On this latter point, it will be 
recalled that those conducting voter registration drives had to tell 
people that their efforts were “not made in conjunction with or  
authorized by the secretary of state.”260 One can easily imagine how 
this disclosure might, at least for some prospective registrants, 
lessen the level of credibility or gravitas that they ascribe to the  
message that they should register and, in turn, how this compelled 
disclosure might dissuade them from registering at all. 
Judge Trauger’s concern about the power of a speaker’s message 
being diminished or mitigated by a government-drafted disclosure 
requirement, in fact, tracks the majority’s fear in Becerra that  
the effectiveness of a crisis pregnancy center’s anti-abortion view-
point is significantly diminished by having to convey the fact that 
California offers free and low-cost abortion services.261 Both  
Hargett and Becerra thus tap into what the author of this Article 
previously called the “message-diluting or message-adulterating” 
consequences of some compelled-speech mandates.262 Regarding 
Becerra, the author explained elsewhere that: 
by being forced to convey facts about a procedure to 
which the speaker (i.e., a licensed crisis pregnancy 
center) objects and, in turn, to convey facts that 
might (because they specify that abortion services 
 
258 Judge Trauger wrote that “the speech touched on by the Act falls within the highest 
level of constitutional protection.” Id. She had observed earlier in her opinion that “[a] 
discussion of whether or not a person should register to vote, moreover, inherently 
‘implicates political thought and expression.’” Id. at 724 (quoting Buckley v. Am. Const. 
Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 195 (1999)). 
259 Id. at 730. 
260 Id. at 712–13. 
261 As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in Becerra, “[b]y requiring [licensed crisis 
pregnancy centers] to inform women how they can obtain state-subsidized abortions—at 
the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from choosing that option—the licensed 
notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of [the centers’] speech.” Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life 
Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind 
of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).  
262 Clay Calvert, Wither Zauderer, Blossom Heightened Scrutiny? How the Supreme 
Court’s 2018 Rulings in Becerra and Janus Exacerbate Problems with Compelled-Speech 
Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1408 (2019) (emphasis in original). 
52 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:1 
 
are offered free and at low-cost) lead a patient to 
adopt that procedure, the power of the speaker’s own 
message in favor of not terminating pregnancy is  
arguably diminished.263 
In summary, and as in McManus addressed immediately above, 
the Supreme Court’s logic in Becerra and Reed laid the groundwork 
for a formulaic approach in Hargett to identifying strict scrutiny as 
the appropriate test. It also is important to note that Judge Trauger 
considered her method for selecting scrutiny to fall in line with 
“well-established constitutional standards for evaluating compelled 
speech”264 and to encompass “bedrock First Amendment princi-
ples.”265 There was, in other words, no need in the judge’s mind  
to consider an alternative methodology for choosing scrutiny; the  
principle that strict scrutiny applies to content-based, compelled-
speech mandates permeates the constitutional bedrock. Viewed in 
this light, Becerra’s impact—cited four times in just two paragraphs 
by Trauger—is proving both swift and profound.266 
D. Compelling Sex Offenders to Express Self-Stigmatizing 
Messages 
In October 2019, U.S. District Judge Marc Treadwell in Reed v. 
Long267 granted a preliminary injunction—on behalf of several  
registered sex offenders—that stopped Butts County, Georgia’s 
Sheriff Gary Long from placing signs on the public rights-of-way 
immediately in front of their residences268 that warned people not to 
 
263 Id. 
264 Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 730. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (M.D. Ga. 2019). 
268 A right-of-way was defined in Long as “that part of the yard closest to the road.” Id. 
at 1376. The fact that the signs were on rights-of-way abutting the residences of the 
plaintiffs rather than closer to their abodes was irrelevant for purposes of the First 
Amendment analysis. Judge Treadwell reasoned that: 
[W]hen the Defendants place signs in front of registrants’ homes, the 
fact that the signs are in rights-of-way, rather than a few feet closer to 
the homes, does not alter the First Amendment issues raised by the 
posting of the signs and the ban on any response by the Plaintiffs to  
the signs. 
Id. at 1374. 
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trick-or-treat there.269 The case plainly pitted the sheriff’s concern 
with protecting children on Halloween270 against the First Amend-
ment right of sex offenders not to be compelled to convey the  
sheriff’s stigmatizing warning message.271 
Judge Treadwell chose strict scrutiny to measure the validity of 
Sheriff Long’s mandate.272 In selecting this yardstick, he quoted the 
Supreme Court’s 2018 Janus decision for the proposition that the 
First Amendment protects the right not to speak.273 He also turned 
to the seminal “Live Free or Die” license-plate case of Wooley,  
particularly because it suggests that while the message at issue  
may be that of the government and thus considered “government 
speech,” it is not immune from a traditional compelled-speech  
analysis.274 This is important because the government speech  
doctrine generally shields governmental entities from First Amend-
ment claims of censorship.275 As Erwin Chemerinsky observes, 
 
269 The signs included images of two red stop signs, along with a drawing of a Halloween 
treat bag overlaid with the international “no symbol” (  ). Id. at 1369. The text, which 
was set in all capital letters as indicated here, read: “WARNING! NO TRICK-OR-TREAT 
AT THIS ADDRESS!! A COMMUNITY SAFETY MESSAGE FROM BUTTS 
COUNTY SHERIFF GARY LONG.” Id. The sheriff had posted such signs near Halloween 
in 2018, and he “testified that he plan[ned] to place identical signs in front of the residences 
of the fifty-seven registered sex offenders living in Butts County” proximate to Halloween 
in 2019. Id. at 1370. 
270 Regarding the sheriff’s interest, Judge Treadwell explained that: 
[N]otwithstanding the absence of any specific information or data 
indicating that the Plaintiffs pose a risk, Sheriff Long strongly believes 
the signs are necessary. As he posted on his re-election campaign’s 
Facebook page: “I am so ready for this fight. My staff and I will fight 
this to the end!!! Nothing is more important than our children!!!” 
Id. at 1371. 
271 See id. at 1374 (“The Plaintiffs argue that their First Amendment rights were violated 
when the Defendants placed the signs in front of their homes and forbade them from 
moving the signs or placing any contradicting or competing message near the signs.”). 
272 See id. at 1377 (“To justify the burden on the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, the 
Defendants must show (1) the compelled speech and their restrictions promote a 
compelling government interest and (2) only the least restrictive means to further that 
interest were used.”). 
273 Id. at 1374. 
274 Id. at 1376. 
275 See generally Clay Calvert, The Government Speech Doctrine in Walker’s Wake: 
Early Rifts and Reverberations on Free Speech, Viewpoint Discrimination, and Offensive 
Expression, 25 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1239 (2017) (providing an overview of the 
government speech doctrine). 
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“when the government is the speaker, the First Amendment does not 
apply at all or provide a basis for challenging the government’s  
action.”276 Yet, as Judge Treadwell wrote in citing Wooley, “the  
Supreme Court has never said that government speech cannot also 
be, or can’t become, compelled speech.”277 
Treadwell, engaging in a nuanced approach to scrutiny, also 
thoroughly weighed the strength of the competing interests before 
announcing that strict scrutiny was the correct standard. First, he  
seriously questioned the validity of the sheriff’s ostensible interest 
in safeguarding minors from sexual abuse. To wit, he opined that: 
 the plaintiffs “by all accounts…are rehabilitated. 
They live productive, law-abiding lives.”278 
 “[t]he Sheriff’s decision is not based on any de-
termination that the Plaintiffs are dangerous.”279 
 “[t]he evidence adduced at the hearing tends to 
establish that, having served their sentences, they 
have been rehabilitated and are leading pro-
ductive lives.”280 
 “Sheriff Long acknowledged that since he 
became sheriff in 2013, he has never had any 
problem with [sex offender] registrants having 
unauthorized contact with minors, or, for that 
matter, any problems at all with registrants living 
in Butts County.”281 
 there was an “absence of any specific inform-
ation or data indicating that the Plaintiffs pose  
a risk…”282 
Collectively, these observations belittle the sheriff’s safety  
interest in compelling speech in Long and, sub silentio, suggest that 
heightened scrutiny is warranted to review his mandated message 
because his justification for intruding on the speech rights of sex 
 
276 Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 730 (2011). 
277 Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1376. 
278 Id. at 1367–68. 
279 Id. at 1368. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 1371. 
282 Id. 
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offenders is questionable. As Judge Treadwell encapsulated it,  
the plaintiffs had, “as far as the law is concerned, paid their debts  
to society.”283 A further incursion on their rights, without more  
particularized evidence, thus seemingly merits strict scrutiny. 
In contrast to the sheriff’s interest, the First Amendment concern 
with stymieing the compelled-speech obligation was much weight-
ier for Treadwell for at least four reasons. First, he noted that  
the plaintiff sex offenders were barred by the sheriff from engaging  
in counterspeech against the warning signs.284 Specifically, they 
were prohibited from posting their own responsive yard signs  
bearing competing messages.285 
Counterspeech, of course, traditionally is the preferred self-help 
remedy in First Amendment jurisprudence for speech with which 
people disagree or find offensive.286 Sheriff Long, in brief, stripped 
the plaintiffs of the opportunity to fight back—on their own prop-
erty and with their own words, no less—and to battle against the 
sheriff’s compelled warning message. This conflicts with Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s observation for the plurality in United States v.  
Alvarez287 that “[t]he First Amendment itself ensures the right to  
respond to speech we do not like.”288 
 
283 Id. at 1367. 
284 See id. at 1375 (“By their own admission, the Defendants plan to restrict the Plaintiffs’ 
speech if allowed to post the signs this Halloween.”). 
285 See id. at 1371 (“This year, like last year, residents and homeowners will not be 
allowed to move the signs, cover the signs, place something in front of the signs, or post a 
competing sign.”) (emphasis added). 
286 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If 
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by 
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence.”), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1961); see also Mary Anne 
Franks, Fearless Speech, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 294, 309 (2018) (noting that “First 
Amendment fundamentalists insist the best response to bad speech is more speech,” but 
arguing that “[t]he optimistic embrace of counter-speech as the cure for falsity and injury 
is, however, unfounded”); Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the 
Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 55, 58 (2018) (observing that “a First Amendment tradition that has valorized 
the notion of ‘counterspeech.’ A central tenet of the First Amendment is that more speech 
is an effective remedy against the dissemination and consumption of false speech”). 
287 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
288 Id. at 728. 
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Although Judge Treadwell did not cite it, the Supreme Court’s 
1994 decision in City of Ladue v. Gilleo289 substantially bolsters  
his point that denying the right to speak through a sign in one’s yard 
is particularly egregious. As Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned  
in Gilleo for a unanimous Court, “[r]esidential signs are an unusu-
ally cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for  
persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window  
sign may have no practical substitute.”290 Such signs, he wrote,  
embody “a venerable means of communication that is both  
unique and important.”291 Stevens added that “[a] special respect for  
individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and 
our law…; that principle has special resonance when the govern-
ment seeks to constrain a person’s ability to speak there.”292  
In brief, thwarting one’s ability to speak through a home yard sign 
raises significant First Amendment concerns, thereby militating in 
favor of applying strict scrutiny to measure the validity of any  
such governmental efforts. 
Second, Judge Treadwell examined the underlying substantive 
content of the compelled speech. He determined that it did not  
involve conveying objective facts about the plaintiffs, but rather  
pivoted on hurling “accusations” at them.293 The accusations, of 
course, are that it is dangerous to trick-or-treat at the plaintiffs’  
residences and that people should avoid them.294 
Third, Treadwell focused on the location where the compelled 
speech would occur and how that venue, in turn, would exacerbate 
the detrimental impact of the message by making the plaintiffs seem 
to endorse it. He explained that: 
 
289 512 U.S. 43 (1994). In Gilleo, the Court struck down for violating the First 
Amendment a municipal ordinance that barred residential signs that conveyed, among 
other things, “political, religious, or personal messages.” Id. at 54. Plaintiff Margaret Gilleo 
challenged the ordinance, which prohibited an 8.5- by 11-inch sign she posted in a second-
story window that expressed the anti-war sentiment, “For Peace in the Gulf.” Id. at 46–47. 
290 Id. at 57. 
291 Id. at 54. 
292 Id. at 58 (internal citation omitted). 
293 Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2019). 
294 See id. at 1369–70 (describing the content of the signs that the sheriff posted in 2018 
and that he planned to post again in 2019). 
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[s]omeone who displays, or allows the display of, a 
sign in front of their home likely intends to convey 
that the message is endorsed by them, or allowed by 
them, or, at the very least, that they have acquiesced 
in the message. By requiring the Plaintiffs to display 
these signs, Sheriff Long and his deputies are requir-
ing the Plaintiffs to effectively endorse or adopt, or 
at least acquiesce in, his message, not theirs, because 
the only message Sheriff Long will allow is his.295 
Fourth, the judge focused on the importance of the source of the 
compelled message and, more specifically, the credibility of that 
source in the public’s eyes and how it would likely sway or influence 
the interpretation of the warning message. Source credibility,  
indeed, is a very important concept in communication research when 
it comes to trusting messages.296 The warning sign in Long featured 
the statement “A COMMUNITY SAFETY MESSAGE FROM 
BUTTS COUNTY SHERIFF GARY LONG.”297 Judge Treadwell 
reasoned that “[t]he public undoubtedly will assume that Sheriff 
Long’s determination is correct and, just as undoubtedly, the public 
assume that this determination is based on some process that yielded 
a conclusion that, in fact, the Plaintiffs’ homes are unsafe.”298  
That assumption, he emphasized, would be false.299 
 
295 Id. at 1376–77. 
296 See Sarah De Meulenaer et al., Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and the 
Effects of Source Credibility on Health Risk Message Compliance, 33 HEALTH COMM. 
291, 291 (2018) (“Source credibility consists of two dimensions: source expertise; the 
degree of knowledge or expertise a source has on the message topic; and source 
trustworthiness, the degree to which an audience perceives the assertions made by a source 
to be valid.”); Kristen D. Landreville & Cassie Niles, “And That’s a Fact!”: The Roles of 
Political Ideology, PSRs, and Perceived Source Credibility in Estimating Factual Content 
in Partisan News, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 177, 181 (2019) (“Source credibility is 
conceptualized as audience perceptions of the speaker’s competence (or expertise), 
trustworthiness, and goodwill.”); Andrea Miller & David Kurpius, A Citizen-Eye View of 
Television News Source Credibility, 54 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 137, 140 (2010) (“The currency 
of credibility and trust hinges largely on the credibility and trustworthiness of the 
information and, particularly, the sources.”). 
297 Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1369. 
298 Id. at 1377. 
299 Id. (“There has been no process available to the Plaintiffs to contest Sheriff Long’s 
determination that their homes are unsafe.”). 
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In summary, four factors—(1) the denial of a self-help counter-
speech remedy for the plaintiffs; (2) the accusatory substantive  
content of the compelled message; (3) the front-yard location of the 
compelled message; and (4) the credibility of the source to whom 
the compelled message was directly attributed—collectively mili-
tated in favor of applying strict scrutiny, particularly when those  
factors were considered alongside the dearth of evidence proffered 
by Sheriff Long demonstrating that the plaintiffs posed any danger. 
While it is unsurprising that Judge Treadwell selected strict scrutiny 
and cited Janus and Wooley in the process of doing so, he neither 
referenced Becerra nor cited Reed for the general principle that  
content-based laws typically are subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, 
Treadwell’s analysis departs on this latter point from those of the 
judges in McManus and Hargett. Given his critique, however, of  
the sheriff’s interest in compelling speech and his analysis of the 
four factors noted above, Judge Treadwell reached the correct  
conclusion in selecting strict scrutiny to measure the validity of  
sex-offender warning signs. 
Ultimately, Long differs from the other 2019 compelled-speech 
cases analyzed thus far in two respects. First, it did not involve a 
statute, but rather the independent actions of a non-legislative  
governmental actor—Sheriff Long. Treadwell, however, gave no  
indication that this affected his analysis. 
Second, and more importantly, the compelled speech in Long: 
(1) targeted and stigmatized individuals based on their past bad acts, 
and (2) was justified by suppositions—really, mere guesses—that 
they might engage in those same acts again. This is a key  
difference from the other cases. For example, while the ostensible 
interests in compelling speech in Wheeler (the unreinforced  
masonry case) and Long both pivoted on protecting the public from 
supposed future harms (collapsing buildings during earthquakes, in 
the former, and abuse by sexual offenders during Halloween, in the 
latter), only in the latter case did the compelled speech both tarnish 
an individual’s reputation within his community (neighbors would 
see the signs) and degrade his internal sense of dignity and self-
worth. Thus, while strict scrutiny was selected by the judges in both 
Wheeler and Long for evaluating compelled speech, the need seems 
to be greater to apply it in Long (assuming that one perceives 
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warning signs targeting humans, rather than buildings, as more  
constitutionally suspect). Although it certainly may be hard to feel 
much sympathy for registered sex offenders, even when they  
have already served their prison time, Judge Treadwell’s careful  
analysis of the interests on both sides of the compelled-speech  
equation—those of Sheriff Long in mandating speech and those  
of the plaintiffs in opposing it—provides a thoughtful template  
for selecting scrutiny that does far more than just assume that  
a compelled-speech mandate is subject to strict scrutiny because  
it is content-based. 
E. Anti-Discrimination Laws and Compelling the Creation of 
Speech-Based Products 
As with Long immediately above, the compelled-speech cases 
examined in this section involve the stigmatization of individuals. 
In the disputes here, however, the opprobriously branded individu-
als are not the ones being compelled to speak against their will.  
Rather, they are people who, based on their sexual orientation, are 
denied dignity and equal treatment under the law because others,  
in the face of anti-discrimination statutes, refuse to be compelled  
to create what they contend are speech-based artifacts meriting  
First Amendment protection and exemption from those statutes.300  
Thus, the 2019 cases here are on the leading edge of what Professor 
R. George Wright calls “conflicts between speech claims and anti-
discrimination claims in consumer contexts.”301 
Furthermore, akin to the counterposed interpretations of the 
scrutiny standard in the unreinforced masonry case of Wheeler, the 
scrutiny disputes here can be framed contrastingly, depending on 
one’s ideologies and values. Specifically, they can be seen either as 
cases weaponizing the First Amendment—via the invocation of 
free-speech claims and the adoption of strict scrutiny—to target 
 
300 Cf. Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding 
Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241, 269 (2015) (“With wedding vendors, it is public 
accommodation law. Granting free speech significance to the provision of wedding 
services makes customers belonging to historically subordinated groups more vulnerable 
to discrimination.”). 
301 R. George Wright, Speech and Discrimination in Consumer Contexts, 48 STETSON L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2018). 
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gays and lesbians (or, at least, to attack equality-centric laws  
protecting them from disparate treatment based on sexual  
orientation) or as ones in which the First Amendment simply  
safeguards religiously devout individuals from being forced  
to create expressive items celebrating values (namely, that same-sex 
marriages are acceptable) they find deeply objection-able. More 
briefly, the cases pit principles of equality against individual liberty. 
Indeed, in certainly the most contentious and high-profile  
compelled-speech cases of 2019, the selection of scrutiny followed 
the resolution of two more foundational, threshold questions.  
First, was speech even targeted for regulation or was it affected, if 
at all, merely incidentally or tangentially to the regulation of  
conduct?302 In other words, if only conduct was involved or if 
speech was impacted only incidentally to conduct, then the First 
Amendment would essentially be neutralized.303 The cases thus tap 
into what traditionally has been a rather fundamental dichotomy  
between First Amendment protected speech and unprotected  
conduct.304 But compounding the problem, as illustrated later, is a 
related secondary question: If speech, in fact, does exist and is  
regulated, then who is actually speaking—the creator of the speech 
product or the customer who purchases it? More succinctly, to 
whom should the speech be ascribed? 
A trio of cases—each involving business owners who voiced  
religious-based objections to having to comply with anti- 
discrimination public accommodations laws by creating what  
they claimed were speech-based products celebrating same-sex 
 
302 Cf. Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 183, 188 (2015) (“The notion that there is a distinction between laws that regulate 
speech and laws that regulate conduct with merely an incidental effect on speech is well 
established.”). 
303 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (“It is . . . true that the First 
Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing 
incidental burdens on speech.”). 
304 Randall P. Bezanson, Is There Such a Thing as Too Much Free Speech?, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 601, 601 (2012) (“From its beginning, the First Amendment speech guarantee has 
rested on two fundamental boundaries: speech versus conduct and liberty versus utility.”); 
R. Randall Kelso, supra note 42, at 356 (“By its terms, the First Amendment proscribes 
only government action ‘abridging the freedom of speech,’ not conduct. Governmental 
regulations of conduct, therefore, are outside of the ambit of the First Amendment.”). 
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weddings—illustrate these predicaments. The 2019 cases address-
ing the issue of scrutiny are, from oldest to most recent: (1) the  
Supreme Court of Washington’s unanimous ruling in Washington v. 
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.;305 (2) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit’s two-to-one decision in Telescope Media Group v. 
Lucero;306 and (3) the Supreme Court of Arizona’s four-to-three  
ruling in Brush & Nib Studios v. City of Phoenix.307 
The debate over selecting scrutiny in such right-not-to-speak 
claims involving public accommodations laws was not resolved by 
the Supreme Court in the 2018 case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission.308 The Court held in favor of 
cake baker Jack Phillips and his refusal to create a cake for a  
same-sex wedding reception. The decision was based narrowly on 
Free Exercise Clause grounds, with the Court dodging the Free 
Speech Clause claim.309 Justice Clarence Thomas, it should be 
noted, wrote a separate concurrence on Phillips’s free speech theory,  
finding both that creating a custom wedding cake was expressive 
conduct protected by the First Amendment and that “Colorado’s 
public-accommodations law cannot penalize it unless the law  
withstands strict scrutiny.”310 
In delivering the opinion of the Court, however, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy left it for another day to sort out precisely how applying 
“constitutional freedoms [of speech] in new contexts can deepen our 
understanding of their meaning.”311 While Kennedy may have been 
focusing on whether creating a wedding cake falls within the 
 
305 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019). 
306 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019). 
307 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019). 
308 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
309 See id. at 1724 (concluding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s “actions 
here violated the Free Exercise Clause”); see also Abner S. Greene, Barnette and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. Rev. 667, 667 (2019) 
(noting that in Masterpiece Cakeshop, “the Court resolved the matter on narrower, as-
applied, Free Exercise Clause grounds”). 
310 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1745–46 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
311 Id. at 1723. 
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meaning of “speech” and implicates coverage by the First Amend-
ment,312 his words could just as easily apply now to the law’s under-
standing of scrutiny selection in such cases where First Amendment 
concerns are determined to exist. 
So, how did the courts in the three cases here rule on the question 
of scrutiny? One court, in fact, did not rule on it. Specifically, the 
Supreme Court of Washington in Arlene’s Flowers, in reconsidering 
the case on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court in light of its  
ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop, concluded that the creation and 
sale of wedding floral arrangements was neither pure speech nor  
expressive conduct313 and thus received no First Amendment speech 
protection.314 Instead, it was “unprotected conduct,”315 and therefore 
Washington’s high court never faced the scrutiny selection issue. In 
turn, Barronelle Stutzman, a Southern Baptist who believes  
marriage should only be between a man and a woman,316 lost  
her free speech claim.317 Arlene’s Flowers thus illustrates the 
 
312 See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1618 (2015) (“When an act (whether a regulatory act of 
government or a communicative or expressive act of a speaker) is held to implicate the 
First Amendment—when a First Amendment-inspired test or standard of review applies—
the act can be considered to be covered by the First Amendment.”); Amanda Shanor, First 
Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 319 (2018) (asserting that “First 
Amendment coverage denotes the scope of activities that litigants and judges consider 
proper targets of constitutional litigation and review”). 
313 Expressive conduct generally refers to the idea that certain forms of conduct can rise 
to the level of speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. As former Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor wrote in characterizing cross-burning as a form of speech, “the First 
Amendment protects symbolic conduct as well as pure speech.” Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 360, n.2 (2003). The Court’s primary test for expressive conduct requires both 
that a particularized message be intended by the actor engaging in the conduct, as well as 
a great likelihood that the message will be understood as intended by those who view it in 
the surrounding circumstances. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
The Court has clarified, however, that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a 
condition of constitutional protection,” particularly when it comes to paintings, music, 
literature and parades. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557, 569 (1995). See also Corbin, supra note 300, at 244 (noting that “[w]hether 
conduct has an expressive element is (often but not always) determined by the test set forth 
in Spence v. Washington”). 
314 Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1224–28 (Wash. 2019). 
315 Id. at 1227. 
316 Id. at 1211. 
317 Id. at 1228. 
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importance of the first of the two “foundational, threshold ques-
tions” noted above.318 
However, in both Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib  
Studios, the respective majorities determined that First Amendment-
protected speech was at issue, thus they confronted the scrutiny 
question.319 Before examining their resolution of the scrutiny  
question, it helps to briefly understand the nature of the speech in 
each case and the objections raised by the respective plaintiffs. 
In Telescope Media Group, the speech consisted of wedding  
videos produced by Carl and Angel Larsen, a Christian couple,  
as part of their Telescope Media Group business.320 They sought  
to produce only wedding videos “promot[ing] their view of  
marriage as a sacrificial covenant between one man and one 
woman”321 in order to influence “the cultural narrative regarding 
marriage.”322 They objected to producing same-sex wedding videos 
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), which prohibits  
places of public accommodation from discriminating against indivi- 
duals based on their sexual orientation.323 In brief, they claimed  
it was “unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the  
First Amendment to require them to make same-sex-wedding  
videos.”324 In concluding that the Larsens’ videos “are, in a word, 
speech,”325 the Eighth Circuit majority emphasized the large amount 
of editorial control and judgment the couple intended to exercise  
in creating them.326 
 
318 Sherman, supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
319 Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 750 (8th Cir. 2019); Brush & Nib 
Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890, 908 (Ariz. 2019). 
320 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 750 (“The Larsens’ videos are a form of speech 
that is entitled to First Amendment protection.”). 
321 Id. at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
322 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
323 MINN. STAT. § 363A.11(a)(1) (2019) and MINN. STAT. § 363A.17(3) (2019). 
324 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 749. 
325 Id. at 751. 
326 The majority wrote: 
The complaint makes clear that the Larsens’ videos will not just be 
simple recordings, the product of planting a video camera at the end of 
the aisle and pressing record. Rather, they intend to shoot, assemble, 
and edit the videos with the goal of expressing their own views about 
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In Brush & Nib Studios, the Arizona Supreme Court majority 
concluded that custom wedding invitations created by Joanna Duka 
and Breanna Koski, the owners of Brush & Nib Studios, “constitute 
pure speech entitled to full First Amendment protection.”327  
In holding the invitations were pure speech, the majority focused on 
the fact that Duka and Koski “use their original artwork, paintings, 
hand-drawn images, words, and calligraphy as a means of personal 
expression.”328 The duo, who are Christians, “do not believe that 
two people of the same sex can be married.”329For them, “creating  
a custom wedding invitation that conveys a message celebrating 
same-sex marriage, for any customer regardless of sexual orien- 
tation, violates their sincerely held religious convictions.”330  
They sued the City of Phoenix to prevent it from enforcing a public  
accommodations ordinance they claimed “compels them to use their 
artistic talents and personal expression to create custom invitations 
celebrating same-sex weddings in violation of their free speech 
rights.”331 Although they alleged a violation of their speech rights 
under Arizona’s constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court nonethe-
less applied First Amendment principles to resolve the case.332 
In summary, majorities of both the Eighth Circuit in Telescope 
Media Group and the Supreme Court of Arizona in Brush & Nib 
Studios concluded that speech covered by the First Amendment, not 
simply the conduct of refusing to sell a product as the governmental 
 
the sanctity of marriage. Even if their customers have some say over 
the finished product, the complaint itself is clear that the Larsens retain 
ultimate editorial judgment and control. 
Id. 
327 Brush & Nib Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890, 908 (Ariz. 2019). 
328 Id. at 909. The majority held that “pure speech” encompasses “original artwork,” as 
well as “words, pictures, paintings, and films,” that “are used by a person as a means of 
self-expression.” Id. at 906. 
329 Id. at 898. 
330 Id. 
331 Id. at 899–900. 
332 Id. at 903 (reasoning that “because federal precedent conclusively resolves Plaintiffs’ 
claim, we can adequately address it under First Amendment jurisprudence,” and adding 
that “by applying First Amendment jurisprudence, we…address Plaintiffs’ state claim.). 
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entities had claimed,333 was at issue. They thus additionally needed 
to address the level of scrutiny to apply to resolve the compelled-
speech claims; both selected strict scrutiny.334 How did they choose 
that test? Sections 1 and 2 below examine the approaches to scrutiny 
in Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios, respectively. 
Each section reviews both the majority and dissenting opinions as 
they relate to the selection of scrutiny. 
Section 3 then shows how these cases illustrate a foundational 
problem with selecting scrutiny in a formulaic way that hinges on 
whether a law is content-based or content-neutral. The line separat-
ing content-based from content-neutral laws sometimes is anything 
but clear.335 The majorities in both cases deemed the public  
accommodations laws at issue to be content-based measures as  
applied to the plaintiffs’ activities.336 In so holding, the majorities 
also adopted and applied strict scrutiny. In contrast, the dissents in 
both cases concluded the laws were content-neutral and subject to a 
more deferential standard of review.337 Thus, if one initially  
perceives the individual liberty of speech, on the one hand, and the 
interest in equality and non-discrimination, on the other, to be 
roughly comparable, then: (1) the selection of strict scrutiny is  
problematic because it initially tilts the playing field in favor of  
the former interest over the latter, and (2) the very process that  
leads to the selection of strict scrutiny—deciphering whether a law 
is content-based or content-neutral—is malleable and, cynically 
viewed, manipulatable to conform to a jurist’s prioritization of  
liberty over equality. 
 
333 Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 752 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Minnesota’s 
position is that it is regulating the Larsens’ conduct, not their speech.”); Brush & Nib 
Studios, 448 P.3d at 900 (“The City argues…that the Ordinance, as applied to Plaintiffs’ 
custom wedding invitations, regulates conduct, not speech.”). 
334 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754 (“Laws that compel speech or regulate it based 
on its content are subject to strict scrutiny, which will require Minnesota, at a minimum, to 
prove that the application of the MHRA [Minnesota Human Rights Act] to the Larsens is 
‘narrowly tailored to serve [a] compelling state interest[].’”) (quoting Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)); Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 914 (concluding 
that Phoenix’s ordinance “must survive strict scrutiny”). 
335 See infra Section I.E.3. 
336 See id. 
337 See id. 
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1. Resolving Scrutiny in Telescope Media Group 
The Eighth Circuit in Telescope Media Group applied a simple, 
cut-and-dried methodology to conclude that strict scrutiny was  
appropriate: “Laws that compel speech or regulate it based on its 
content are subject to strict scrutiny.”338As is critical for this  
Article, the majority drew heavy support from the Supreme Court’s 
2018 Janus decision in fashioning the first facet of this disjunctive 
rule.339 Specifically, it cited Janus for the proposition that as  
between the right to speak and the right not to speak, “the latter is 
perhaps the more sacred of the two rights.”340 That notion draws life 
from dual assertions Justice Alito made for the Janus majority: (1) 
“measures compelling speech are at least as threatening” as those 
thwarting it, and (2) “[w]hen speech is compelled . . . additional 
damage is done” beyond that caused when speech is restricted  
because forcing people to “endorse ideas they find objectionable is 
always demeaning.”341 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit majority 
quoted Janus for the principle that there is a “‘cardinal constitutional 
command’ against compelled speech.”342 In brief, Janus evidenced 
for the majority both the harm wrought by compelled-speech  
mandates (their “demeaning” nature) and that they are verboten (the  
cardinal constitutional command against them), thereby providing 
support for the decision to apply strict scrutiny. 
For the majority, Telescope Media Group fit snugly within this 
framework. Here, the court deemed it demeaning for the Larsens, 
under the MHRA, to be forced to convey a positive message about 
same-sex marriage that conflicted with their beliefs.343 Where 
Becerra proved particularly powerful in Wheeler, McManus, and 
Hargett in building a rationale for applying strict scrutiny in  
compelled-speech cases,344 it was Janus that played a front-and-
 
338 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754 (emphasis added). 
339 See id. at 752–53 (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) four times). 
340 Id. at 752 (citing Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463–64). 
341 Id. 
342 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 752 (quoting Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463). 
343 Id. at 752–53.  The majority explained that the MHRA “compels the Larsens to speak 
favorably about same-sex marriage if they choose to speak favorably about opposite-sex 
marriage.” Id. at 752. 
344 See supra text accompanying notes 88–90, 200–206, and 255–266. 
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center role for the Telescope Media Group court in establishing  
its bright-line rule that “[l]aws that compel speech . . . are subject  
to strict scrutiny.”345 
Two other Supreme Court right-not-to-speak decisions also 
nudged the majority towards concluding that laws compelling 
speech are subject to strict scrutiny—Tornillo, addressed earlier,346 
and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston.347 In Hurley, the Court held that the First Amendment  
allowed the private organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade—an  
inherently expressive activity348—to exclude, in the face of a  
Massachusetts public accommodations law, the carrying of a banner 
by a gay, lesbian, and bisexual organization because its banner 
would intrude on the autonomy of the parade organizers in control-
ling the parade’s messages.349 The dispute in Hurley pivoted not on 
banning the group from marching, but rather on allowing it to march 
with “its own banner.”350 The Court ruled for the parade organizers, 
concluding their “claim to the benefit of this principle of auto- 
nomy to control one’s own speech is as sound as the South Boston 
parade is expressive.”351 
The Eighth Circuit majority used both Tornillo and Hurley 
largely to rebut Minnesota’s argument that the injury to the Larsens 
was not, in fact, demeaning because the MHRA did not require them 
to convey a specific government-drafted message.352 For the major-
ity, Tornillo and Hurley stood for the collective principle that the 
forced inclusion of a third-party’s message (a political candidate’s 
views in Tornillo, and a gay, lesbian, and bisexual organization’s 
banner in Hurley) is just as harmful as being forced to convey  
 
345 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754. 
346 See supra text accompanying notes 114–18 (addressing Tornillo). 
347 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
348 Id. at 568 (“Parades are…a form of expression, not just motion, and the inherent 
expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving 
protest marches.”). 
349 Id. at 573 (concluding that “this use of the States power violates the fundamental rule 
of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message”). 
350 Id. at 572. 
351 Id. at 574. 
352 See Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 753 (8th Cir. 2019). 
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a government-scripted statement.353 In other words, for the Eighth 
Circuit, the “foisting of a third party’s message on a speaker”354  
is equally as injurious as the government compelling its own pre-
fabricated message. 
The majority added that beyond simply compelling speech,  
the MHRA interfered with the speech rights of the Larsens by  
operating “as a content-based regulation of their speech.”355 As the  
appellate court wrote, there were “overlapping” concerns about 
compelling speech and imposing a content-based regulation, thus 
providing two justifications for why the MHRA, as applied to the 
Larsens’ wedding videos and their desire not to create ones celebrat-
ing same-sex marriages, should be subjected to strict scrutiny.356 
The majority deemed the MHRA content-based, despite its  
facial neutrality, because the obligation it imposed on the Larsens to 
create wedding videos for same-sex couples was triggered by their 
initial decision to create a specific type of content—namely, wed-
ding videos for opposite-sex couples.357 That is to say, the MHRA 
both: (1) created an obligation to produce one type of content (same-
sex wedding videos) only because of the Larsens’ earlier decision to 
produce another type of content (opposite-sex wedding videos), and 
(2) penalized their initial decision by forcing them to create content 
to which they objected.358The majority cited Reed to support the  
notion that the MHRA was content-based because its operation was 
triggered in Telescope Media Group by the ideas and messages  
expressed through wedding videos.359 
Finally, the majority turned to Tornillo to support the theory that 
the Larsens were penalized based upon content they produced, much 
in the same way that Florida newspapers in Tornillo were penalized 
for printing content critical of candidates for public office.360 In a 
nutshell, the Larsens would not have been obligated to create same-
 
353 Id. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. at 753. 
356 Id. at 752. 
357 Id. at 753. 
358 Id. 
359 Id. 
360 Id. 
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sex wedding videos had they not elected to create opposite-sex ones, 
and Florida newspapers would not have faced a mandate to publish 
the views of candidates for public office they opposed had they not 
published views critical of them in the first place.361 Thus, much as 
the Supreme Court in Tornillo fretted about the chilling effect that 
Florida’s right-of-reply law might have on newspapers by deterring 
them from printing their own views about candidates in order not to 
be compelled to publish those of the candidates they opposed,362 the 
Eighth Circuit majority worried about the chilling effect on the 
speech of the Larsens, who wanted to “make films that promote their 
view of marriage as a ‘sacrificial covenant between one man and 
one woman.’”363 As the Telescope Media Group majority wrote in 
quoting Tornillo, “‘the safe course’ for the Larsens would be to 
avoid the wedding-video business altogether. Yet this type of  
compelled self-censorship, a byproduct of regulating speech based 
on its content, unquestionably ‘dampens the vigor and limits the  
variety of public debate.’”364 
But the majority did not stop there in equating the gravity of the 
content-based penalty and the possibility of self-censorship in  
Telescope Media Group with that in Tornillo. It contended that  
the obligation imposed by the MHRA was actually worse than  
that levied by the right-of-reply statute in Tornillo.365 The majority  
reasoned that in Tornillo, “all the newspaper had to do was  
reproduce verbatim an opinion piece written by someone else…. 
The MHRA, in contrast, would require the Larsens to use their  
own creative skills to speak in a way they find morally objection-
nable.”366 In other words, it is more injurious—from a First Amend-
ment perspective, in the majority’s view—to be compelled to  
create objectionable content for someone else than it is to publish  
objectionable content someone else has already created. This  
suggests a type of logic where the sweat-of-one’s-brow—the effort  
 
361 Id. 
362 See supra text accompanying notes 116–17 (addressing the chilling effect and self-
censorship concerns in Tornillo). 
363 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 748. 
364 Id. at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
365 Id. at 754, n.4. 
366 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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of writing rather than merely printing—affects right-not-to-speak  
scrutiny analyses. 
All of this reasoning, it must be emphasized, occurred before the 
majority articulated its clear-cut rule noted earlier that “[l]aws  
that compel speech or regulate it based on its content are subject  
to strict scrutiny.”367In brief, Janus, Hurley, and Tornillo played  
key roles for the Eighth Circuit majority in supporting its selec- 
tion of strict scrutiny. Applying that test, the majority reversed  
the trial court’s dismissal of the Larsens’ free speech claim and sent  
the case back to the lower court to decide whether a preliminary  
injunction should be issued.368 
Judge Jane Kelly dissented.369 As with the majority, she  
recognized that videos are expression safeguarded by the First 
Amendment.370 But that conclusion provided no succor, in her view, 
for the Larsens. Why? Not only because she believed the MHRA 
would actually survive strict scrutiny,371 but also because she found 
the more deferential, intermediate scrutiny standard was the correct 
test, as she viewed the MHRA to be a content-neutral regulation that 
does not, in fact, compel speech.372 The statute only regulates  
conduct, in Judge Kelly’s view, and is neither content-based on its 
face nor was it adopted with the illicit motive of targeting particular 
content, thereby putting it outside of Reed’s requirements for a  
content-based law.373 In brief, the MHRA regulates the speech prod-
ucts of the Larsens, but only incidentally to regulating discrimina-
tory conduct by places of public accommodation—here, the  
 
367 Id. 
368 Id. at 747 (“Because the First Amendment allows the Larsens to choose when to speak 
and what to say, we reverse the dismissal of two of their claims and remand with 
instructions to consider whether they are entitled to a preliminary injunction.”). 
369 Id. at 762 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
370 Id. at 771. 
371 Id. at 776 (“Although intermediate scrutiny is the applicable standard, the MHRA 
would survive even strict scrutiny.”). 
372 Id. at 763–73 (contending that the majority “tries to recharacterize Minnesota’s law 
as a content-based regulation of speech, asserting that it forces the Larsens to speak and to 
convey a message with which they disagree. Neither is true,” and finding that “[t]he MHRA 
neither compels speech nor targets speech based on its content.  In fact, the law says nothing 
about speech at all,” and adding that it “is a content-neutral statute and subject to 
intermediate scrutiny”). 
373 Id. 
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Telescope Media Group business.374 The mere fact that a speech-
based product was involved did not make the law, at least for Judge 
Kelly, content-based and thus did not trigger strict scrutiny.375 
Four facets of her logic in concluding that intermediate  
scrutiny was appropriate are important, especially when contrasted 
with that of the majority. First, she distinguished Tornillo because it 
did not involve a public accommodations law, but rather pivoted  
on a statute that directly compelled specific content to be printed  
by newspapers.376 As such, the Eighth Circuit majority’s efforts to  
analogize the harms suffered by the Larsens to those sustained by 
the Miami Herald in Tornillo “fail[ed] from the start.”377 
Second, she used Hurley, which did involve a public accommo-
dations law, to her advantage by distinguishing its facts from those 
in Telescope Media Group. Judge Kelly pointed out that Massa- 
chusetts’ public accommodations statute transformed an inherently  
expressive parade into its very own public accommodation.378  
Thus, the statute, by demanding inclusion of a banner with a  
specific message, necessarily had the effect of a content-based  
regulation by requiring the speaker (the parade organizer) to alter  
its own message.379 As she interpreted it, Hurley stands for the  
principle “that a facially neutral [public accommodations] law  
may be subject to strict scrutiny if it is applied in a way that ma-
terially burdens the speaker’s ‘autonomy to choose the content  
of his own message.’”380 
 
374 Id. at 776. 
375 Id. at 763 (opining “[t]hat the service the Larsens want to make available to the public 
is expressive does not transform Minnesota’s law into a content-based regulation”). 
376 Id. at 773 (“That a law regulating the content of a newspaper was deemed a content-
based regulation of speech has no bearing on whether a law regulating discrimination in 
places of public accommodation also so qualifies.”) (emphasis in original). 
377 Id. 
378 Id. at 775 (noting that “the application of Massachusetts’s law in Hurley improperly 
transformed the parade sponsors’ speech into a public accommodation”). 
379 Id. at 774. 
380 Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 573 
(1995)) (emphasis in original). 
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In contrast, the public accommodation in Telescope Media 
Group is the business itself that offers wedding video services,381 
not—despite their claims—the Larsens’ own speech.382 Instead, the 
speech—the message—is that of their customers, as the Larsens are 
simply in the business of telling customers’ messages and stories, 
regardless of how much editorial control the Larsens exercise.383  
In brief, wedding videos are speech, but the message they convey 
belongs to the customer for whom they are created.384 Thus, the 
Larsens’ own message is not altered by the MHRA. If, instead, the 
Larsens were independent videographers or filmmakers telling their 
own stories, rather than operators of a public accommodation telling 
stories on behalf of others, then the level of scrutiny would be  
different, Judge Kelly averred,385 and strict scrutiny would apply.386 
Therefore, Judge Kelly’s comparison with Hurley taps into the  
secondary fundamental issue noted earlier affecting scrutiny in  
compelled-speech cases involving public accommodations laws: 
Who is really speaking—the business or the customer?387 If the 
speaker is the business (or, as in Hurley, the parade organizer),  
then a public accommodations law that forces it to provide content 
against its desire will trigger strict scrutiny. If, in contrast, the 
speaker is the customer, then the business is only engaged in the 
conduct of creating someone else’s speech-based product and strict 
scrutiny is unnecessary to consider the business’s First Amendment 
 
381 Id. at 767 (“The Larsens concede that, by offering wedding-video services to the 
general public, TMG [Telescope Media Group] qualifies as a place of public 
accommodation under the MHRA’s definition.”). 
382 Id. at 775 (“Whereas the application of Massachusetts’s law in Hurley improperly 
transformed the parade sponsors’ speech into a public accommodation, here it is the 
Larsens who are affirmatively declaring their speech to be a public accommodation by 
selling their videography services on the open market.”). 
383 Id. 
384 Id. (“Although the Larsens may exercise editorial control over TMG’s [Telescope 
Media Group’s] services, it is still ultimately the couple’s story that is being told, not that 
of the Larsens.”). 
385 Id. (“If the Larsens truly were artists speaking their own message, then TMG similarly 
would not qualify as a place of public accommodation and this entire lawsuit would be 
unnecessary.”). 
386 Id. at 776 (“A law telling an independent artist what pictures to paint or a newspaper 
what articles to publish would still be subject to strict scrutiny.”). 
387 See supra p. 60. 
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claim because speech is being regulated only incidental to the  
conduct of its creation. 
The majority in Telescope Media Group clearly saw the speaker 
as the Larsens. It did so by focusing on two assertions the Larsens 
made: (1) that they create wedding videos “with the goal of express-
ing their own views about the sanctity of marriage,”388 and (2) that 
they “retain ultimate editorial judgment and control.”389 For the  
majority, this meant that the videos created by the Larsens became 
their own public accommodations un-der the MHRA, much like the 
parade in Hurley was its own public accommodation.390 
Judge Kelly, in contrast, embraced a perceptual, reasonable- 
observer view of who was speaking. What mattered for her was 
whether “viewers of TMG’s wedding videos would be likely to  
understand them to be expressions of the Larsens’ ‘particularized 
message’ about marriage.”391 This tracks the second prong of the 
two-part test for symbolic speech adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Spence v. Washington.392 Under the Spence test, conduct rises to the 
level of speech not only if a person intends through his or her  
actions to convey a particularized message, but also if that message 
is substantially likely to be understood given the circumstances in 
which it occurred.393 Under this standard, she concluded that  
“reasonable observers” would not perceive the same-sex wedding 
videos the Larsens would be forced to create under the MHRA  
as conveying their own message.394 The majority in Telescope  
Media Group, it should be noted, held that wedding “videos 
 
388 Id. at 751 (emphasis added). 
389 Id. (emphasis added). 
390 Id. at 758 (“But when, as here, Minnesota seeks to regulate speech itself as a public 
accommodation, it has gone too far under Hurley and its interest must give way to the 
demands of the First Amendment.”) (emphasis added). 
391 Id. at 775 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)). 
392 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974). 
393 See id. at 410–11 (“An intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in 
the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”). 
394 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 775 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting  
in part). 
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themselves are…speech,”395 and thus it did not need to use the 
Spence test. This raises the issue of whether a test that applies  
for symbolic expression (Spence) is relevant where pure speech  
products are involved. 
In brief, Telescope Media Group illustrates competing methods 
for deciding who is speaking in public accommodations law cases 
where speech products are compelled: (1) should the asserted  
intent of, and amount of editorial control exercised by, a service  
provider decide the issue; or (2) should a judge’s resolution of how 
a reasonable observer, looking at the finished speech product, would 
perceive it be determinative? Both tacks seem problematic: self-
serving protestations of conveying one’s own message and includ-
ing contractual verbiage specifying ultimate editorial control can  
exempt one out of public accommodations laws, on the one hand, 
while fathoming who is truly speaking can amount to a guessing 
game and perhaps lead to misattribution, on the other hand.396  
The split in Telescope Media Group fails to resolve this issue and, 
instead, illustrates how taking different routes to speech attribution 
can ultimately lead to very different conclusions. 
A third facet of Judge Kelly’s analysis on the level-of-scrutiny 
determination warranting review is her favorable use of the  
Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic 
and Institutional Rights.397 In Rumsfeld, the Court rejected the  
argument made by FAIR—an association of law schools and  
faculty members—that a federal law (the Solomon Amendment)  
violated their First Amendment rights of free speech and  
expressive association by compelling them, at the risk of losing  
federal funding, to host military recruiters on campus and to allow 
those recruiters to disseminate their views.398 FAIR objected to the  
military’s discriminatory policy regarding gay service members be-
cause it conflicted with FAIR’s own non-discriminatory beliefs and 
 
395 Id. at 751. 
396 See Wright, supra note 301, at 6–7 (asserting that “[a]udiences will not always be of 
one mind in judging matters of speech authorship and endorsement,” and adding that 
“[c]ourts should thus more generally recognize the possibility of divided, mixed, and 
uncertain audience ascriptions of responsibility for speech”). 
397 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
398 Id. at 51–53. 
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policies about gays and lesbians.399 The theory, in brief, was that 
being forced to accommodate the recruiters’ views about gays in the 
military would alter and dilute the law schools’ non-discriminatory 
viewpoint on that subject.400 
The Supreme Court rejected FAIR’s argument. It concluded the 
Solomon Amendment primarily regulated conduct (allowing  
on-campus access to military recruiters), not speech.401 To the extent 
that law schools were forced to engage in speech by emailing and 
posting flyers notifying students that military recruiters would be on 
campus, the Court determined that such speech was “plainly inci-
dental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of conduct.”402  
It reasoned that this speech was “a far cry” from that at issue in  
Barnette and Wooley where individuals had to endorse “a Govern-
ment-mandated pledge or motto.”403 
Judge Kelly cited Rumsfeld to support her conclusion that  
the MHRA is not transformed into a content-based regulation of  
speech subject to strict scrutiny merely because its regulation  
of conduct incidentally affects speech.404 She indicated that the  
impact was merely incidental, much like that in Rumsfeld, because 
the Larsens were not forced “to advocate a particular, government- 
sanctioned message.”405 
A fourth point—one beyond distinguishing Tornillo, one  
distinct from using Hurley to her advantage, and one separate from 
favorably invoking the Court’s decision in Rumsfeld—about Judge 
 
399 See id. 
400 Id. 
401 Id. at 60 (“As a general matter, the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not 
speech.  It affects what law schools must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—
not what they may or may not say.”). 
402 Id. at 62. 
403 Id. The Court explained that: 
Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other 
recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is simply not the same as 
forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a Jehovah’s Witness 
to display the motto “Live Free or Die,” and it trivializes the freedom 
protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest that it is. 
Id. 
404 Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 776 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kelly, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
405 Id. 
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Kelly’s logic in the scrutiny determination is especially important 
for this Article. In particular, she cited both Becerra and Janus as 
standing for the principle that “when the government compels an 
individual to engage in speech the individual otherwise would find 
objectionable, this ordinarily constitutes a content-based regulation 
triggering strict scrutiny.”406 As with Wheeler, McManus, Hargett, 
and Long, this indicates the collective powerful impact of Becerra 
and Janus. Yet, the key word here, given Kelly’s conclusion that 
intermediate scrutiny should apply, is “ordinarily.” Her close  
comparison of the facts in Telescope Media Group with key  
compelled-speech cases such as Tornillo, Hurley, and Rumsfeld 
makes it evident—at least in her view—that Becerra and Janus 
merely create a rebuttable presumption, not an insurmountable one, 
regarding strict scrutiny. In other words, Becerra and Janus are not 
immune from pushback by lower courts that take the time to  
closely compare the facts of the case before them with those at  
issue in other Supreme Court rulings. Her assertion of the  
compelled-speech scrutiny rule, with its inclusion of “ordinarily,” 
contrasts directly with the majority’s unequivocal, caveat-free  
assertion in Telescope Media Group that “[l]aws that compel 
speech . . . are subject to strict scrutiny.”407 
With the Eighth Circuit’s split over scrutiny in mind, the  
Article next turns to a similar divide in a nearly identical case that 
confronted the Supreme Court of Arizona in 2019, Brush & Nib  
Studios v. City of Phoenix.408 
2. Resolving Scrutiny in Brush & Nib Studios 
In deciding the applicable level of scrutiny, the Brush & Nib  
Studios majority turned to the usual formula—the dichotomy  
between content-based and content-neutral laws.409 Unsurprisingly, 
it also cited Reed for the twin propositions that content-based laws 
 
406 Id. at 772 (emphasis added). 
407 Id. at 754. 
408 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019). 
409 Id. at 912 (observing that “we must first decide what level of scrutiny applies to the 
Ordinance. This requires us to examine whether the Ordinance is a content-neutral or 
content-based regulation of speech, or merely a regulation of conduct.”). 
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are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny.410 
The majority concluded that while Phoenix’s public accommoda-
tions law was facially content-neutral, it operated as a content-based 
law as applied to the wedding invitations created by the owners  
of Brush & Nib Studios, Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski.411  
The majority reasoned that the law “coerces Plaintiffs into abandon-
ing their convictions, and compels them to write celebratory  
messages with which they disagree.”412 It analogized the situation 
to Hurley, just as the majority did in Telescope Media Group,  
with Duka and Koski’s wedding invitations being transformed by 
the law into their very own expressive public accommodations.413 
Significantly, the Arizona Supreme Court majority quoted favorably 
the Eighth Circuit majority’s bright-line rule in Telescope Media 
Group that “‘[l]aws that compel speech or regulate it based on its 
content are subject to strict scrutiny.’”414 Applying strict scrutiny, 
the Brush & Nib Studios majority ruled in favor of Duka and Koski’s 
free speech claim and entered summary judgment for them as to 
their “creation of custom wedding invitations that are materially 
similar to the invitations in the record.”415 
What role did Becerra and Janus play for the majority in  
leading up to its choice to apply strict scrutiny? Becerra, along with 
Wooley, was used to stand for the principle that the First Amend-
ment guards against laws “requiring an individual to express a  
prescribed government message.”416 Janus, in contrast, was used to 
illustrate “[t]he importance of protecting an individual’s autonomy 
over his or her speech.”417 As with the majority in Telescope Media 
Group, the majority in Brush & Nib Studios pointed to Janus for  
the notion that compelled-speech mandates are more dangerous  
than those restricting speech because it is demeaning to be forced to 
 
410 Id. at 913. 
411 Id. at 914. 
412 Id. 
413 Id. 
414 Id. at 913 (quoting Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 754  
(8th Cir. 2019)). 
415 Id. at 926. 
416 Id. at 904. 
417 Id. at 905. 
78 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:1 
 
endorse ideas one finds objectionable.418 Thus, while the majority in 
Brush & Nib Studios did not explicitly hold that either Becerra or 
Janus mandated strict scrutiny, the two cases were used more to  
illustrate the injuries wrought by compelled-speech mandates. 
The majority’s opinion drew three dissents, including one  
authored by Judge Scott Bales which was joined by the other two 
judges not in the majority.419 This dissent was also the lengthiest of 
the three, and it is examined here regarding the selection of scrutiny. 
Judge Bales contended that while Phoenix’s public accommoda-
tions law would survive strict scrutiny as applied to Duka and  
Koski’s invitations,420 it did not need to face that test. He argued that 
the law is “content neutral”421 and “regulates conduct, and not 
speech, [such that] any burden on speech is incidental.”422 Thus, as 
in Rumsfeld, the law does not raise heightened First Amendment 
concerns.423 Additionally, just as Judge Kelly did in Telescope  
Media Group, he factually distinguished Hurley as irrelevant.424 
Bales also benchmarked the facts in Brush & Nib Studios against 
those in Barnette and readily distinguished them, remarking that  
“requiring businesses to treat customers equally is in no way com-
parable to compelling public-school children to salute the flag.”425 
 
418 Id. 
419 Id. at 929 (Bales, J., dissenting, joined by Timmer, J., and Staring, J.). 
420 Judge Bales wrote that “the interest in preventing discrimination is compelling” and 
that the “case implicates the compelling interest in preventing discrimination in public 
accommodations.” Id. at 929–30. He added that there is “no less restrictive alternative” 
means of serving that interest. Id. at 933. In brief, both prongs of the strict scrutiny test 
would be satisfied. 
421 Id. at 932. 
422 Id. 
423 Id. (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006)). 
424 Regarding Hurley, he observed that: 
[t]o the extent a parade analogy is apt, this case is more like a supplier 
of banners refusing to sell to a disfavored group than a parade-
organizer being compelled to include groups with objectionable views. 
Brush & Nib and its owners are like the suppliers, not the parade-
organizers. The organizers would be the marrying couple and forcing 
them to include particular messages in their wedding would be more 
analogous to Hurley. 
Id. at 933. 
425 Id. at 930. 
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Critically, Judge Bales argued—also much as Judge Kelly did in 
Telescope Media Group—that even if speech is involved, the  
message it conveys is not ascribable to the creators (Duka and  
Koski) and thus their speech rights are not at stake.426 He contended 
that “our analysis of the issues should consider whether others 
would view Brush & Nib’s creation of custom invitations as  
expressing its owners’ endorsement of same-sex marriage.”427 Thus, 
dissents in both Media Telescope Group and Brush & Nib Studios 
would adopt a perception-based, reasonable-observer standard on a 
seemingly pivotal threshold question of whether the speech, in fact, 
is that of the creator or the customer. Bales blasted the majority for 
considering the question of message attribution to be irrelevant.428 
In fact, the majority had reasoned that when pure speech (rather than  
expressive conduct, where the understanding of someone who  
observes the conduct is relevant under the Spence test for deciding 
if speech exists within the meaning of the First Amendment)429 is at 
issue, then message attribution does not matter because pure speech 
contains the personal expression of the creator/artist.430 
3. Exposing a Fundamental Problem with the Usual 
Methodology for Choosing Scrutiny Beyond  
Selecting a Too Stringent Standard 
The majorities in both Media Telescope Group and Brush & Nib 
Studios concluded that strict scrutiny was the correct standard for 
measuring the validity of public accommodations laws as applied to 
the creation of speech-based products that convey messages to 
which their creators object on religious grounds.431 Both majorities 
adopted this standard by reasoning that the laws in question  
compelled-speech, were content-based as applied to the plaintiffs 
 
426 Id. at 933. 
427 Id. 
428 Id. (“The majority goes even further and holds that whether a message is attributed to 
a speaker is irrelevant in this case.”). 
429 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974); see also supra text 
accompanying note 393 (setting forth the Spence test). 
430 Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 911–12. 
431 See Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 754 (8th Cir. 2019) (selecting 
strict scrutiny); Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 914 (concluding that to be constitutional, 
Phoenix’s ordinance “must survive strict scrutiny”). 
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and that, in turn, both compelled-speech and content-based laws  
require strict scrutiny.432 The Telescope Media Group majority  
articulated—and the Brush & Nib Studios majority quoted favora-
bly—a seemingly hard-and-fast rule codifying this methodology: 
“Laws that compel speech or regulate it based on its content are  
subject to strict scrutiny.”433 
The dissents in both cases contended that while the respective 
public accommodations laws would have survived strict scrutiny, 
more deferential standards were appropriate. Judge Kelly concluded 
in Telescope Media Group that the MHRA was content-neutral and 
subject to intermediate scrutiny.434 Judge Bales’ dissent in Brush & 
Nib Studios determined that “[b]ecause the [o]rdinance regulates 
conduct, and not speech, any burden on speech is incidental.”435  
He added that even if one sees the ordinance as regulating speech, it 
nonetheless “is content neutral.”436 
The cases thus illustrate a key weakness with using a reduct-
ionist methodology for determining scrutiny in compelled-speech 
cases that pivots on whether a statute is content-based or content-
neutral: What is content-based or content-neutral is subjective  
and manipulatable. The Supreme Court itself, of course, long has  
recognized this problem: The formulaic dichotomy is not as clear  
as one might first believe.437 Scholars also have focused on this  
trouble for some time.438 However, the problem is exacerbated in 
situations such as Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios 
where conduct and speech are entangled and where, in turn, jurists 
 
432 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 752 (concluding that the MHRA “operates as a 
content-based regulation of their [the Larsens’] speech”); Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d 
at 914 (concluding that “the [o]rdinance, as applied to Plaintiffs’ custom wedding 
invitations, operates as a content-based law”). 
433 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754; Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 913 
(quoting Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754). 
434 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 776 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
435 Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 932 (Bales, J., dissenting). 
436 Id. at 933. 
437 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular 
regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”). 
438 Stone, supra note 82, at 251 (“The content-based and content-neutral concepts are not 
self-defining…Moreover, several types of ambiguous restrictions do not fit neatly within 
either the content-based or the content-neutral category.”). 
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have wiggle room to disagree about whether conduct or speech is 
the primary target of regulation. 
The danger is that judges’ political ideologies will sway these 
determinations and fill that wiggle room, akin to how the personal 
economic philosophies of the justices dictated decisions during the 
Lochner era.439 Thus, if the First Amendment fight over the right not 
to speak in Becerra was really a proxy for a larger battle about  
abortion rights, and if the First Amendment fight over the right not 
to speak in Janus was really a proxy for a larger battle about labor 
union rights, then the First Amendment fight over the right not to 
speak in Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios was  
really a proxy for a larger battle about gay rights. Viewed in this 
light, ramping up scrutiny in all three cases simply served what some 
perceive as the conservative-libertarian purpose of using “the First 
Amendment to erect a barrier against regulation that [is] aimed to 
promote liberal or progressive values.”440 In other words, it is the 
weaponization theme to which Justice Kagan referred in her  
Janus dissent441 and the Lochnerization of the First Amendment.442  
Indeed, “the use of civil libertarian arguments to undermine antidis-
crimination law has been identified by several scholars as a parti-
cularly worrisome form of modern-day Lochnerism.”443 The use of 
a pliable dichotomy between content-based and content-neutral  
laws for selecting scrutiny provided the mechanism for making the 
 
439 Jesse H. Choper & Stephen F. Ross, The Political Process, Equal Protection and 
Substantive Due Process, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 1040 (2018) (observing how “the 
Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution faced a unique crisis in the 1930s, when a 
series of laws enacted by elected officials were jeopardized by judicially-developed 
interpretations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses that allowed courts to 
invalidate laws based on the Justices’ personal economic philosophy”). 
440 Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231, 236 (2014). 
441 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 93. 
442 Supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
443 Kessler & Pozen, supra note 98, at 1963. See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
1205, 1233 (2014) (“By withdrawing from the vulnerable ground of property and contract 
to the more politically congenial ground of the First Amendment… libertarian skeptics 
have put themselves in a position to threaten even the core applications of public 
accommodations laws.”). 
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possibility of strict scrutiny and facilitating such Lochnerism  
a somewhat easy reality for the majorities in both Telescope  
Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios. Both majorities, in turn, 
found that the laws, as applied to the plaintiffs’ speech products, 
failed strict scrutiny.444 
With this examination of the 2019 scrutiny determinations in 
Wheeler, Building Industry Association, McManus, Hargett, Long, 
Media Telescope Group, and Brush & Nib Studios in mind, as well 
as the recognition that in only one instance (Building Industry  
Association) was strict scrutiny not selected, the next part  
addresses five First Amendment interests and values that courts 
might consider when choosing scrutiny in future compelled-speech 
cases involving non-commercial expression. 
 
II. BEYOND BECERRA, JANUS, AND CONTENT-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS: 
CONSIDERING FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS AND BENCHMARKING  
AGAINST PRECEDENTS IN COMPELLED-SPEECH CASES 
If courts were to delve more deeply into the First Amendment 
interests and values at stake in compelled-speech cases before  
selecting a scrutiny standard, instead of just considering if a mandate 
were content-based, then what interests and values might they  
evaluate? Set forth below are five First Amendment interests and 
values that courts might analyze. They are: (1) the First Amendment 
anti-orthodoxy interest in not speaking; (2) the First Amendment  
interest in self-realization through the receipt of speech; (3) the  
First Amendment interest in the discovery of factual know- 
ledge; (4) the First Amendment interest in facilitating democratic  
 
444 Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 755–58 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that 
“regulating speech because it is discriminatory or offensive is not a compelling state 
interest,” and finding that “when, as here, Minnesota seeks to regulate speech itself as a 
public accommodation, it has gone too far under Hurley and its interest must give way to 
the demands of the First Amendment”); Brush & Nib Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 
890, 915 (concluding that Phoenix “has failed to demonstrate that the [o]rdinance,  
as applied to Plaintiffs’ creation of custom wedding invitations, furthers a compelling 
governmental interest,” and also finding that “because the purpose of the [o]rdinance  
is to regulate conduct, not speech, regulating Plaintiffs’ speech is not narrowly tailored  
to accomplish this goal,” thus meaning that the ordinance failed both prongs of  
strict scrutiny). 
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self-governance; and (5) the First Amendment interest in protecting 
an autonomous press. 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, given that the unique  
facts of a case might suggest other interests meriting examination. 
For example, the First Amendment interest in protecting anonymous 
speech is not included among the five core interests set forth below, 
but it certainly is relevant in cases such as McManus.445 
Additionally, no single interest is either controlling or a neces-
sary condition for a specific level of scrutiny. Furthermore, it may 
be that some interests and values simply are irrelevant for a case, 
given the nature of the compelled message. However, they ulti-
mately should be considered collectively (in any given case, as  
indicated in the analysis below, appraisal of some interests and  
values may point toward heightened scrutiny, while others may not), 
with the final goal being adoption of a standard that strikes the best 
balance between the apparent First Amendment interests in compel-
ling speech and in not speaking. The factors below, at various points, 
also tap into the facts of key Supreme Court compelled-speech  
decisions, thus allowing for benchmarking by judges of the cases 
before them with the high court’s rulings. Thus, when determining 
the level of scrutiny, courts should: (1) consider these five First 
Amendment interests and values, and (2) engage in close compari-
sons between the facts at issue and those in Supreme Court rulings. 
Additionally, in articulating the five First Amendment interests 
and values, this Part illustrates how they might, where relevant, be 
implicated in the 2019 cases examined in this Article—Wheeler, 
Building Industry Association, McManus, Hargett, Long, Media 
Telescope Group, and Brush & Nib Studios. In brief, the cases  
analyzed in Part I often are brought to bear in Part II. 
The overarching principle should be that strict scrutiny is war-
ranted when the most harmful and seemingly egregious incursions 
on First Amendment interests and values are created by a com-
pelled-speech mandate, particularly when the First Amendment  
interests and objectives in compelling speech are, by comparison, 
 
445 See supra text accompanying notes 191–193 (noting the Fourth Circuit’s concern with 
anonymity in Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019)). 
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disproportionately weak. Strict scrutiny should apply in these situa-
tions because it presumes a law is unconstitutional,446 and thus the 
government faces the rightfully daunting task of justifying its harm-
ful incursions into an individual’s right-not-to-speak province. 
However, when the First Amendment interests in not speaking and 
in being compelled to speak are relatively comparable, then the 
more deferential, yet still heightened, inter-mediate scrutiny test 
should be adopted. Finally, when the harm wrought to the First 
Amendment interests and values in not speaking is minimal, partic-
ularly when the benefit to the public of compelling the speech is 
maximal, then a version of the Zauderer test—one akin to rational 
basis review—should apply. 
What all of this means is that courts must spend more time up 
front in selecting a scrutiny test rather than just asking if a law is 
content-based and, if it is, then subjecting it to the sledgehammer 
that often is strict scrutiny. The approach offered here borrows from 
Justice Stephen Breyer’s 2019 recommendation in Iancu v. Brunetti 
that courts should “appeal more often and more directly to the values 
the First Amendment seeks to protect” in considering the scrutiny 
statutes receive.447 He rejects rigidly applying strict scrutiny to laws 
merely because they are content-based, particularly if those laws 
“pose little or no threat to the speech interests that the First Amend-
ment protects.”448 Breyer avers that “content discrimination, while 
helping courts to identify unconstitutional suppression of expres-
sion, cannot and should not always trigger strict scrutiny.”449  
By adapting Breyer’s proportionality approach to scrutiny so that it 
is used in the initial selection of a traditional scrutiny standard 
(strict, intermediate, or rational basis), one must examine “the  
seriousness of the harm to speech” interests and “the importance of 
 
446 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 479 (2014). 
447 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2305 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
448 Id. at 2304 (emphasis added). 
449 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(emphasis in original). Justice Breyer suggests that strict scrutiny should apply when the 
government discriminates against the viewpoint conveyed on a particular topic. Id. (“To 
use content discrimination to trigger strict scrutiny sometimes makes perfect sense. There 
are cases in which the Court has found content discrimination an unconstitutional method 
for suppressing a viewpoint.”) (emphasis added). 
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the countervailing objectives.”450 In other words, the approach to 
selecting scrutiny advocated here involves evaluating some of the 
same factors Breyer uses when he actually applies his proportional-
ity methodology to decide if a regulation “works harm to First 
Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant 
regulatory objectives.”451 Judicial heavy lifting therefore should be 
done both in selecting a scrutiny test and then in applying it. 
A. The First Amendment Anti-Orthodoxy Interest in Not Speaking 
Compelling a person to speak necessarily interferes with her  
autonomy—her “individual dignity and choice”452—about what to 
say and how to say it.453 The Supreme Court’s logic in Barnette and 
Wooley, however, suggests that not all speech compulsions are 
equally harmful to autonomy interests. This pushes back on the 
Court’s “general rule” in Hurley that compelled statements of fact 
are just as suspect as compelled statements of opinions.454 
The starting point here is for courts to mull over where the  
substantive content of the compelled message, taken in its entirety, 
falls on a continuum. On one end of this spectrum are objectively 
verifiable statements of true (i.e., accurate) facts about particular 
topics or subjects; it is the end of the continuum suggesting a  
deferential form of review is appropriate. On the opposite end are 
purely subjective stances, viewpoints or ideologies involving—akin 
to Barnette—”…politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters  
of opinion”455 that, when a person is forced to convey them,  
“invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of 
 
450 Id. at 2236 (emphasis added). 
451 Id. at 2235–36. 
452 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
453 See Wu, supra note 71, at 2033 (“Compelling individuals to speak, even in 
circumstances in which it is clear that they might or might not be sincere, fails to accord 
due respect for those individuals as autonomous, thinking human beings whose views are 
independent of those of the state.”). 
454 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 
(1995) (contending that “this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, 
applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements 
of fact the speaker would rather avoid”). 
455 W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). The other matters of 
opinion would also include, but are not limited to, views regarding “history, state pride, 
and individualism.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). 
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the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official  
control.”456 In other words, this is the end of the continuum that  
safeguards the anti-orthodoxy interest of the First Amendment, 
thereby militating in favor of strict scrutiny.457 
Cases such as Wheeler, involving an objectively verifiable  
message about a building’s construction and the fact that it “may” 
be dangerous in an earthquake (assuming experts have, in fact, 
demonstrated hazards may arise), as well as ones like Becerra, 
where it is patently provable that California provides free and low-
cost abortion services, fall on the end of the continuum militating 
for deferential review.458 Similarly, Maryland’s statute in McManus 
simply compels disclosure of only factual information—the names 
of advertisement buyers and the prices they paid for those ads—as 
does Tennessee’s disclaimer in Hargett that statements made by 
those conducting registration drives are not authorized by the 
state.459 None of those cases involve the compelled conveyance of a 
subjective idea, viewpoint or philosophy. Thus, this factor—when 
viewed in isolation from the others below—suggests that Wheeler, 
McManus, and Hargett should have been subject to a defer- 
ential standard of review akin to rational basis. As the Article later  
illustrates, countervailing First Amendment interests and values 
must be factored into the scrutiny selection equation and may, in 
turn, suggest a more stringent standard is needed.460 
In contrast, cases such as Barnette, Wooley (a state motto  
expressing the apparent view that one is better off dead than to live 
in an unfree society), and Tornillo (conveying a political candidate’s 
viewpoint to which the speaker-newspaper objects) fall on the other 
end.461 Disputes on this end merit a more rigorous level of review. 
Why? Because, as the Court opined in Wooley, “[t]he First 
 
456 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
457 See Rubenfeld, supra note 104 and accompanying text (addressing the anti- 
orthodoxy value). 
458 See generally Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Or. 
2019); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
459 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019); League of Women Voters v. 
Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706 (M.D. Tenn. 2019). 
460 See infra Conclusion. 
461 See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
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Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view 
different from the majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they 
find morally objectionable.”462 
It is important to note the Court’s choice of the word “idea”  
rather than “fact.” It suggests a key difference—one embraced by 
the continuum proposed here—between conveying objectionable 
ideas and objectionable facts, with the former conflicting more  
significantly with the First Amendment’s protection on “matters of 
opinion.”463 Indeed, the Wooley Court buttressed this distinction  
between ideas and facts by emphasizing that New Hampshire’s state 
motto consisted of an “ideological point of view,”464 not a factual 
assertion. Thus, although the crisis pregnancy centers in Becerra  
objected to abortion, they were not compelled to transmit objection-
able ideologies, beliefs, or views about abortion, merely facts.465 
The notion that compelling individuals to voice a disagreeable  
viewpoint (as compared to a distasteful fact) merits a heightened  
degree of scrutiny also comports with the longstanding principle in 
First Amendment jurisprudence—a principle recently reinforced 
twice by the Court—that viewpoint discrimination by the govern-
ment when regulating private speech is verboten.466 It also jibes  
with the Court’s observation in a compelled-speech case involving 
cable system operators that “the principle that each person should 
decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of ex- 
pression, consideration, and adherence” resides “[a]t the heart of  
the First Amendment.”467 There is no mention of “facts” there.  
 
462 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. 
463 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
464 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. 
465 As Justice Breyer explained in his Becerra dissent, “the availability of state resources 
is not a normative statement or a fact of debatable truth. The disclosure includes 
information about resources available should a woman seek to continue her pregnancy or 
terminate it, and it expresses no official preference for one choice over the other.”  
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388 (2018)  
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
466 See, e.g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (calling it “a core postulate 
of free speech law” that “[t]he government may not discriminate against speech based on 
the ideas or opinions it conveys”); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (dubbing viewpoint discrimination “a form of speech suppression so potent 
that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny”). 
467 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (emphasis added). 
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In other words, this principle embodies a core anti-orthodoxy First 
Amendment interest. 
This first factor uses a continuum because a compelled  
message might involve the expression of both objectively verifiable 
facts and subjective viewpoints. Consider a twist on the sheriff’s 
sex-offender warning signs at issue in Long.468 If the signs had 
simply read “This is the residence of a registered sex offender,” then 
(assuming a registered sex offender indeed lived there) it would be 
a purely factual message. But Sheriff Long’s actual signs did not 
convey that factual statement or, for that matter, any facts about the 
occupants. Instead, they expressed the opinion—an accusatory per-
spective and belief—that a particular residence was dangerous by 
including two stop signs, the word “WARNING!” and the message 
“NO TRICK-OR-TREAT AT THIS ADDRESS.”469 If the signs 
also had included “This is the residence of a registered sex  
offender,” then they would have embodied statements of both fact 
and opinion. In such hybrid cases, it would be for judges to decide 
whether the entire message, when viewed as a whole, fell closer to 
one end of the continuum than to the other or whether it was in the 
middle, indicating intermediate scrutiny might be appropriate.470 
What about cases such as Telescope Media Group and Brush & 
Nib Studios? They also involve both objectively verifiable facts and 
subjective values. The stories told in wedding videos and the infor-
mation communicated on invitations express both facts (for videos, 
what took place and who was there; for invitations, the date, time 
and location of a wedding), and subjective values (celebrating  
specific forms of love and marriage, depending, of course, on the 
contents of the videos and invitations). No government-scripted  
philosophy or maxim, however, is compelled, unlike in Barnette and 
 
468 Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1370 (M.D. Ga. 2019). 
469 Id. 
470 The notion that mixed messages should be viewed as a whole is recognized in other 
areas of First Amendment law, such as obscenity. In obscenity cases, triers of fact must 
consider whether media artifacts—for instance, magazines that may include editorial 
material stretching from news articles to editorials to photospreads—taken as a whole 
appeal to a prurient interest in sex. See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (providing 
that for a work to be deemed obscene, triers of fact must “find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest”) (emphasis added). 
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Wooley. Instead, these cases more closely track the hosting and  
accommodating of the values of a third-party scenario in Tornillo. 
This raises the sub-issue of whether being compelled to create  
or host a third-party’s viewpoint in the course of operating a pub- 
lic business is as harmful to the anti-orthodoxy value as being  
compelled to a convey a government-drafted viewpoint in a non-
business setting. A key argument for finding the former is less inju-
rious is that the invasion occurs only within the public sphere of 
business operations, not the private “sphere of intellect and 
spirit.”471 Thus, while being mandated to create—as part of a 
speech-product—an ideological message with which one disagrees 
intrudes on the anti-orthodoxy principle, the intrusion is arguably 
less egregious when the compulsion occurs during the course of 
business operations rather than in one’s private life. 
On the anti-orthodoxy factor, cases such as Building Industry 
Association, where the compelled speech is “art” of the speaker’s 
choosing—the speaker possesses vast discretion to select whatever 
message it is that the public-facing art she purchases conveys—tilt 
toward a deferential form of scrutiny. In essence, the government 
has given the speaker significant ability to control his or her own 
message, as long as it falls within the very broad, if not bound- 
less, category of art. No government ideology or that of a third  
party is compelled. 
Finally—although it is unlikely to arise—being forced by the 
government to convey an objectively verifiable false statement  
of fact would be treated as falling on the Barnette, Wooley, and 
Tornillo side of the continuum and, on this factor standing alone, 
would demand heightened scrutiny. That is because, as the Supreme 
Court has observed, there generally “is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact.”472 The government forcing a person to con-
vey a false statement of fact seems particularly degrading to a per-
son’s sense of dignity and autonomy or, as the Court put it in Bar-
nette, “the sphere of intellect” protected by the First Amendment.473 
 
471 W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
472 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
473 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
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Conveying a false fact upon government compulsion is decidedly 
anti-intellectual. 
B. The First Amendment Interest in Self-Realization Through the 
Receipt of Speech 
This interest pivots on the unenumerated First Amendment right 
to receive and access speech474 and, in particular, how the receipt of 
speech facilitates a person’s sense of self-fulfillment and self- 
realization. As Professor C. Edwin Baker explained, “individual 
self-fulfillment and participation in change are fundamental  
purposes of the First Amendment.”475 Similarly, Thomas Emerson  
emphasized this point in his enduring 1970 tome The System of Free 
Expression, writing that “freedom of expression is essential as a 
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment. The proper end of man 
is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human  
being.”476 Viewed in this light, speech is shielded as “an end itself, 
an end intimately intertwined with human autonomy and dignity.”477 
The focus on this variable thus is how the receipt of compelled-
speech might facilitate the recipient’s sense of self-realization and 
self-fulfillment. 
 
474 See Packingham v. N.C., 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–37 (2017) (asserting that “[a] 
fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places 
where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more,” 
and rebuking North Carolina for adopting a statute that barred sex offenders from 
“access[ing] to what for many are the principal sources for knowing current events, 
checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and 
otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge”) (emphasis added); 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972) (recognizing a right to receive speech, 
including information and ideas); Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“This right to 
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth . . . is fundamental to our 
free society.”) (internal citation omitted); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) 
(observing that “the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment 
contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press 
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, 
[and] the right to read”) (emphasis added); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) 
(“This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature…and necessarily protects the 
right to receive it.”) (internal citation omitted). 
475 C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 51 (1989). 
476 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 6 (1970). 
477 Smolla, supra note 153, at 9. 
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This factor is highly relevant in cases such as Media Telescope 
Group and Brush & Nib Studios where, standing by itself, it  
militates in favor of a deferential standard of review for evaluating 
measures compelling speech. That is because a public accommoda-
tions law that requires the creation of wedding videos and invitations 
celebrating same-sex marriages facilitates the receipt of speech by 
the individuals in those marital unions that validates and affirms 
their identities and love, thereby leading to self-fulfillment and real-
ization of their identity as gay, married individuals. Additionally, 
the receipt of such speech products symbolizes their inclusion in  
society as individuals worthy of equal treatment under its laws, thus 
enhancing their sense of dignity and self-worth. Furthermore, mar-
ried individuals can look back at the invitations or watch the videos 
again and again, even years or decades later, bringing memories and 
renewed meaning to their lives—throughout their lives—via speech. 
Denial of the receipt of such speech when opposite-sex couples 
are simultaneously allowed this opportunity thus amounts to a dig-
nitary harm, with the inability to receive speech symbolizing  
disrespect. They are—to put it bluntly—denied a key part of their 
life narratives that give them meaning. It is like watching a film in 
which key parts have been censored and edited out, destroying the 
story’s meaning and significance. 
Such denial of the receipt of speech therefore means much  
more than just being deprived of access to a non-speech product, 
like a wedding gift of towels or a toaster. Those utilitarian items 
neither edify nor enrich an individual’s mind and spirit. If “[c]hoices  
about marriage shape an individual’s destiny,” as Justice Anthony  
Kennedy wrote in Obergefell v. Hodges,478 then being denied receipt 
of speech about one’s own marriage shapes, in a stigmatizing way, 
the meaning of that event for an individual by jettisoning a celebra-
tory facet of the story. If the act of getting married helps one realize 
her own identity, then so too does being able to possess the story 
about that marriage as one would like it told. 
In cases such as Media Telescope Group and Brush & Nib  
Studios, this variable also is critical because it does not necessitate 
 
478 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
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a fight over whether speech or conduct is being regulated. Essen-
tially, it freely and perhaps boldly concedes to the plaintiffs that 
speech is at issue—even speech celebrating the value of same-sex 
marriage to which those plaintiffs object and invoke their anti- 
orthodoxy interest described in Section A. Yet, the variable here  
in Section B provides the defendants with a countervailing First 
Amendment interest in receiving such speech (a self-realization 
through receipt of expression interest) to forcefully push back 
against strict scrutiny. 
In brief, there is a profound self-realization or self-fulfillment 
interest in compelling business operators to create speech products 
like same-sex wedding invitations and videos. This suggests a  
deferential standard of review is warranted for public accommoda-
tions laws as applied to the products at issue in Media Telescope 
Group and Brush & Nib Studios. This First Amendment-based  
interest, of course, must be considered along with the First Amend-
ment anti-orthodoxy interest of the creators of such products.  
To the extent that a judge concludes the two First Amendment  
interests are relatively comparable, this militates in favor of select-
ing an intermediate scrutiny test that does not initially slope the 
playing field decidedly in favor of one interest over the other. 
This variable is also implicated in Building Industry Association, 
where it stands by itself, pointing to a deferential form of scrutiny 
as well. Why? Because experiencing public-facing art—whether 
simply because it is aesthetically beautiful and thus brings individ-
ual happiness and pleasure or because of some deeper meanings or 
messages an observer takes away from pondering it—can be ful-
filling and enrich a person’s life. In other words, compelling the  
display of art so that others can receive it—can view it and experi-
ence it—sometimes affects viewers’ lives in meaningful ways.479 
Furthermore, this variable arises in McManus and suggests that 
deferential review is merited. It does so to the extent that people who 
choose to read the compelled facts about buyers of political 
 
479 See THOMAS MERTON, NO MAN IS AN ISLAND 35 (Shambala Publ’ns 2005) (1955) 
(“Art enables us to find ourselves and lose ourselves at the same time. The mind that 
responds to the intellectual and spiritual values that lie hidden in…a painting…discovers a 
spiritual vitality that lifts it above itself…”). 
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advertisements and what they paid for them may feel more  
educated about politics, thereby helping to realize their own  
identities as informed and savvy citizens. Receiving such speech 
might, for example, bring them empowering confidence, making 
them feel as if they will not be duped by a political advertisement 
because they understand who sponsored it. It should be noted that 
this is a different value than the democratic self-government  
interest discussed below in either voting wisely or participating  
in democracy. In other words, receipt of the compelled-speech  
in McManus can simply make people feel differently about  
themselves when it comes to politics, regardless of whether they  
actually vote and irrespective of whether they otherwise engage in 
dialogue and debate with others about politics. It is, then, a sense of 
self-fulfillment that comes from being an informed political citizen. 
In Hargett, the compelled speech might affect one’s identity as 
either a registered or unregistered voter. For example, if a person is 
dissuaded from registering due to hearing the mandated disclaimer, 
as Judge Trauger indicated one might well be, then the person  
has not realized his or her full potential and capacity to influence  
the political process.480 Additionally, as the late Professor Kenneth 
Karst asserted, “voting remains a crucial symbol of citizenship,  
of membership in the community.”481 Receiving a message that  
dissuades the possibility of voting (due to not registering) thus  
negatively affects the realization of one’s identity as a full  
member of the community. This indicates that, as to this First 
Amendment interest in Hargett, heightened scrutiny of Tennessee’s  
law is warranted. 
Finally, this variable does not seem relevant for Wheeler or 
Long. Receiving speech about a building’s structural integrity does 
not appear likely to affect one’s self-realization or self-fulfillment. 
It certainly might influence where one chooses to live or shop 
through the acquisition of knowledge (as discussed below in Section 
C), but that impact feels different in kind from the interest in self-
 
480 See League of Women Voters v. Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706, 730–31 (M.D. Tenn. 
2019) (noting that the “the disclaimer is designed to highlight the speaker’s lack of 
authority” and thus, in the plaintiffs’ view, it “will cause a stigmatic injury by making voter 
registration activities seem somehow illegitimate”). 
481 Karst, supra note 63, at 26. 
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realization through the receipt of speech. The warning signs in Long 
are not likely to affect the self-realization or self-fulfillment of the 
people who read them. However, they may change how those people 
behave and their course of conduct about where to trick-or-treat  
(discussed in Section C). 
C. The First Amendment Interest in the Discovery of Factual 
Knowledge 
Professor Vincent Blasi identifies “truth seeking” as a basic 
value “served by a robust free speech principle.”482 The First 
Amendment truth-seeking interest links to the Supreme Court’s  
frequent invocation—dating back to Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States483—of the marketplace 
of ideas theory for speech protection.484 
Although connected to the marketplace of ideas theory, which 
pivots on protecting speech to discover truth and to test conceptions 
of truth,485 the variable identified here holds that government inter-
vention in the marketplace via compelled-speech obligations some-
times is justified to help listeners discover the wisest course of  
action for themselves by acquiring factual knowledge.486 In other 
words, this variable bridges the marketplace of ideas quest for truth 
 
482 Vincent Blasi, Holmes and Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1. 
483 Holmes, in often-quoted language, reasoned in Abrams that: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely 
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
484 Rodney A. Smolla, The Meaning of the “Marketplace of Ideas” in First Amendment 
Law, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 437, 438 (2019) (“The marketplace of ideas metaphor has 
been invoked constantly by the Supreme Court justices in First Amendment cases.”). 
485 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (addressing the marketplace of  
ideas theory). 
486 For instance, in upholding a compelled-speech mandate imposed on terrestrial 
broadcasters, the Supreme Court cited the truth-seeking function of the First Amendment 
and the marketplace of ideas, but emphasized that “[i]t is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
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with the acquisition of facts and factual knowledge in that market-
place as a central First Amendment value.487 
The link to the truth-seeking interest is especially important in 
considering the constitutionality of compelled-speech mandates  
because it “focuses on the value of speech to the listener, not the 
speaker.”488 In brief, compelled-speech mandates pump more 
speech into the marketplace of ideas, thus potentially allowing  
listeners and readers to better sort out what is true or wise for 
them.489 The emphasis on listeners’ rights to receive factual infor-
mation has justified the Supreme Court in upholding compelled, 
fact-based disclosure obligations in the commercial speech realm.490 
Furthermore, in Becerra, Justice Breyer contended that  
the fact-based, compelled-speech obligation imposed on crisis  
pregnancy centers by California actually fostered the marketplace of 
ideas “by providing information to patients to enable them to make 
fully informed medical decisions in respect to their pregnancies.”491 
Thus, if the marketplace of ideas serves what the Court has called 
the “truth-seeking function” of speech,492 then sometimes compel-
ling others to speak facts enhances truth discovery through the  
acquisition of knowledge. Truth in this sense is not some objectively 
verifiable or absolute truth;493 Holmes himself “detested abso- 
lutism.”494 Rather, as Justice Breyer suggests in Becerra, it is an 
 
487 See Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133 HARV. L. REV. 439 
(2019) (bridging the marketplace of ideas to knowledge as a First Amendment value). 
488 Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 615, 677 (1991). 
489 The danger, of course, is that the government, via compelled-speech obligations,  
is allowed to distort the marketplace of ideas with only the views and facts that it privileges 
and values. 
490 Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
491 Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
492 Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
493 Justice Holmes, in fact, did not believe in absolute truths. See Jared Schroeder, The 
Holmes Truth: Toward a Pragmatic, Holmes-Influenced Conceptualization of the Nature 
of Truth, 7 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. 169, 178 (2018) (encapsulating Holmes’s views  
on truth). 
494 Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart 
Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 35, 48 (2010). 
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informed decision about the best course of action or, to use Professor 
Stanley Ingber’s term, a judgment about “the best decisions.”495 
Under this factor—standing by itself and in isolation from the 
others articulated here—the guiding principle is that the more a 
compelled-speech mandate appears to facilitate the acquisition of 
factual knowledge that might help to better inform a person’s  
decisions about a future course of action that is important to that 
person, the less rigorous should be the level of scrutiny that is  
applied to measure its validity. How might this play out in some of 
the cases examined in this Article? 
In Wheeler, acquiring the factual knowledge that a building’s 
structure might make it vulnerable in an earthquake could affect 
one’s future course of action. Learning this fact might, in turn, cause 
a person to seek out additional information, either about unrein-
forced masonry structures generally or about whether the specific 
building in question has undergone seismic retro-fitting, even if it is 
not up to the threshold needed to avoid the placard requirement.  
The acquisition of such information in the marketplace of ideas thus 
might lead a person to decide whether or not to live there or even 
simply whether or not to shop there. Where one chooses to live  
certainly seems to be a course of action that would be important to 
the average person. This suggests a deferential standard of scrutiny 
is warranted—at least on this factor—in Wheeler. 
The variable, however, seems far less relevant for examination 
in a case such as Building Industry Association. In Building  
Industry Association, the speech was art. While art certainly may  
be valuable for self-realization as argued above in Section B, its  
relevance here is much more speculative because the real-estate  
developers were not mandated to choose or fund art with a particular  
message, be it factual or otherwise. Viewing art usually does not 
involve the acquisition of factual knowledge. 
In McManus, however, acquiring factual knowledge about the 
source of a political advertisement might influence a person’s  
future course of action in terms of either adopting or rejecting the 
 
495 Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.  
1, 25. 
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advertisement’s stance or position on a ballot initiative or a  
candidate. That, in turn, could affect how that person votes on such 
important matters. This suggests that a deferential form of review is 
warranted in McManus, at least on this sole factor. Furthermore, the 
First Amendment interest here overlaps with the democratic self-
governance value described in the next section in cases such as 
McManus where political speech is involved. 
In Hargett, Judge Trauger pointed out that the mandated  
disclaimer was “designed to highlight the speaker’s lack of  
authority,”496 with the implication being that it might deter people 
from registering to vote. Thus, the acquisition of factual knowledge 
in Hargett certainly might influence and inform a very important 
future course of action about whether to register to vote, thereby 
suggesting—on this factor alone—that less rigorous scrutiny is  
merited. As this indicates, however, Tennessee’s mandate might 
actually dissuade and suppress participation in the political process, 
something that conflicts both with the self-realization interest in  
receipt of speech discussed above in Section B and with the First 
Amendment interest in facilitating democratic self-governance  
addressed in Section D below. This demonstrates the importance  
of the point emphasized at the start of this Part of the Article that  
the five First Amendment interests and values must be considered  
collectively when selecting a standard of scrutiny. 
In Long, the warning signs do not facilitate the acquisition  
of factual knowledge that might help a person to make a better- 
informed decision about where to trick-or-treat. Instead, the mes-
sages are statements of opinion that might actually confuse people 
and cause them to make less informed decisions because the  
opinions of the sheriff regarding the dangerousness of specific resi-
dences are speculative. This militates in favor of applying height-
ened scrutiny on this variable in Long. As noted above, the general 
principle for this variable is that the more a compelled-speech  
mandate appears to facilitate the acquisition of factual knowledge 
that might help to better inform a person’s decisions about a future 
course of action that is important to that person, the less rigorous 
 
496 League of Women Voters v. Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706, 730 (M.D. Tenn. 2019). 
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should be the level of scrutiny that is applied to measure its validity. 
The opposite is true in Long. 
Finally, the variable seems irrelevant in Telescope Media Group 
and Brush & Nib Studios. These cases do not involve the receipt 
of factual information that might help the recipients—for purposes 
here, the married couples who want to receive the speech from busi-
ness operators are considered the recipients—make better informed 
choices about a future, important course of action. As noted above 
in Section B, however, the wedding invitations and videos serve a 
very different and valuable function in self-realization through the 
receipt of speech. 
D. The First Amendment Interest in Facilitating Democratic Self-
Governance 
Philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn contended more 
than seventy years ago that in the “method of political self-govern-
ment, the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the  
speakers, but the minds of the hearers.”497 Citizens thus must have 
access to as much information as possible to facilitate “the voting of 
wise decisions.”498 As former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post 
encapsulates this value, “[t]he First Amendment is understood to 
protect the communicative processes necessary to disseminate  
the information and ideas required for citizens to vote in a fully  
informed and intelligent way.”499 
This interest is more than just scholarly or theoretical. It was  
reinforced by Justice Kagan in her Janus dissent, where she  
explained that the First Amendment was meant “to protect  
democratic governance.”500 Similarly, Justice Breyer wrote the year 
prior to Janus that among the “interests close to the First Amend-
ment’s protective core” are “the processes through which political 
 
497 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 245, at 25 (emphasis added). 
498 Id. 
499 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2367 (2000). 
500 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018)  
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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discourse or public opinion is formed or expressed.”501 Any “gov-
ernment regulation [that] negatively affects” those processes, he 
added, is typically scrutinized “with great care.”502 
Indeed, the Court has made it evident that laws burdening  
political speech are subject to strict scrutiny.503 In explaining why 
that test applies, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission that “the right of citizens to inquire, 
to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is  
a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary  
means to protect it.”504 Importantly, Kennedy’s quotation refers both 
to the right to speak and the right to receive speech—the right “to 
hear”—thereby implicating compelled-speech obligations that 
might, in fact, provide greater information affecting “the voting  
of wise decisions.”505 This interest is particularly acute, the Court 
wrote decades earlier, when it comes to speech affecting “campaigns 
for political office.”506 
Consideration of this variable thus requires appraising: (1) the 
apparent nature and depth of the interference caused by a  
compelled-speech mandate with a speaker’s independence from 
government control and manipulation as an autonomous, participa-
tory member of a democratic society; and (2) how the compelled-
speech mandate might either help or hinder the listener’s ability to 
better participate in the political process in, as Post put it, “a fully 
informed and intelligent way.”507 In other words, attention must be 
paid to the impact of the law on both the speaker and the audience. 
Given the longstanding rule noted above that laws burdening  
political speech face strict scrutiny review508 and the Court’s  
observation in Citizens United that political speech “is central to the 
meaning and purpose of the First Amendment,”509 consideration of 
 
501 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017)  
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
502 Id. 
503 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
504 Id. at 339. 
505 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 245, at 25. 
506 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). 
507 Post, supra note 499, at 2367. 
508 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. 
509 Id. at 329. 
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this factor—standing by itself—starts from the presumption that 
strict scrutiny applies if a compelled-speech mandate affects politi-
cal speech. That presumption, however, may be overcome by  
considering the two factors above. For instance, if the intrusion on 
the speaker’s ability to function independently from the government 
in the political process—not, in other words, to be co-opted by it as 
a stooge or tool for conveying the government’s subjective view-
point on either a political issue or about a government official  
(or candidate for a government office)—seems minimal, while the  
benefit to the audience of receiving accurate factual information that 
may help to better inform voting booth decisions appears significant, 
then this might rebut the presumption for strict scrutiny and suggest 
that the more deferential intermediate scrutiny test is appropriate. 
However, before considering the effects on both the speaker and 
the audience, the threshold issue that must be addressed is when  
this variable even comes into play. That determination, as proposed 
here, pivots directly on whether the compelled speech provides  
factual information to those who read or hear it that might better 
inform their politically oriented actions and decisions. The perspec-
tive of the audience—”the minds of the hearers,” as Meiklejohn 
wrote—thus is key.510A judge therefore should ask if the compelled 
message, on its face, transmits factual information that might  
help to enlighten a reasonable person’s choice or choices regarding 
actions affecting democratic governance, such as for whom to vote 
or whether to campaign for or against a candidate for public office 
or a ballot issue. 
Importantly, if the compelled message involves non-factual  
political information (i.e., a political opinion or viewpoint), then  
this triggers consideration of another First Amendment interest  
addressed earlier—the anti-orthodoxy interest—and militates in  
favor of strict scrutiny as to that variable.511 In brief, the focus on 
the variable in this section is on compelled factual information  
affecting democratic self-governance because the compelled disclo-
sure of non-factual political information is already addressed by  
the anti-orthodoxy variable. 
 
510 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 245, at 25. 
511 Supra Part II, Section A. 
2020] SELECTING SCRUTINY IN COMPELLED-SPEECH CASES 101 
 
The factual message on the warning placards in Wheeler does 
not trigger consideration of this variable. Why? Because, on its face, 
the message simply provides factual information about a building’s 
structure and the dangers that its structure may pose during an earth-
quake. The message might influence where a person chooses to live, 
selects to shop, or otherwise chooses to do business—something  
already addressed above in Section C’s consideration of the First 
Amendment interest in the discovery of factual knowledge. The 
message, however, seemingly would not affect how a person votes, 
which raises an important distinction for the application of this  
variable. Specifically, the issue of what Portland should do about its 
approximately 1,600 unreinforced masonry structures—how they 
should be regulated, whether Portland should mandate certain  
levels of retrofitting and whether the buildings should be subject to 
a warning-placard requirement—clearly is a contentious political 
one in that community.512 However, the speech itself on the warning 
signs is not. The words compelled—the facts expressed—are what 
matters for this variable. 
This variable also is not implicated by Oakland’s art mandate in 
Building Industry Association. Although art obviously can be polit-
ical in nature, as made evident earlier,513 Oakland’s law neither 
specifies nor requires that real-estate developers purchase or fund 
art that conveys a particular message, be it political or otherwise.514 
Without a mandate calling more directly for conveyance of factual 
information that might enlighten a reasonable person’s choice or 
choices regarding actions affecting democratic governance, this  
factor is rendered irrelevant in Building Industry Association.515 
Furthermore, this variable is not connected to Long. A brief  
discussion of why it is not relevant there further fleshes out and clar-
ifies the author’s intent for this variable’s application. The message 
 
512 See Njus, supra note 4, at A10. 
513 See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n-Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 775 F. App’x. 348, 349 (9th Cir. 
2019); see also supra Section I.A (addressing two political and legal controversies spawned 
by art; “Building Industry Association, in contrast, had nothing to do with either 
commercial speech or the disclosure of purely factual information. Instead, it had 
everything to do with compelling the display or funding of art”). 
514 See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 775 F. App’x. at 349. 
515 See Id. 
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on the sheriff’s warning signs certainly might affect a person’s  
decision about whether to trick-or-treat at a specific home or resi-
dence—something already addressed in Section D’s discussion of 
Long on the discovery-of-factual-knowledge variable.516 Whether to 
ask for candy and other treats at a particular venue, however, is  
not a choice affecting democratic self-governance, such as voting or 
supporting a candidate or a ballot initiative. 
One might argue, however, that the warning message is political 
because it may generate support for a government official—namely, 
Sheriff Long—by suggesting to residents that he is highly concerned 
about protecting children from ostensibly dangerous sexual offend-
ers. In brief, the compelled speech might chum the political waters 
favorably for him. Recall here that the signs proclaim that the warn-
ing message was brought to them by Sheriff Long.517 In other words, 
the primary compelled message on the signs may influence where a 
child trick-or-treats, but a secondary compelled message (one that 
identifies a government sponsor) may affect whether a parent or 
neighbor supports a government actor (namely, the sheriff) and, in 
turn, the policies that actor favors. 
This secondary message—one that potentially affects politics by 
identifying a government actor as the source of another compelled 
message—does not, however, trigger this variable. If it did, then that 
also would mean that the signs in Wheeler were political because 
they identified Portland’s local government as the sponsor of the 
message by including the “P.C.C.” (Portland City Code) designa-
tion.518 Portland residents who might have found the placards useful 
might have more ardently supported members of the local govern-
ment as a result, viewing those local officials as taking important, 
positive steps in protecting them from dangers posed by unrein-
forced masonry buildings. Thus, in considering if this variable is 
triggered, courts should focus only on the primary message being 
compelled, not on the government sponsorship of that message. 
 
516 See Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2019); see also supra 
Section I.D (setting forth the content of the signs at issue in Long). 
517 See Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1369. 
518 See Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1288 (D. Or. 
2019) (setting forth the content of the placards at issue in Wheeler). 
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Additionally, this variable is not implicated in Telescope Media 
Group and Brush & Nib Studios.519 Those cases involve messages 
celebrating same-sex weddings. Same-sex marriages and weddings 
unquestionably are political issues. The primary messages conveyed 
in the compelled-speech products in those cases do not, on their face, 
provide facts to those who read or watch them that might better in-
form their decision-making in a self-governing democracy. Rather, 
the primary factual messages are ones that announce and memorial-
ize a couple’s wedding and love.520 For instance, the primary  
message in a wedding invitation most likely involves facts regard-
ing who is getting married, along with facts about when and where  
the wedding is to occur, and words extending an invitation to  
the recipient to attend the wedding and celebrate the occasion.  
One might argue that receiving an invitation to a same-sex wedding 
could enlighten recipients about the nature of same-sex weddings or 
influence how they feel about their permissibility, but these are akin 
to secondary messages taken away, not primary ones. 
This variable, however, clearly is implicated in both Hargett and 
McManus. In Hargett, the disclaimer on its face directly relates to 
the voting registration process and must be conveyed to those who 
have not yet registered, thereby affecting a threshold decision for 
many people of whether to join in a vital part of the democratic  
self-governing process as a voter.521 In McManus, the factual- 
disclosure mandate on its face affects political advertisements—
content designed to sway and influence potential voters.522 
In Hargett, the speakers are forced to convey a factual message 
(namely, that what they are saying to potential registrants “is not 
made in conjunction with or authorized by the secretary of state”) 
523 that may, as Judge Trauger pointed out, detrimentally impact 
their ability, as citizens participating in the democratic process via 
 
519 See generally Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019); Brush 
& Nib Studios v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019). 
520 See Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 775; Brush & Nib Studios, 448 P.3d at 930. 
521 League of Women Voters v. Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706, 720 (M.D. Tenn. 2019). 
522 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 510–11 (4th Cir. 2019). 
523 Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 712–13 (construing TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132, 
repealed by H. B. 2363, 111th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2020). 
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voter registration drive, to sign up potential voters.524 In other 
words, the power of citizens acting in a political capacity is harmed 
by the government’s message. In contrast, the benefit to listeners 
from hearing the message appears de minimis. The compelled  
information does not, on its face, inform them in any way about how 
to register to vote or the benefits of voting.525 If the information is, 
in fact, relevant in some way to the voting process, then the govern-
ment would need to prove that during the actual application of  
judicial scrutiny.526 In brief, there appears to be little evidence to 
rebut the presumption on this variable that strict scrutiny provides 
the appropriate test. 
In McManus, the compelled-speech mandate guards against 
what Meiklejohn called the “mutilation of the thinking process”527 
by providing factual information to voters about who is sponsor- 
ing political ads.528 This information may help voters to better  
sort out the possible motives behind such ads by knowing who is 
advocating the positions the ads espouse. In brief, the information 
may foster “the voting of wise decisions”529 by providing greater 
context to voters for understanding them. The depth of the com-
pelled-speech interference with speakers’ autonomy as independent 
political actors is arguably minimal, as it involves disclosing only 
names (of ad purchasers) and prices. 
On the other hand, Maryland’s law compromises the independ-
ence of news organizations as political actors by using them to  
convey factual information that that state deems important.530  
The fact that the news outlets do not cast votes for candidates and 
may be corporations seemingly does not lessen this concern, partic-
ularly in light of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.531 
The Court there affirmed the extension of First Amendment political 
 
524 Id. at 730 (noting that “the disclaimer is designed to highlight the speaker’s lack of 
authority”). 
525 Id. at 734. 
526 See id. at 730. 
527 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 245, at 26; see also supra notes 248–49 and  
accompanying text. 
528 See Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 511 (4th Cir. 2019). 
529 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 245, at 25. 
530 See McManus, 944 F.3d at 518. 
531 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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speech rights to corporations.532 Adding to the gravity of the  
intrusion on the speakers’ rights in McManus is the fact that the 
speakers are members of the press, thereby putting into play a fifth 
First Amendment interest addressed below: That of protecting an 
autonomous press—one that plays a watchdog role on the govern-
ment—from government incursions on its editorial decisions and 
judgments.533 This illustrates why a holistic, totality-of-the-circum-
stances approach to scrutiny selection that involves consideration  
of multiple variables is important. Viewed together, consideration 
of both the First Amendment interest in facilitating democratic  
self-governance and the First Amendment interest in protecting an  
autonomous press suggest that strict scrutiny may be warranted,  
especially given the presumption on the former variable that strict 
scrutiny applies. 
Of course, any such conclusion must be considered along with 
the fact that, on the first variable addressed in Part II (the anti-ortho-
doxy interest), only factual information is being compelled by  
Maryland’s statute, thus militating in favor of a deferential standard 
of review in McManus on that variable.534 Additionally, the Article 
contended that the second variable (the self-realization interest 
through the receipt of speech) tilted toward a deferential form of  
review.535 Furthermore, as noted above, consideration in McManus 
of the third variable—the First Amendment interest in the discovery  
of factual knowledge—also suggests that deferential review is  
warranted.536 In other words, when the anti-orthodoxy interest, the 
self-realization interest and the interest in the discovery of factual 
knowledge are considered collectively, along with the interests  
addressed in this Section and below in Section E, then a judge  
might reasonably find that intermediate scrutiny applies, given the  
seemingly equal significance of the countervailing interests. 
 
532 Id. at 899. 
533 See McManus, 944 F.3d at 515. See also infra Section II.E; supra note 220 and 
accompanying text (addressing the watchdog role of the press). 
534 See supra Section II.A. 
535 See supra Section II.B. 
536 See supra Section II.C. 
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E. The First Amendment Interest in Protecting an Autonomous 
Press 
In cases such as Tornillo and McManus, the First Amendment 
interest in protecting the editorial autonomy and independence  
of news organizations under the Press Clause comes into play.537  
These cases are about more than just free speech; they are also about 
a free press. Of the 2019 cases addressed in this Article, only 
McManus raises Free Press concerns that trigger this variable.538 
The guiding principle here is that the greater the intrusion into  
the editorial autonomy of a news entity caused by a compelled-
speech mandate, the greater is the reason to apply strict scrutiny to 
measure that mandate’s validity.539 In considering this variable, 
courts should closely benchmark the facts of the case before them 
with those in Tornillo. 
The Article, in Section B of Part I, illustrated that there are,  
in fact, seemingly critical differences between Tornillo and 
McManus.540 Those distinctions suggest that the intrusion into  
editorial autonomy interests is much more severe in Tornillo than it 
is in McManus. This, in turn, provides some reason for pushing back 
against the application of strict scrutiny—at least, on this variable 
standing alone—in McManus. The true key for the application of 
this factor, if courts were to adopt it when deciding scrutiny, is 
whether they perceive the ruling in Tornillo as creating an absolute, 
bright-line rule against any governmental intrusions into journalistic 
decision making (thus necessitating strict scrutiny) or whether they 
view it as less absolute in nature and as simply raising a danger to 
be guarded against. Laws such as Maryland’s statute, by not com-
pelling the transmission of a political viewpoint to which a newspa-
per objects, provide an entrée for courts to engage in a more refined 
and nuanced approach for interpreting Tornillo. To the extent 
Tornillo is still perceived as absolute, however, then this factor  
militates in favor of applying strict scrutiny in McManus. 
 
537 See supra text accompanying notes 214–20 (addressing the Supreme Court’s focus on 
editorial autonomy from the government in Tornillo). 
538 See supra Section II.B. 
539 Id. 
540 See supra text accompanying note 231 (drawing distinctions between Tornillo and 
McManus). 
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In summary, this Part proposed five First Amendment interests 
that courts should consider when determining scrutiny in compelled-
speech cases not involving commercial expression. Furthermore,  
it illustrated how those interests might come into play and be  
analyzed in the 2019 rulings addressed in Part I. In the process of 
addressing these factors, courts should also benchmark the facts of 
the cases before them with those in U.S. Supreme Court rulings  
involving compelled-speech obligations. 
In some situations, not all five interests will be relevant.  
For instance, this Part suggested that in Wheeler, two factors—the 
anti-orthodoxy interest and the discovery of factual knowledge  
interest—militated in favor of applying a deferential form of  
scrutiny to Portland’s placard ordinance, while the other three  
factors—self-realization through the receipt of speech, democratic 
self-governance, and press autonomy—were irrelevant. In brief, 
something akin to rational basis review was more appropriate  
in Wheeler. 
On the other hand, the Article argued that all five interests were 
relevant in McManus. The anti-orthodoxy, self-realization, and  
discovery of factual knowledge interests tilt toward a deferential 
form of review, while the democratic self-governance and press  
autonomy interests lean toward strict scrutiny. Another First 
Amendment interest not among the five here, but one noted above 
that may be relevant in some cases, including McManus, is safe-
guarding the First Amendment interest in anonymous political 
speech.541 In McManus, the First Amendment interest in protecting 
the anonymity of advertising buyers would tilt toward strict scrutiny.  
In cases such as McManus, where multiple factors lean one way and 
multiple factors lean the other direction, it suggests that intermediate 
scrutiny is most relevant because it neither stacks the deck against a 
compelled-speech law (strict scrutiny) or gives it a virtual free pass 
(rational basis review or something similar to the Zauderer test). 
Such a nuanced approach to selecting scrutiny thus is the benefit of 
an interests-and-values methodology. 
 
541 See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (noting the Fourth Circuit’s concern 
with anonymity in Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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CONCLUSION 
All compelled-speech cases simply are not alike. Some involve 
political speech; others do not. Some compel the dissemination  
of government-scripted messages, while others mandate the disclo-
sure of facts that will necessarily vary from situation to situation, 
such as revealing the names of those buying advertisements and the 
prices they paid. Some involve only Speech Clause interests, while 
others involve a combination of Speech Clause and Press Clause 
concerns, thereby putting two First Amendment clauses into play. 
Additionally, some require speech that publicly stigmatizes 
and humiliates an individual based on past bad acts, while others 
simply deprecate buildings based on the nature of their construction 
technique and therefore harm their owners’ fiscal interests. In other 
words, there may be dignity harms in some cases, while there  
may be financial ones in others. Finally, some compelled-speech 
battles pit an individual’s ability to be free from conveying a  
message that conflicts with his deeply held religious beliefs against 
the ability of others to live in a non-hostile world that does not  
discriminate against and demean them based upon their sexual  
orientation. The differences among these scenarios, at least at first 
blush, are seemingly substantive ones, not merely superficial dis-
tinctions. They are distinctions that might make a difference when 
it comes to the standard of judicial review. 
Yet, with the lone exception of the related rulings by both U.S. 
District Judge Vince Chhabria and the Ninth Circuit Court of  
Appeals in the public-facing art case of Building Industry Associa-
tion,542 one might well be forgiven for believing they all feature 
identical facts and all raise the same heightened level of First 
Amendment concerns about invading a person or an entity’s right 
not to speak. That is because courts in all the other cases analyzed 
here—admittedly, a small sample, but one purposefully chosen to 
involve disputes featuring a diverse range of facts and compelled-
speech mandates—deployed strict scrutiny. 
 
542 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 
2018), aff’d, 775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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This does not mean that strict scrutiny was necessarily the wrong 
standard in all the disputes. For instance, the Article contends that 
Judge Treadwell was correct in Long in selecting strict scrutiny, but 
largely because he examined—in advance of choosing that test—the 
weaknesses of the sheriff’s interest in compelling speech and a quar-
tet of reasons (ones beyond the simple content-based nature of the 
mandate) why strict scrutiny was justified.543 On the other hand, 
strict scrutiny may not have been the optimal test in other cases. In 
particular, the Article makes the case for applying a more deferential 
test in McManus—namely intermediate scrutiny.544 It also argues 
that applying strict scrutiny in Wheeler can be viewed as unneces-
sary and wrongheaded—a weaponization and Lochnerization of the 
First Amendment to attack a public-safety disclosure ordinance that 
involved fact-based signs measuring less than one square foot.545 
Furthermore, the Article demonstrates that embracing a methodol-
ogy for selecting strict scrutiny that pivots on whether a law is con-
tent-based or content-neutral is problematic due to its malleability 
in the public accommodations law cases of Telescope Media Group 
and Brush & Nib Studios, where the majorities and dissents frac-
tured over whether, in fact, the laws were content-based or content-
neutral as applied to the plaintiffs’ speech-based products.546  
Additionally, the Article illustrated how evaluating the First 
Amendment interest in safeguarding self-realization through the  
receipt of speech indicates that strict scrutiny was unwarranted—
intermediate scrutiny, instead, was more appropriate—in Telescope 
Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios, with the self-realization  
interest pushing back forcefully against the anti-orthodoxy interest 
of the plaintiffs in those cases.547 
Ultimately, this Article reveals that strict scrutiny today is the 
default standard of review in compelled-speech cases not involving 
 
543 See supra Section I.D (addressing Long). 
544 See supra text accompanying notes (making the argument for a lesser standard of 
scrutiny in McManus). 
545 See supra text accompanying notes 93–107 (arguing that Magistrate Judge Acosta’s 
decision in Wheeler to select scrutiny was incorrect, as it weaponized the First Amendment 
against a fact-based, health-and-safety regulation). 
546 See supra Section I.E (addressing Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios). 
547 See supra Section II.B. 
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either the disclosure of non-controversial facts in commercial 
speech settings (Zauderer cases) or informed-consent provisions  
incidental to professional medical procedures (Casey cases).  
Perhaps the most direct articulation of the guiding rule was by the 
Eighth Circuit in Telescope Media Group: “Laws that compel 
speech . . . are subject to strict scrutiny.”548 The Supreme Court of 
Arizona majority in Brush & Nib Studios favorably quoted that 
rule.549 The federal district court in McManus spelled out a similar 
clear-cut rule, although later pointing out that it was subject to  
exceptions: “laws compelling speech are treated as content-based 
and are subject to strict scrutiny.”550 Likewise, the federal district 
court in Wheeler adopted this rule, albeit carving out a caveat  
for Zauderer-like cases involving commercial speech: “a regulation  
that compels a disclosure is a content-based regulation of speech,  
subject to heightened scrutiny, unless an exception applies.”551  
The court in Wheeler also made it evident that the “heightened  
scrutiny” standard to which it referred was, indeed, strict scrutiny.552 
And in her dissent in Telescope Media Group, Judge Kelly articu-
lated a variation of same rule, but qualifying it with the word “ordi-
narily” to suggest it is rebuttable: “when the government compels 
an individual to engage in speech the individual otherwise would 
find objectionable, this ordinarily constitutes a content-based regu-
lation triggering strict scrutiny.”553All in all then, strict scrutiny is 
the presumptive test today in compelled-speech cases.554 
The situation surely will remain this way if courts ritualistically 
follow a traditional, reductionist approach to deciding scrutiny  
under which content-based laws, as compared to content-neutral 
 
548 Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 754 (8th Cir. 2019). 
549 Brush & Nib Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890, 913 (Ariz. 2019). 
550 Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 287 (D. Md. 2019). 
551 Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1296 (D. Or. 2019). 
552 See id. at 1305 (“As noted above, the placard provision in the Ordinance is a content-
based regulation of non-commercial speech, and therefore, is invalid unless Defendants 
can survive strict scrutiny.”). 
553 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 772 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting  
in part). 
554 This comports with Professor Genevieve Lakier’s observation that in compelled-
speech cases, the Court tends these days to make “a sort of a metaphysical claim, that any 
time the government compels speech, we have to apply strict scrutiny.” Genevieve Lakier, 
Commentary: Post-Panel Commentary, 13 FIU L. REV. 853, 860 (2019). 
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ones, are presumptively subject to strict scrutiny.555The Supreme 
Court’s 2018 compelled-speech rulings in Janus and Becerra, when 
coupled with the Court’s 2015 decision in Reed, buttress the princi-
ple that heightened review should apply in compelled-speech  
cases that do not fall within the narrow parameters of the Zauderer 
or Casey exceptions recognized in Becerra.556 
Returning to the questions posed in the Introduction, the  
primary methodology for selecting scrutiny was, then, both to cite 
the principle that content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny 
and to conclude that the compelled-speech mandates in question 
were content-based and thus subject to that test.557 The problems 
with this methodology are that: 
(1) strict scrutiny may not be appropriate—may be too  
stringent of a test—given the competing First Amendment interests 
at stake in any given case and, more specifically, in the cases  
examined here of Wheeler, McManus, Media Telescope Group, and 
Brush & Nib Studios, and 
(2) it can be manipulated to serve political or cultural  
ideologies in some settings where there is room for disagreement as 
to whether a law is content-based or content-neutral, such as the 
cases of Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios  
analyzed in this Article. 
The Article also illustrated that the Court’s decision in Becerra 
played a key role in buttressing the selection of strict scrutiny in 
 
555 See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and 
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 596 (2003) (“The 
distinction between content-based and content neutral government actions is fundamental 
to free speech doctrine. A content-based government speech restriction receives the most 
rigorous scrutiny, which is almost always fatal. By contrast, a content neutral speech 
restriction receives much more lenient intermediate review.”). 
556 See supra text accompanying notes 21–41 and 80–81 (addressing Janus, Becerra  
and Reed). 
557 See Brush & Nib Studios, LC v. City of Phx., 448 P.3d 890, 913–14 (Ariz. 2019); 
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 752–54 (8th Cir. 2019); League of Women 
Voters v. Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706, 729–30 (M.D. Tenn. 2019); Wash. Post v. 
McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 286–87 (D. Md. 2019); Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. 
Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1296 (D. Or. 2019). 
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Wheeler,558 McManus,559 and Hargett.560 Furthermore, Janus was 
cited by the courts in selecting that test in McManus,561 Long,562  
and Telescope Media Group.563 The Ninth Circuit in Building  
Industry Association, however, distinguished Janus from the case 
before it, limiting Janus’s reach to disputes involving the subsi- 
dization of private speech.564 
Because compelled-speech mandates invariably require  
messages that relate to a particular topic or specific subject  
matter—be it unreinforced masonry structures (Wheeler), political 
advertisements (McManus), voter-registration drives (Hargett),  
or a person’s status as a sex offender (Long)—they are almost  
automatically subject to strict scrutiny under the methodology 
adopted by most courts here. As Justice Breyer explained in Becerra 
in pushing back against this formulaic tack for scrutiny in  
compelled-speech cases, “[v]irtually every disclosure law could  
be considered ‘content based,’ for virtually every disclosure law re-
quires individuals ‘to speak a particular message.’”565 Magistrate 
Judge Acosta certainly embraced this formulaic notion, citing 
Becerra for the principle that “a regulation that compels a disclosure 
is a content-based regulation of speech.”566 
Furthermore, when courts conclude that anti-discrimination 
laws affecting public accommodations compel a person to create  
expressive products that convey a specific message (Telescope  
Media Group and Brush & Nib Studios), those laws too (in the  
majorities’ view) must face strict scrutiny, at least as applied to the 
 
558 Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1296. Acosta referred to Becerra as NIFLA in short-
citation references. See also supra text accompanying notes 88–90. 
559 McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 297. See also supra text accompanying notes 194–95. 
560 Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 729–30. 
561 McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 297. See also supra text accompanying notes 185–89. 
562 Supra notes 272–73 and accompanying text. 
563 Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 752–54 (8th Cir. 2019). See also supra 
text accompanying notes 344–45. 
564 See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 775 F. App’x.. 348, 350  
(9th Cir. 2019). 
565 Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380 (2018) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234–35 (2015)). 
566 Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1296 (D. Or. 2019) 
(citing Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371; Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 
755–56 (9th Cir. 2019)). 
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creation of those artifacts by individuals who raise religious-based 
objections and when courts view the speech products as expressing 
the views of those who create them, not customers. How a court 
should determine who is speaking through such products—by  
focusing on the extent of editorial control and judgment left to the 
vendor or by asking how a reasonable person would perceive who 
is speaking based on the finished product—remains highly  
problematic in this approach, as the fracture over which method  
applies between the majority and dissent in Telescope Media Group 
indicates.567 Additionally, Judge Bales’s dissent in Brush & Nib  
Studios argued that the perception of the observer of the speech is  
critical, whereas the majority reasoned that it made no difference.568 
Surviving strict scrutiny is “the legal equivalent of sinking a  
basket from half-court”569—an exceedingly difficult task, as noted 
earlier.570 Its deployment creates a steep, uphill battle for democrat-
ically elected lawmakers who believe they must inform the public 
about certain information. To wit, Portland’s placard ordinance was 
enjoined in Wheeler.571 Maryland’s law compelling newspapers to 
publish the identity of ad buyers and the prices they paid was  
enjoined in McManus.572 Tennessee’s voting-registration disclaimer 
requirement was enjoined in Hargett.573 A Georgia sheriff’s warn-
ing sign mandate about sex offenders was enjoined in Long.574  
And the majorities in both Telescope Media Group and Brush &  
Nib Studios found that public accommodations laws protecting  
people from discrimination based on their sexual orientation failed  
strict scrutiny.575 
 
567 Supra notes 395388–96 and accompanying text. 
568 448 P.3d 890, 929–33 (Ariz. 2019). See also supra notes 420388–30 and  
accompanying text. 
569 Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman, The Future of Physicians’ First 
Amendment Freedom: Professional Speech in an Era of Radically Expanded Prenatal 
Genetic Testing, 76 WASH & LEE L. REV. 577, 608 (2019). 
570 Supra notes 51388–55 and accompanying text. 
571 Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1312 (D. Or. 2019). 
572 Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 278 (D. Md. 2019). 
573 League of Women Voters v. Hargett, 400 F. Supp. 3d 706, 710 (M.D. Tenn. 2019). 
574 Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2019). 
575 Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 748 n.4 (8th Cir. 2019). 
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Given its power, strict scrutiny thus should not be trotted  
out lightly or formulaically by one branch of government—the  
judiciary—to target the work of another—the legislature—simply  
because a compelled-speech mandate, such as one notifying citi-
zens about a building’s structure in the interest of protecting them  
from possible harm, is content-based. One possible alternative is  
for judges to: 
(1) consider the First Amendment interests and values impli-
cated by any given compelled-speech mandate; and 
(2) benchmark the mandate against the treatment of those same 
First Amendment interests and values in key Supreme Court  
rulings involving compelled speech such as Barnette, Wooley, 
Tornillo, Hurley, Becerra, and Janus where the Court declared  
invalid compelled-speech obligations. 
Part II identified five First Amendment interests and values that 
courts might consider in such a methodology. It is an approach  
under which the determination that a regulation is content-based 
does not, standing alone, create a presumption that strict scrutiny 
applies and that, concomitantly, the regulation is presumptively  
invalid. A more nuanced and flexible tack, in other words, should 
be adopted that selects a scrutiny standard based on a thorough and 
holistic evaluation of the First Amendment interests at stake and on 
an examination of how those same interests were treated by the  
Supreme Court in prior compelled-speech cases. 
Adopting a First Amendment interests approach, of course, has 
drawbacks. First, it lacks the consistency and predictability of the 
Court’s predominant scrutiny methodology under which content-
based laws are subject to strict scrutiny unless an exception applies. 
Judges may view First Amendment interests and values differently, 
thus adding a degree of subjectivity to the selection-of-scrutiny pro-
cess. Second, it entails a more time-consuming task for judges. They 
must ferret out the competing interests at stake, as well as the nature 
and depth of the incursions into the province of the First Amend-
ment, before picking a scrutiny standard. The constitutional territory 
may, depending on the case, involve evaluating not simply interests 
in free speech, but also—as in Tornillo and McManus—interests in 
a free press that might be gored by a compelled-speech obligation. 
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This adds an additional level of analysis. In brief, while the principle 
that a content-based law is subject to strict scrutiny provides a short-
cut tool for selecting the test that applies, thereby allowing judges to 
devote greater time and energy to the subsequent application of the 
test, an interests-and-objectives methodology requires that judges 
expend significant effort on both selecting and applying scrutiny.  
In other words, time must be spent both upfront on choosing the 
relevant scrutiny test and then down the road on applying it. 
This more nuanced approach to choosing scrutiny additionally 
requires, as noted above, that judges benchmark the compelled-
speech cases before them against the facts, interests, and values at 
stake in major U.S. Supreme Court compelled-speech decisions.576 
For instance, Justice Kagan in Janus contrasted the facts there  
to those in Barnette and found them dissimilar, thus bolstering  
her argument that the Janus majority was wrong in choosing  
heightened scrutiny to review Illinois’s agency-fee statute.577 In the 
compelled-art case of Building Industry Association addressed  
earlier in this Article, Judge Chhabria engaged in substantial bench-
marking against Supreme Court precedent. In particular, he cited  
Wooley, Barnette, and Tornillo as cases where the Court “closely 
scrutinized”578 compelled-speech measures and “applied heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny.”579 The case before him, he concluded, 
did “not raise any of the red flags discussed” in those decisions.580 
Additionally, Chhabria found that the case before him did not, in 
quoting Justice Breyer, “otherwise ‘significantly affect the interests 
that the First Amendment protects.’”581 In brief, by distinguishing 
 
576 In addition to the U.S. Supreme Court compelled-speech decisions addressed earlier 
in this article—namely, Becerra, Janus, Wooley, Barnette, Tornillo, Hurley and 
Rumsfeld—other important high court rulings affecting the right not to speak (including 
expressive association cases) that should be used as points of comparison include Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) and Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind,  
487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
577 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2494 (2018) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
578 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1060  
(N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 775 F. App’x. 348 (9th Cir. 2019). 
579 Id. 
580 Id. 
581 Id. (quoting Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) 
(Breyer, J., concurring)). 
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key Supreme Court rulings in compelled-speech cases from the  
dispute he was tasked with resolving, Chhabria was able to conclude 
that the ordinance was not subject to strict scrutiny and, instead, was 
only subject to a form of rational basis review.582 
In affirming that decision, the Ninth Circuit also benchmarked 
the law at issue in Building Industry Association with Supreme 
Court rulings. Specifically, the appellate court observed that Oak-
land’s ordinance was distinguished from that in Wooley because it 
did “not endorse any specific viewpoint.”583 Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit contrasted compelled-art measure before it with Janus,  
noting that Oakland’s measure did not “compel the subsidy of  
private speech.”584 This analysis facilitated the appellate court’s 
conclusion that heightened scrutiny was not warranted.585 
A problem with this approach, however, is that judges can  
interpret the same landmark cases in markedly different ways.  
That is dramatically illustrated by Telescope Media Group, in  
which the majority cited Tornillo and Hurley to support the  
application of strict scrutiny,586 while the dissent distinguished both 
Tornillo and Hurley from the case before it.587 Adopting an inter-
ests-and-values approach that involves benchmarking with key  
Supreme Court cases thus requires, in some instances, tolerating 
more subjectivity in selecting scrutiny than usually occurs with the  
content-based-versus-content-neutral formula. 
The bottom line for now, however, is that Reed, Becerra, and 
Janus potently combine to create a presumptively strict scrutiny 
world for compelled-speech mandates, regardless of the underlying 
First Amendment interests and values at stake. Justice Kagan cer-
tainly was correct when she observed in Janus that most compelled-
 
582 See id. (“Therefore, the ordinance is subject to review under the First Amendment 
only to ensure that it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
583  Bldg. Indus. Ass’n–Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 775 F. App’x. 348, 350  
(9th Cir. 2019). 
584 Id. 
585 See id. (“However, that the First Amendment is implicated does not alone necessitate 
analysis under exacting scrutiny. We find the compelled speech precedents put forth by 
BIA inapposite to the regulatory framework at hand.”). 
586 Supra notes 352–64 and accompanying text. 
587 Supra notes 376–86 and accompanying text. 
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speech cases do not feature facts nearly as disturbing as those in 
Barnette about compelling a child to salute the government’s flag 
and utter an oath pledging allegiance to it.588 Yet, setting aside the 
outlier that is Building Industry Association, one would never know 
it based on the pervasive selection of the Court’s most stringent 
test—strict scrutiny—to measure the validity of compelled-speech 
measures involving non-commercial expression in 2019. 
 
588 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2494 (2018)  
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
